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Abstract: Native American activism after the occupation of Wounded Knee in 1973 has 
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to work around the United States government and bring attention to issues concerning 
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“That Wounded Knee was the last stand for the American Indian Movement is the 
unspoken fear at the…national convention….”1 - The New York Times, July 29, 1973 
In April of 1973 residents of Pawnee, Oklahoma, a small town an hour west of 
Tulsa, were concerned about the impending American Indian Movement (AIM) annual 
convention to be held at the start of May. AIM, which caused tensions in town the 
previous year by occupying a BIA building, was currently in the latter stages of a 
seventy-one-day siege at Wounded Knee, South Dakota, and residents were concerned 
similar violence could erupt in Oklahoma.2 Pawnee’s mayor Glenn Wood argued the 
“AIM threat” hurt the town and the Pawnee Nation. While Wood hoped the convention 
would be peaceful should it occur, he also did not deny “vigilantes could spring up” and 
																																																								
1 “Indian Movement is Short of Funds,” New York Times, July 29, 1973. 
2 On September 12, 1972, around fifty AIM members occupied the Oklahoma City office 
of Overton James, the governor of the Chickasaw Nation and state Indian education director due 
to concerns about management of federal monies. The BIA agreed to send representatives to a 
negotiation in Pawnee the following day and AIM members occupied the BIA building in Pawnee 
until a compromise was worked out. The Pawnee tribe was divided over support for the incident 
but the local paper said the compromise was the result of "A few bureaucrats in the Indian office 
at Washington who have the backbone of a jelly fish and the guts of an angle worm gave in to 
trouble makers. They should be fired." Quoted in “American Indian Movement” Encyclopedia of 
Oklahoma. Oklahoma Historical Society. Accessed from 





potentially would be unable to control the violence should it break out.3 The convention 
was postponed when the occupation of Wounded Knee continued into May and 
ultimately moved to the end of July in White Oak, roughly two hours to the east. 
Although the anti-communist John Birch Society tried to warn about the “revolutionary 
nature” and the potential threat of the convention, the only local worries related to “the 
hippie element [that] likes to follow these things.”4 
Originally billed as the largest gathering of Indians in a century, attendance at the 
July convention fell fall short of projections, with the actual number of people being 
closer to five hundred, well off the five to six thousand AIM had originally hoped for. 
The convention, however, was an important milestone for the organization. AIM’s major 
leaders—including Dennis Banks, Clyde Bellecourt, and Russell Means—agreed that 
moving away from direct action protests and towards more traditional channels was 
necessary for AIM to remain relevant. While Banks argued he did not think in terms of 
moderation versus radicalism, he noted that the organization could not “deal with this 
government any longer with violent demonstrations. We’ve got to make sure Indian 
people aren’t hurt. Realistically we have to hold back and follow a pattern of massive 
legislative effort.”5 There was no sign that AIM planned to scale back at the convention; 
if anything the presence of observers from five foreign countries signaled an expansion of 
																																																								
3 “AIM Threat Hurts Pawnee, Worried Mayor Contending,” The Oklahoman, April 21, 
1973. 
4 “Birch Society Offers Advice About AIM,” The Oklahoman, July 14, 1973; “Indians 
Don’t Worry Town Near Campsite,” The Oklahoman, July 20, 1973. See Sherry Smith, Hippies, 
Indians, and the Fight for Red Power. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) for a detailed 
study of the connections between native activism and the counterculture. 
5 “Is AIM Going ‘Straight’? Yes, Say Group’s Chiefs,” The Oklahoman, August 5, 1973. 
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AIM’s outreach for the next few decades. At least in theory, the AIM that came out of the 
White Oak convention would be an organization more focused on policies than public 
image, an organizational structure that fell closer to American Indian rights organizations 
that AIM had spent the last three years declaring old and ineffective. AIM and the Native 
rights movement that would continue through the rest of the 1970s were far more 
successful than the AIM that entered Wounded Knee, even if the television cameras and 
newspaper reporters largely did not follow. 
This post-Wounded Knee AIM, however, has received far less scholarly attention. 
In their work on Native activism of the late 1960s and early 1970s, Paul Chaat Smith and 
Robert Allen Warrior write that “AIM had promised the Lakota revolution on Pine Ridge 
would be only the beginning, but the seventy-one day uprising instead marked the high 
tide of the most remarkable period of activism carried out by Indians in the twentieth 
century.”6 Chaat Smith and Warrior relegate the post-Wounded Knee period to an 
epilogue that chronicles the legal cases that arose from the Wounded Knee occupation 
and noting that while some “hardy militants” continued to picket events, the movement 
attracted little attention.7 Like a Hurricane was not meant to be a comprehensive history 
of the American Indian Movement or Native activism writ large, but in the twenty years 
since its publication it has in many respects become just that.8 In the last decade 
																																																								
6 Paul Chaat Smith and Robert Allen Warrior, Like a Hurricane: The Indian Movement 
from Alcatraz to Wounded Knee, 1996, 269. 
7 Ibid., 279. 
8 There are a number of good historical monographs that fill in the historiography of the 
American Indian Movement and supplement this study. Contemporaneous accounts can be found 
in Stan Steiner’s The New Indians (New York: Delta Books, 1968) and Robert Burnette and John 
Koster’s The Road to Wounded Knee (New York: Bantam Books, 1974). Rex Weyler’s Blood of 
the Land: The Government and Corporate War Against the American Indian Movement (1984) 
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historians have begun to expand our understanding of the period’s activism, but the 
narrative remains fragmented and in parts largely untold. This study does not promise to 
a comprehensive history of the movement, or even of the period following Wounded 
Knee.9 Instead it argues that Native rights and AIM in the post-Wounded Knee period 
stresses important issues for American Indian activists that remain relevant through the 
present day. In the decades that followed Wounded Knee, AIM was left in the 
uncomfortable position of attempting to define itself even though many outside observers 
had already attempted to do so. In the process of seeking additional funding sources, AIM 
entered into the international political arena, an area in which it managed to achieve some 
of its longest lasting impacts. Yet, at the same time, the organization found itself torn 
apart by internal and external debates about how the movement fit within the various 
Cold War political ideologies. As we will see, these conflicts, far more than Wounded 
Knee, ultimately undermined AIM’s mission by the end of the 1990s. 
																																																								
provides some background and provides discussion of AIM post-Wounded Knee, including 
discussion of international events.  The most accessible overview of tribal sovereignty issues in 
the twentieth century is generally Charles Wilkinson’s Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern 
Indian Nations (New York: WW Norton, 2005). Additionally, works such as Julie Davis’s 
Survival Schools: The American Indian Movement and Community Education in the Twin Cities 
(Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 2013) provides an example of a new generation 
of scholarship that shifts beyond the national issues and chronicles AIM’s influence on 
educational issues in Minneapolis. 
9 In particular, I largely avoid the case of Leonard Peltier, the Native American prisoner 
arrested and convicted for his alleged role in a shoot-out on the Pine Ridge Reservation in 1975 
that killed two FBI agents. While Peltier is the highest profile Indigenous prisoner in the United 
States and the subject of Peter Matthiesson’s best-selling In the Spirit of Crazy Horse: The Story 
of Leonard Peltier and the FBI’s War on the American Indian Movement first published in 1983, 
his legal case is more complex than can be chronicled here without opening up a larger discussion 
unrelated to the dissertation. Furthermore, Peltier’s case achieved considerable support in Europe 
but was a lesser issue in regards to Indigenous activism in the Western Hemisphere. In addition to 
Matthiesson’s book, Steve Hendricks’s The Unquiet Grave: The FBI and the Struggle for the 
Soul of Indian Country (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2005) provides an overview of some 
of the issues related to the case. 
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The purpose of this dissertation is to show what happened in the years following the 
occupation of Wounded Knee and attempt to understand whether or not that incident 
marked as drastic a decline in activism as some scholars  have claimed. American Indian 
activism in the second half of the twentieth century was an ever-evolving series of groups 
and organizations that had various levels of connections and interplay. While the 
American Indian Movement was the most prominent, it was only part of a larger 
movement to secure indigenous rights in the United States. Even though no protest akin 
to Wounded Knee took place in the three decades following, activism made massive 
strides towards achieving many of the goals laid out in that seminal protest. Activists 
took their case to the international political arena, secured recognition at the United 
Nations, and prompted indigenous issues on a regular basis for the next thirty years. 
Nevertheless, as with any movement in its formative years, the international turn in 
indigenous activism had its far share of issues. In particular activists could not 
fundamentally agree on their position in relation to Cold War and Western political 
ideologies that should have been separate from the indigenous issues but nevertheless 
remained central to them. 
Turning international following Wounded Knee was a natural progression of re-
embracing an international identity for American Indians that was not only rooted in the 
nation-to-nation status tribal nations hold with the United States government, but also the 
long history of Native American activists seeking to fully implement their sovereign 
status in both the United States and the world. It certainly was not an overreach or a 
misguided course, but rather a parallel course to internal activism in the United States. 
Whether the movement could have charted another course and not divided itself in the 
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1980s cannot be entirely answered, but this dissertation hopes to at least provide a 
narrative of how that division happened. 
In writing a dissertation that involves numerous big personalities and a narrative arc 
that ends in a tribunal and vicious in-fighting, the meaningful question is: what is the real 
historical significance of the period following Wounded Knee? Beyond charting a small 
part of the history of the second half of the twentieth century, this dissertation works in 
dialogue with a growing body of scholarship on Indigenous activism in the second half of 
the twentieth century that seeks to expand the narrative beyond the early 1970s Red 
Power Era. Furthermore, even though scholars have begun to look at the international 
connections activists in the United States drew with international organizations, few have 
focused on the Western Hemisphere and Latin America in particular. The most obvious 
source for transnational Indigenous activism has also been the least studied. Finally, 
many of the events covered have involved non-indigenous activists and their 
contributions to the movements. Scholars such as Sherry Smith and György Tóth have 
argued for the benefits of these non-Indigenous allies in their respective works, but while 
non-native allies are certainly needed, this dissertation also seeks to encourage scholars 
of the period to take a more critical look at those involved.10 
 
Red Power Before AIM 
The utilization of pan-Indian alliances among multiple tribes to advocate for 
Indigenous issues is a regular event in Native American history. The Pueblo Revolt 
																																																								
10 See Sherry L. Smith, Hippies, Indians, and the Fight for Red Power (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012) and György Ference Tóth, From Wounded Knee to Checkpoint 
Charlie: The Alliance for Sovereignty Between American Indians and Central Europeans in the 
Late Cold War (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2016) as discussed previously. 
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during the Spanish colonization of the southwest, the Iroquois confederacy, or the rise of 
Tecumseh’s confederacy in the early nineteenth-century Ohio Valley, all signal a long 
history of Native inter-tribal relations. As a result, the various activist movements that 
sprang up throughout the twentieth century are not necessarily novel inventions. As 
historian Bradley Shreve categorizes it, while the more militant movements of the 1960s 
and 1970s created new ideas, at their root they were “an evolution in intertribalism” that 
embraced the past while drawing inspiration from contemporary movements.11 
Histories of twentieth century activism generally begin with the Society of 
American Indians (SAI), which formed on Columbus Day in Columbus, Ohio, in 1911.12 
The group brought together boarding school-educated Native Americans and non-Natives 
supportive of indigenous issues. A product of the Progressive Era, the organization’s 
founders embraced “education, hard work, and…adapting their attitudes, values, and 
habits of life to those of the larger American society.”13 While SAI’s assimilationist push 
is limited by today’s standards, the SAI offers important antecedents to later activism. 
For one, as Kyle Mays notes, SAI leaders such as Charles Eastman sought to assert 
																																																								
11 Bradley Glenn Shreve, Red Power Rising: The National Indian Youth Council and the 
Origins of Native Activism (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), 16. 
12 Hazel W. Hertzberg, The Search for an American Indian Identity; Modern Pan-Indian 
Movements (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971) remains the most comprehensive 
account of the SAI. Other works of significance include Philip Deloria’s “Four Thousand 
Invitations: Situating the Society of American Indians” American Indian Quarterly 37 (Summer 
2013), Peter Iverson’s Carlos Montezuma and the Changing World of American Indians 
(University of New Mexico Press, 1982), Lucy Maddox’s Citizen Indians: Native American 
Intellectuals, Race, and Reform (Cornell University Press, 2005), and Tadeusz Lewandowski’s 
recent biography of Gertrude Bonin, Red Bird, Red Power: The Life and Legacy of Zitkala-Sa 
(University of Oklahoma Press, 2016) provides a much needed look at one of the most significant 
leaders of the period. 
13 Ibid., 31. 
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Indigenous identity at the transnational level through participation in the Universal Races 
Congress in London in 1911. The transnational aspect and parallels Eastman and W.E.B. 
DuBois drew between Indigenous and African American issues indicate that activists 
were keenly aware of the global political contexts into which Native issues had to 
interject themselves.14 Additionally, as K. Tsianina Lomawaima argues in her article, 
“The Mutuality of Citizenship and Sovereignty: The Society of American Indians and the 
Battle to Inherit America,” the SAI worked against the “false binaries” of the time to 
fight for Native issues through a process of layering. Layering acknowledged that “no 
one-size-fits-all answers exist in Indian country, but an effective strategy layers a 
political pragmatism attentive to local wishes and goals with determined, long-term work 
on national issues.”15 
As with activist movements in the second half of the twentieth century, the SAI 
was hindered by relations with non-Natives and the perception they held of the 
organization. The association quickly divided over the path it would take in advocating 
for indigenous issues. Thomas Sloan and Carlos Montezuma argued for a much more 
aggressive policy involving legal action against the Bureau of Indian Affairs and 
intensive lobbying in Washington. In contrast, Arthur Parker, the nephew of Ely Parker—
the first Native American head of the BIA under Ulysses Grant—sought to plot a more 
cautious course in order to increase support from non-Native reformers. Historian Fred 
																																																								
14 Kyle T. Mays, “Transnational Progressivism: African Americans, Native Americans, 
and the Universal Races Congress of 1911,” Studies in American Indian Literatures 25 (Summer 
2013). 
15 K. Tsianina Lomawaima, “The Mutuality of Citizenship and Sovereignty: The Society 




Hoxie, in his overview of the era, writes that Parker’s main goal was to build an 
organization rooted in apolitical and non-partisan issues so that it could “demonstrate our 
sanity…and proceed cautiously” in the hopes of receiving “help from quarters that we 
little suspect.”16 The Society of American Indians largely dissolved by the mid-1920s, 
wrecked by controversies relating to the use of peyote in the Native American Church. 
While limited in scope and problematic by later standards, the SAI marked a critical 
turning point in Native activism, and its legacies carried through for decades after it 
ended. 
While much of the historiography of Indian policy during the 1930s rightfully 
focuses on BIA head John Collier and the “Indian New Deal” that accompanied Franklin 
Roosevelt’s larger New Deal, activism went well beyond these policies. Collier, who 
grew to support Native issues after visiting Taos Pueblo in New Mexico, sought to 
reform a system suffering from serious problems. The Merriam Report in 1928 
chronicled an excess of issues that derived from the assimilationist polices of the 
previous thirty years. With the rise of individual allotments and the end of communal 
landholding, the Merriam Report documented widespread poverty on reservations. 
Collier’s program attempted to return control, at least in theory, to reservations and 
Native Americans themselves, along with ending the policy of individual allotments. 
Through the Indian Reorganization Act, Collier and the Bureau of Indian Affairs sought 
to give tribes control of their politics through the formation of new tribal or business 
councils. While Collier’s original goals were stronger than the weakened IRA that passed 
																																																								
16 Frederick E Hoxie, This Indian Country: American Indian Activists and the Place They 
Made, 2013, 259. 
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Congress in 1934, both versions utilized western political traditions and undermined the 
traditional tribal governmental structures and chiefs. The new policies proved 
controversial, with activists such as Seneca Alice Lee Jemison telling Collier, “We are 
tired of experiments. Try this out on someone else.”17 Collier toured Indian Country 
advocating for adoption of the new constitutions, but the reforms were rejected by tribes 
ranging from the Senecas to the Navajos. The Lakotas on Pine Ridge, primarily driven by 
the more assimilated members, voted to adopt the new tribal council, a decision that 
would be the centerpiece of criticism forty years later during the occupation of Wounded 
Knee, which is covered in chapter one. 
At the same time that Collier’s reforms were limited and problematic, the shifting 
winds in Washington allowed for greater involvement of Native Americans in their own 
affairs. Leaders such as D’Arcy McNickle (Salish) and Robert Yellowtail (Crow) found 
themselves either working for the federal government or intimately involved in tribal 
politics in ways that would have been impossible decades before. These new leaders 
would go on to lead the next generation of activists in the post-World War II era that 
began with the creation of the National Congress of American Indians in Denver in 1944. 
The outbreak of World War II and the large-scale support of the war effort by the 
American Indian community created “a new spirit of common purpose.” Between 
experiences overseas and migrations to urban centers to work in factories, Native 
Americans exited the war awakened to the issues in Indian Country and directed their 
anger at “the institutions, the laws and regulations which impoverished Indian life.” As 
																																																								
17 Ibid., 299. 
	
11	 
Fred Hoxie notes, the formation of the NCAI came at the same time that John Collier 
resigned from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, creating a vacuum that was ultimately filled 
not by another non-Native head, but by a wealth of Indian voices from across the 
country.18 
The NCAI also arrived at an important time to counter the reactionary 
conservative shift that developed in the aftermath of World War II. Fearful of a return to 
the economic crisis of the Great Depression, Republicans, who secured control of 
Congress in 1946, sought to reduce the federal budget. Coupled with the rise of the Cold 
War mentality, communal landholdings on reservations and government funding for 
tribes came under attack by Republicans such as Utah Senator Arthur Watkins. 
Proclaiming that he would follow in the path of Abraham Lincoln, Watkins proposed the 
policy of termination that would eliminate the government to government relationship 
tribes had with the federal government, instead placing tribal nations under the 
jurisdiction of the state in which they resided. Watkins argued that the policy would 
enable Native Americans to be “free.” While a relatively small number of tribes were 
ultimately subjected to the policy, the results for those tribes were devastating. The 
Menominees in Wisconsin lost successful businesses in the process, and the Klamath and 
other tribes experienced similar issues.19 The termination policies were widely decried in 
																																																								
18 Ibid., 317. 
19 For more on the Menominees businesses prior to termination see Brian C Hosmer, 
American Indians in the Marketplace: Persistence and Innovations Among the Menominees and 
Metlakatlans (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2009). Donald Lee Fixico, Termination and 
Relocation: Federal Indian Policy, 1945-1960 (Albuquerque, N.M.: University of New Mexico 




Indian Country for seeking to undo treaty obligations, a sign of the shifting goals of 
activists from the era of the Society of American Indians. 
At the same time, the United States government began a process that sought to 
voluntarily re-locate Native Americans to large urban centers. While Native Americans 
had begun migrating to cities in large numbers during World War II to take advantage of 
job opportunities in war-related manufacturing, the Relocation Program provided 
government funds and job training and placement opportunities and contributed to a 
further rise in urban Indian populations. Many of the major leaders of the Red Power era 
took part in the relocation process while for many also creating a divide between more 
conservative reservation politics and the new urban organizations that would ultimately 
develop. The relocation program has received considerable attention as an under-funded 
failure that sought to strip Indians of their connections to the reservations, the project was 
an integral part of the formation of twentieth century Indian identity and the divide 
between reservation and city was never as stark as portrayed.20 
By the early 1960s, the NCAI had been around for a decade and a half and had 
effectively fought back against the termination policies of the 1950s. Yet, the 
																																																								
20 In his autobiography Russell Means cites his experiences with the program in 
Cleveland, including substandard housing in a poor neighbor and a lack of promised 
opportunities, as a galvanizing force in his decision to become active in Native politics. Russell 
Means with Marvin J. Wolf, Where White Men Fear to Tread (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1995, 141-149. See Douglas K. Miller “Willing Workers: Urban Relocation and American Indian 
Initiative, 1940s-1960s” Ethnohistory 60 (Winter 2013), 51-76 for a study that moves beyond the 
old narrative and shows how Native Americans asserted agency and utilized program to their 
advantage. There are a number of works on Urban Indians, some of the most significant include 
Nicolas G. Rosenthal, Reimagining Indian Country: Native American Migration & Identity in 
Twentieth-Century Los Angeles (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), Rosalyn 
R. LaPier & David R.M. Beck, City Indian: Native American Activism in Chicago, 1893-1934 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015) and James B LaGrand, Indian Metropolis: Native 
Americans in Chicago, 1945-75 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004). 
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organization was caught in an internal debate about how to advance its policies and 
advocate for Native American issues with tribal leaders in the late fifties, finding 
themselves debating a specific role for tribes in American life. As Hoxie writes, the major 
questions included, “Were [tribes] primarily local associations of needy people whose 
goal was to lobby Congress on behalf of their members?…Were tribes primarily in the 
business of generating federal dollars and improving living conditions? Or alternatively, 
should modern tribes be viewed as embryonic states…?”21 While the NCAI vacillated 
between defining tribal positions within the federal government and developing a 
“domestic 4 point plan,” a younger generation of activists spurred by the optimism of the 
early 1960s and the Kennedy presidency sought to redefine Native activism. 
 
Red Power 
The first American Indian to use the term “Red Power” to signify American 
Indian activism was a Ponca fancy dancer named Clyde Warrior. A traditionalist at heart, 
Warrior also fully embraced a new wave of activism in the early 1960s. When he ran for 
the presidency of the Southwest Regional Indian Youth Council in 1961, Warrior 
delivered a short yet fiery speech to the assembled college-age delegation. After the other 
candidate’s thirty-minute speech, Warrior simply pointed to his arms and said, “I am a 
full-blood Ponca Indian. This is all I have to offer. The sewage of Europe does not run 
through these veins.” As Warrior biographer Paul McKenzie-Jones notes, the speech not 
only won Warrior the presidency, but it “was the first time in generations that such direct, 
																																																								
21 Hoxie, This Indian Country, 339. 
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condemnatory, and anticolonial language had been uttered publicly by an American 
Indian toward the hegemonic American settler culture.”22  
Following the victory, Warrior and the SRIYC would become involved in 
anthropologist Sol Tax’s Workshops for American Indian Affairs, ultimately moving 
beyond a regional focus and changing the organization’s name to the National Indian 
Youth Council (NIYC). Comprised of younger activists than the NCAI, the Youth 
Council generally got along favorably with the older organization. With the election of 
Vine Deloria, Jr. as executive director, the NCAI also began to embrace the new youth 
movement in Indigenous activism. Tensions rose however, when Warrior and other 
NIYC members including Mel Thom and Warrior’s wife, Della, crashed an NCAI parade 
in 1966. Driving a rented convertible, the group drove the parade route with hand-made 
signs that read “Red Power - National Indian Youth Council” and “Custer Died for Your 
Sins” on either side.23 The incident not only marked a break between the younger 
activists and the most conservative NCAI leadership, but it was also the first public use of 
the term “Red Power.” Building on the recent invocation of “Black Power” by Stokley 
Carmichael, NIYC promised a new avenue of Indigenous activism that was much more 
public than the NCAI’s usual process of legislative activism and negotiations. 
At the same time that the NIYC’s more forceful tactics upset older activists, they 
signaled a shift in Indian Country. Just two years later Vine Deloria, Jr., now resigned 
from his position as the executive director of the NCAI, published his seminal work, 
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Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto. The book quickly became a best-seller, 
among both Native Americans and non-Natives. Written with both a sense of humor and 
a stinging critique of Indian policies, the book served as the basis for the next era of 
activism. In his most critical chapter, Deloria Jr. assessed the relation between African-
American civil rights struggles and Indigenous movements, arriving at an ambivalent 
conclusion that Indian nationalism was being overlooked in attempts to merge the two 
minority struggles into one amorphous campaign. While noting Native and African 
Americans both had political conflicts with the “white man,” they were fundamentally 
different. Whereas African American leaders such as Martin Luther King, Jr. sought to 
integrate into society, Native Americans in many respects sought to remove themselves.24 
While the title become the bumper sticker slogan of the rising Red Power movement, the 
book provided guidance for activists as they approached the end of the turbulent 1960s. 
At the same time that Natives began to utilize a more vocal embrace of tribal 
identity, the counterculture of the 1960s saw “playing Indian” as a way of spurring 
conservative policies and finding a more “authentic” identity away from the conformity 
of the 1950s. 25 During the decade the two interacted as large parts of Indian Country 
witnessed protests asserting indigenous treaty rights that drew support from the 
counterculture. In Washington State, tribal leaders in the mid-1960s sought to exert their 
treaty-guaranteed rights to fish without state inference. When the State cracked down on 
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“illegal” fishing by tribal members, local and national leaders rallied and staged “fish-
ins”. The movement attracted both indigenous peoples and non-Natives, with celebrities 
such as Marlon Brando and Dick Gregory taking part. While Brando and Gregory’s status 
brought attention, many leaders were also disheartened that television and newspaper 
reporters only showed up when the celebrities were around. Furthermore, the NIYC 
helped organize Brando’s symbolic “fish-in” appearance and found itself derided by 
locals as “college kids in sports jackets who showed up merely to make themselves look 
good.”26 The animosity between locals fearful their concerns were being overshadowed 
would be a central issue in the occupation of Wounded Knee nearly a decade later. 
The late 1960s marked a critical turning point for Native activism. In 1968, 
Dennis Banks, Clyde Bellecourt, and Eddie Benton-Banai, among others, formed the 
American Indian Movement in Minneapolis. The founders met while serving time in 
Minnesota’s Stillwater Prison and used their time in prison to read works by Black Power 
activists and form programs to support Native cultural and religious ceremonies.27 Upon 
release from prison and moving to Minneapolis, the leaders sought to return to normal 
lives but found themselves increasingly moving away from their day jobs and towards 
activism. The city’s Native community along Franklin Avenue was chronically over-
policed and over-represented in the state’s prisons. Utilizing the tactics of the Black 
Panthers, AIM monitored police radios in order to get ahead of police raids on bars 
frequented by Natives. If the group arrived prior to the police, they would clear the bar; 
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whereas, if they arrived afterwards, they would guard against police brutality and provide 
rudimentary legal advice to the arrestees. The activities ultimately proved successful, 
cutting the number of Native Americans arrested in the city and bringing attention to 
AIM’s activities from Natives outside of the Twin Cities’ vibrant indigenous 
community.28 
At the same time that AIM was organizing to counter police brutality in 
Minneapolis, another group of Native Americans in San Francisco made the first major 
occupation of the Red Power era. Coming in November 1969, the Indians of All Tribes 
(IAT), a loose collection of younger, college-educated activists headed by Mohawk 
Richard Oakes, took over the shuttered Alcatraz Prison. After closure in 1963, local 
leaders negotiated with the federal government to decide what to do with the old federal 
prison and solicited proposals, one of which was an Indigenous request that the island be 
turned into a Native cultural center. After the San Francisco Indian Center burned to the 
ground, activists travelled out to the island and claimed it as Indian Territory, arguing the 
island was excess government property and should be returned to Native Americans 
under the provisions of the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868. While the legal rationale was on 
shaky ground, the utilization of the treaty signified the importance of treaty rights for 
Indigenous protests. The protest quickly won support not only from San Francisco’s 
liberal community, but also from across the United States. 
 In a provocative statement that highlighted the mistreatment of American 
Indians, IAT argued the federal government should have no problem turning over the 
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land because “Alcatraz Island is more than suitable for an Indian reservation,” noting 
among other things, “The population has always been held as prisoners and kept 
dependent upon others.”29 IAT also highlighted the conflict between the older activism of 
the NCAI and the new youth movement when they argued in the manifesto “Our 
Children Will Know Freedom and Justice” that “Many potential leaders have fallen by 
the wayside because they have allowed themselves, or were forced by others, to become 
so involved in the intricacies of bureaucracy that their basic goals were forgotten.”30 
The occupation of Alcatraz did not formally end until June of 1971, when the 
Coast Guard removed the last fifteen holdouts, but it fell out of the public consciousness 
by the middle part of 1970. Red Power, however, remained, and protests spread across 
the country. The most significant of which was the Trail of Broken Treaties that 
culminated with the occupation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs building in November 
1972. The cross-country protest, organized by AIM and treaty rights activists including 
Hank Adams, travelled across the country from San Francisco to Washington, D.C., 
crafting a public statement and list of demands they sought to present to the Nixon 
Administration. The protest, however, was hampered by poor organizing. After arriving 
at lodgings that consisted of a rat-infested church basement, the group moved to the BIA 
building and demanded a meeting. Opinions on what happened next run the gamut from 
deliberate takeover to miscommunication, but the group ended up occupying the building 
for the next week and re-christening it the “Native American Embassy.” Nixon in the 
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final week of his 1972 re-election campaign, largely ignored the protest, leaving 
negotiations to lower-level staffers. While activists ultimately secured meetings with the 
administration, the protest ended with the building ransacked and numerous stolen files 
that activists alleged incriminated the federal government for a variety of crimes against 
Native Americans. The damage to the building and theft of files has been the major 
criticism of the protest but AIM leaders have long claimed the damages resulted from 
agent provocateurs sent in by the FBI to destabilize and undermine the protest. 
Nevertheless, the protest both asserted the importance of treaty rights for Indigenous 
activism while dividing opinions on AIM within Indian Country and outside of it.31 Three 
months later, AIM would again find itself drawing national attention with the occupation 
of Wounded Knee. 
 
Expanding Beyond Traditional Red Power 
In his history of Native activism during the 1960s, historian Daniel Cobb 
highlights a story from Vine Deloria, Jr. about the issues of trying to discuss the events 
that did not get national media attention during the decade. Deloria, Jr. had been invited 
to a conference that would discuss activism in the 1960s but rejected the invitation when 
he realized the only other participant to be active for most of the 1960s was Comanche 
activist LaDonna Harris. In responding to the request, Deloria, Jr. told the organizers, 
																																																								
31 More information of the Trail of Broken Treaties can be found in all of the 
autobiographies of AIM leaders along with Vine Deloria, Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties: An 
Indian Declaration of Independence (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), which provides an 
academic assessment of the movement and its goals. Additionally, Smith and Warrior, Like a 
Hurricane, 149-168 provides a good concise overview of the event. For a negative appraisal of 
AIM see George Pierre Castile, To Show Heart: Native American Self-Determination and 
Federal Indian Policy, 1960-1975 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1998), 111-146. Castile 
labels the BIA protest a “trash-in.” 
	
20	 
“What you’re talking about really is moving everything that happened in the Seventies 
into the Sixties and pretending that it happened then….You guys have got everything all 
screwed up. I’m not going to that thing.”32 The protests between 1969 and 1973 generally 
draw most of the attention in regards to discussion of Native activism in the second half 
of the twentieth century, but these protests were only a minuscule amount of the history 
when it comes to Indigenous engagement since 1950. This work will build on the recent 
thread to expand beyond that four-year time span, and showcase under-analyzed events. 
In chronicling the history of the American Indian Chicago Conference and the 
Workshop on American Indian Affairs, both critical components of early 1960s Native 
American activism, Cobb shows how young activists confronted both indigenous issues 
and the larger Cold War era. In the process of reading Felix Cohen’s article, 
“Colonialism, U.S. Style,” participants began to draw parallels between reservations and 
international affairs. One participant noted that he had “never before thought of the 
Indians as compared to colonialism. I thought colonialism existed only in the older 
countries like southern Europe or in places such as Africa.” The epiphany allowed 
members to more concretely realize the problems facing American Indians, in particular 
the lack of local control on reservations.33 While looking broadly allowed many of the 
younger generation to better understand the world around them, many of the older 
generation and those in the federal government were deeply suspicious. Oliver LaFarge 
and LaVerne Madigan of the older Association on American Indian Affairs rejected the 
																																																								
32 Daniel M. Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America: The Struggle for Sovereignty 
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2008), 1. 
33 Ibid., 64. 
	
21	 
Chicago Conference and organizer Sol Tax in particular, finding the whole affair 
“woolly.”34 As Cobb notes, the Cold War shaped both generations, albeit in different 
ways. Whereas older advocates took a more conservative approach, younger activists like 
Clyde Warrior and the National Indian Youth Council were defining a new path for 
activism embodied in one participant’s inversion of the phrase “Better dead than Red” to 
“Better Red than dead.”35 In addition to Cobb’s work, historians such as Thomas A. 
Britten and Paul McKenzie-Jones have covered activism in the 1960s that was more 
procedural than protest; both, nevertheless, served as “quiet champions” of indigenous 
issues.36 
In addition to scholars studying events prior to the early 1970s, a fruitful avenue 
of research and one this study follows, is expanding the concept of Red Power beyond the 
confines of the United States. This transnational history, or “trans-indigenous” as 
Chadwick Allen has proposed, serves as an important corrective in understanding how 
indigenous peoples interact with others across imposed international borders. As Allen 
has outlined at various points, activists were “both overtly enabled and intimately 
structured by the complexities of transnational networks, those by-products of the 
histories and ongoing legacies of various colonialisms.”37 While scholars have examined 
																																																								
34 Ibid., 49. 
35 Ibid., 68. 
36 Thomas A. Britten, The National Council on Indian Opportunity: Quiet Champion of 
Self-Determination (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2014); Paul McKenzie-
Jones, “Evolving Voices of Dissent: The Workshops on American Indian Affairs, 1956-1972,” 
American Indian Quarterly 38, no. 2 (2014): 207–36; McKenzie-Jones, Clyde Warrior. 
37 Chadwick Allen, “2014 NAISA Presidential Address,” in Native American and 
Indigenous Studies 2 (Spring 2015), 9; Ibid., “A Transnational Native American Studies? Why 
	
22	 
connections between the American Indian Movement and international issues in the past, 
in recent years historians have conducted more detailed studies on the issue.38 Paul 
Rosier’s Serving Their Country serves as a helpful companion work to Cobb’s Native 
Activism providing additional discussion of the international dimensions of American 
Indian ideas in the twentieth century. Rosier highlights how the protests of the 1960s and 
1970s become cloaked in Cold War ideology; in the process American Indians had to 
contemplate the dilemma of “hybrid patriotism” of balancing allegiance to both the 
United States and their tribal affiliations.39 
In terms of detailed studies of American Indian interactions with international 
organizations, European groups and supporters have received the most scholarly study. 
This development is probably a natural continuation of the discussion of the European 
embrace of indigenous culture that traces back to the novels of Karl May and the 
popularity of Wild West shows on the continent. György Ferenc Tóth’s recent book, 
From Wounded Knee to Checkpoint Charlie, exemplifies this point by devoting the first 
chapter to chronicling the German affinity for Karl May’s Winnetou character. Tóth’s 
central argument is that American Indians conducted transnational diplomacy and in the 
process “performed their ideas of Indianness and Indian sovereignty vis-à-vis the U.S. 
nation-state” and Central Europe proved the most fertile ground for support because of a 
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“sense of identification, romanticized notions of revolution, and a countercultural 
community.”40 In focusing on the period after Wounded Knee, Tóth provides a helpful 
addition to the historiography, but his work provides only a limited and at times less than 
critical assessment of the interactions between AIM and Central Europeans. In particular, 
Tóth ignores questioning what the romanticism Central Europeans had of Native 
Americans meant for the connections AIM made in the region. In one instance AIM 
activists toured the region, and Tóth quotes Clyde Bellecourt in acknowledging that the 
highlight of many of the events was native drumming that was rooted in part in old “wild 
west” stereotypes of the “savage Indians.” Furthermore, Tóth notes that the “highlight of 
the evening” was not a Native performer or speaker but rather an East German folk 
singer.41 In a similar manner, Kate Williams’s dissertation, “Cyd-Safiad (Standing 
Together): The Politics of Alliance of Welsh and American Indian Rights’ Movements, 
1960s-Present” provides a comparative account of the two movements and how they 
played off each other over the last half century.42 Both studies are rooted in personal 
histories—Tóth is from Hungary, and Williams is Welsh—and provide helpful but 
limited understanding of transnational aspects of American Indian activism. 
While works like Tóth’s and Williams’s serve as valuable contributions to the 
historiography of indigenous and transnational activism, they are both rooted in the 
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connections between American Indians and Europeans. While Williams’s work draws 
parallels between American Indian issues and Welsh indigeneity in relation to the British 
empire, fewer accounts exist connecting indigenous activism across borders in the latter 
half of the twentieth century. This study endeavors to expand the historiography on the 
subject and highlight the ways in which activists formed indigenous spaces during the 
Cold War that transcended national boundaries and ideologies. In doing so they not only 
built new connections but also expanded the understanding of indigeneity. Just as Martin 
Luther King, Jr. looked at the South Vietnamese and saw himself, American Indian 
activists looked to the four directions and saw themselves and the issues they had been 
confronting at home for decades. 
 
Chapters Overview 
The following chapters move chronologically and seek to provide a narrative of 
one part of the post-Wounded Knee period that focuses on the attempts to build 
transnational alliances in the Western Hemisphere and promote indigenous rights at 
international forums such as the United Nations. Beginning with chapter one’s narrative 
history of the occupation of Wounded Knee, I argue that the occupation became obscured 
by competing narratives that sought to make the occupation an allegory for the ongoing 
war in Vietnam. Whereas the counterculture and other minority rights groups sought to 
draw parallels between the American Indian and the South Vietnamese, both seemingly 
were subjugated to oppressive occupations by American soldiers, conservatives viewed 
the event as a natural outgrowth of the tumultuous 1960s and a potential communist 
threat. Both narratives highlight how AIM, even as it advocated for Native rights and 
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sovereignty, found itself pulled into a Cold War narrative that had little room for third 
parties. 
Chapter two focuses on the development of the International Indian Treaty 
Council and the movement to secure representation at the United Nations, brought on in 
large part as a way to work around the issues the organization faced domestically. In 
contrast to the legal fights and organizational in-fighting at home, the movement overseas 
brought AIM additional support and helped foster the creation of UN policies that 
continue to promote indigenous rights in the twentieth-first century. At the same time 
AIM expanded overseas, the movement had to balance its international successes with 
the responsibilities to Native Americans at home. This balancing act culminated in 
1978’s Long Walk, a return to the protests of the early 1970s, yet one that seemingly saw 
greater successes with Congressional passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act and 
American Indian Religion Freedom Act. The successes of the period, however, masked 
divisions among Native activists about the goals of the movement. In addition, the fact 
that AIM and the IITC had not fully defined how these issues should interact with or fit 
within non-Native political frameworks, promoted debates at the turn of the 1980s about 
the role of AIM in relation to the political left. The chapter concludes by explaining how 
through various tribunals and writings, movement leaders such as Russell Means and 
Dennis Banks attempted to define how native issues compared to both socialism and the 
rising conservative movement embodied by the election of Ronald Reagan. 
These intellectual debates shifted to real world events in the mid-1980s when 
AIM found itself divided over the conflict in Nicaragua between the Sandinistas and the 
Contras. The Sandinistas, the “darlings of the left” as Russell Means called them, were 
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early supporters of AIM, and the movement’s leaders tended to side with the 
revolutionary cause in Central America. Yet, other Native activists found the Sandinistas 
to be as bad as their conservative counterparts in regards to indigenous rights and 
advocated for a third way that focused on indigenous autonomy.43 While AIM had its 
share of in-fighting and conflict in the years following Wounded Knee, the movement 
remained largely cohesive during the period. The Nicaraguan conflict, however, 
fundamentally split the organization into competing factions. 
The final chapter covers some of the debates that arose from the Nicaragua 
conflict in the 1990s. As AIM split into various chapters, each claiming true legitimacy 
and discounting all others, AIM’s major leaders sought to expel each other from the 
organization for various alleged crimes against both the movement and Indian peoples. 
Whereas outside observers of AIM had long questioned the legitimacy of the Indian 
identities of its members, the 1990s saw the organization’s members competing to define 
who was and was not an Indian. At the same time that Russell Means appeared on movie 
screens around the country, the “paper wars” of the 1990s convinced many observers that 
AIM had completely lost its way, demolished in large part by the egos of its founders. 
Yet AIM continues, and the movement’s goals remain unchanged. The conclusion 
brings the narrative up through the recent events opposing the Dakota Access Pipeline 
and the alliances with the Idle No More movement that began in Canada. While much of 
this story covers in-fighting and conflict, in many respects I see this as a more optimistic 
story than many may perceive it. AIM was never just the major figureheads that appeared 
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in media on a regular basis. The movement meant something different to everyone who 
took part in it over the years, and it continues. As Clyde Bellecourt writes in the 
conclusion to his autobiography, “I have helped to create the conditions necessary for 
young people to develop leadership skills. The current generation has all sorts of 
advantages I never had, the greatest of which is access to their culture and ceremonies.”44
																																																								









VIETNAM ON THE PLAINS: 
THE FAILED UNDERSTANDING OF THE OCCUPATION OF WOUNDED KNEE 
“Wounded Knee” 
There was a war All my people came 
We held out The whole world watched 
We won The drums beat on We’re one… 
- A brave 3/731 
As Stanley Lyman, the Bureau of Indian Affairs Superintendent for the Pine 
Ridge Reservation in southwest South Dakota, looked out his window on the morning of 
February 22, 1973, he could feel something was going to happen. Then he saw two little 
kids walking down the street, blissfully unaware of the events “going on in the adult 
world around them.” As Lyman stood watching the kids merrily kick some beer cans 
down the road he could not help but say a prayer.2 The rising tensions on the reservation 
seemed to be coming to a head with the pending impeachment trial of Oglala tribal 
chairman Richard “Dick” Wilson. Wilson, elected the year before, stood accused of 
misusing tribal funds and providing reservation jobs to family and friends. The 
impeachment proceedings against Wilson were the result of simmering tensions between 
																																																								
1 Quoted in “Wounded Knee: A Firsthand Review,” Minnesota Leader, December 30, 
1974. Roger Finzel American Indian Movement Papers, Center for Southwest Research, 
University Libraries, University of New Mexico, Box 1, Folder 8. This chapter is revised from 
my Master’s thesis, “Conflicting Narratives: Wounded Knee, Vietnam, and the Question of 
Indian Identity” (Master’s Thesis, University of Tulsa, 2012) 
2 Stanley David Lyman and Floyd A. O’Neil, Wounded Knee 1973: A Personal Account, 
Bison Books (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1993), 1. 
	
29	 
older traditional Indians and the younger mixed-bloods that went back well beyond 
Wilson’s close electoral victory the year before. Indians of mixed ancestry tended to live 
close to the reservation’s major center of Pine Ridge, while traditional, full-blood, 
Indians leaned towards living in small, remote communities. The few services available 
on the reservation—trading posts, tribal offices, and basic health care—were centered in 
Pine Ridge, forcing traditionalists to make long treks for essential services and jobs. 
Additionally, the rural communities also tended to suffer from a lack of political 
representation in the tribal government that was dominated by mixed-race Oglalas such 
as Dick Wilson. 
Passed during the “Indian New Deal,” the Indian Reorganization Act provided for 
increased self-government and ended the allotment of Indian land to individual 
landowners. The original bill proposed by Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier 
went farther than the final bill passed by Congress, prompting opposition to the bill by 
some Native Americans. Opponents argued that in place of the Indian agent who held 
“dictatorial” power, a new expanded bureaucracy—still under the control of the BIA—
stepped in to enforce Washington policy and ignored traditional tribal ways.3 On the 
other hand, supporters of the act pointed out the end of allotment, preserved Native 
communities, established Native corporations, and strengthened tribal governments at a 
time when many wanted them abolished.4 Pine Ridge adopted an IRA constitution in 
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1936, which created a tribal council and four executive officers: chairman; vice 
chairman; treasurer; and secretary. Dick Wilson first became involved in tribal 
government when he won election to the tribal council representing his hometown of 
Pine Ridge. In 1972 he ran against incumbent Gerald One Feather because, as his 
campaign manager said, he had the time and inclination.5 One Feather drew criticism on 
the reservation for his slow response to the death of Raymond Yellow Thunder in the 
border town of Gordon, Nebraska, and regularly leaving the reservation. While Stanley 
Lyman believed Wilson never felt comfortable outside of the mixed-race communities, 
Wilson tried to capitalize on the apathy towards One Feather and regularly courted full-
blood voters. Wilson hosted a variety of events including picnics and cookouts and made 
regular visits to people’s homes. Additionally, Wilson grew his hair long and said he 
supported the American Indian Movement and their protests in response to the Yellow 
Thunder Killing a “110 percent.”6 
Wilson’s campaign was smart to exploit the popularity of the American Indian 
Movement, as the group had secured one of its biggest successes earlier that year just 
over the border in Nebraska. In February of 1972, authorities in Gordon found the body 
of Raymond Yellow Thunder in his pick-up in a used car lot. Days before police 
discovered his body, two brothers, Leslie and Melvin Hare, along with two of their 
friends, found Yellow Thunder wandering the streets drunk. The group assaulted Yellow 
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Thunder, stripped him of his clothes, and drove him to an American Legion Hall, where 
they used the dazed and confused Indian as a public spectacle. The attack highlighted the 
issues many Lakota had with the various border towns around the reservation, arguing 
that towns such as Gordon, Rushville, and White Clay based most of their economies on 
exploiting reservation Indians. While the towns provided numerous services not available 
on the reservations (including alcohol sales), venturing into them also meant interacting 
with racists who regularly cheated, harassed, and assaulted Indians.7 Whether it was the 
brutality of the incident or something else, Yellow Thunder’s death was the final straw 
for many on the reservation, and they decided to do something about it. After failing to 
secure assistance from the tribe, the BIA, and other organizations, Yellow Thunder’s 
family turned to AIM. After accepting the invitation, the group planned to fill Gordon 
with Indians from the reservation and close it down in protest. For three days, hundreds 
of Lakota filled the tiny town’s streets, and scared most of the town’s residents into 
hiding. Realizing the Indians were not going to leave without results, the district attorney 
arrested the men for manslaughter and false imprisonment, and the town fired a jailer 
accused of mistreating Indian inmates and agreed to set up a human rights commission to 
examine issues in the town.8 Just as AIM succeeded, Wilson’s support for the movement 
and embrace of traditional factions on the reservation secured him a close victory. 
Wilson’s first year in office played out far differently from his campaign 
promised. Shortly after his election Wilson cut his shoulder length hair and replaced it 
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with a crew cut. Wilson’s attempts to suppress his dissenters, like the Oglala Sioux Civil 
Rights Organization (OSCRO) and members of the American Indian Movement, only 
worsened tensions. Following AIM’s takeover of the Bureau of Indian Affairs building in 
Washington, D.C., in November of 1972, Wilson took out a restraining order against 
AIM leader Russell Means and supporter Severt Young Bear, both members of the tribe.9 
In addition, the tribal council passed a resolution that demanded, “The sovereign dignity 
of the Oglala Sioux tribe be upheld and protected against any threats…” arising from the 
American Indian Movement. The resolution also barred any “victory dancing” on the 
reservation in response to the BIA takeover.10 Furthermore, Wilson formed his own 
personal militia, the Guardians of the Oglala Nation, nicknamed “GOONs” by their 
opponents, which carried out an open campaign to suppress dissent on the reservation.  
In addition to reversing his support for AIM, which remains mostly unexplained, 
his opponents claimed the tribal monies that did not go towards creating the private 
police force to harass opponents got funneled into increasing his salary and paid off 
various friends and relatives.11 Wilson also stood accused of circumventing the tribal 
council by using executive sessions and intimidating political opponents, a practice that 
would only get worse later in his tenure. For many on the reservation, Wilson was no 
better than the old Indian agents who stole and cheated the Indians under their “care,” and 
they quickly began to lobby for his impeachment. At the same time, AIM responded to an 
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incident similar to the Yellow Thunder death after a white patron at a bar in Buffalo Gap 
killed Wesley Bad Heart Bull. Unlike Raymond Yellow Thunder, Bad Heart Bull had a 
lengthy criminal record and warrant for assault, and his death may have been forgotten as 
a simple bar fight if not for the increased anxieties and racial tensions throughout the 
region.12 The case drew increased protests when the District Attorney charged Bad Heart 
Bull’s assailant with manslaughter rather than murder. In response to what they perceived 
as a lack of justice, AIM organized a protest that quickly escalated into violence. While a 
small group of Indians met with the district attorney inside the Custer County courthouse, 
AIM members came to blows with police when they tried to force their way into the 
building. The police deployed tear gas, and AIM leader Dennis Banks jumped through a 
courthouse window to escape. When the riot was over, police had arrested twenty-two 
protesters, including Bad Heart Bull’s mother, and the protesters had burned two police 
cars and the town’s small chamber of commerce building. 
The riot in Custer, along with an ongoing campaign to confront the rampant 
racism in Rapid City, South Dakota, led Secretary of the Interior Rogers Morton to ask 
US Attorney General Richard Kleindienst to send US marshals to the Pine Ridge 
Reservation. Rogers was responding to the recent events and the “serious nature” of the 
threat AIM posed to the reservation.13 With Wilson’s impeachment scheduled for the 
coming week, everyone anticipated AIM would make some form of protest should the 
proceeding fail to remove Wilson from office. Dick Wilson, a brash man not afraid of a 
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fight or two, openly threatened to cut off Russell Means’s braids should he set foot on the 
reservation. Means, an Oglala Sioux born on Pine Ridge, had spent most of his life in 
California and Cleveland before joining AIM in the late 1960s. He threatened to run 
against Wilson in the next tribal election where he promised he would unseat the man he 
called a dictator, liar, and a drunk.14 While Wilson was vocal in his opposition to AIM 
and Russell Means, most Oglalas opposed to Wilson hoped to resolve what were 
relatively local issues without involving outside help. However, after the impeachment 
proceedings, chaired by Wilson himself, failed, both sides prepared for the worst.  
As Wilson and his supporters expected a response from AIM, his opponents 
feared the chairman would use the victory to continue his campaign of political 
suppression. OSCRO and traditional tribal elders convened a meeting on February 27 to 
decide a response to the failed impeachment attempt. More than 200 people attended and 
agreed that something needed to be done, but arrived at little consensus. While some 
suggested a takeover of the tribal offices in downtown Pine Ridge, the increased security 
by the US marshals and FBI meant any attempt to take the building could end in 
bloodshed. Instead, Frank Fools Crow, a traditional chief, spoke up and said, “Go ahead 
and do it, go to Wounded Knee.” He said, “You can’t get in the BIA office and the tribal 
office, so take your brothers from the American Indian Movement and go to Wounded 
Knee and make your stand there.”15 The occupation of Wounded Knee had officially 
begun. While the protestors sought to focus on the practices and corruption of Dick 
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Wilson, the intricacies of tribal politics escaped most of those who witnessed the 
subsequent seventy-one-day occupation. Instead most of those who watched on the 
nightly newscasts, read the copious amount of magazine and newspaper articles, and even 
many of those inside Wounded Knee itself came to see the occupation not as an Indian 
issue but as part of larger third-world struggles, and a stylistic parallel to Vietnam taking 
place not in the jungles of South Vietnam, but rather in the Indian Country of South 
Dakota. 
 
Overview of the Occupation 
The group of a few hundred AIM and OSCRO members set out from the small 
hall in which they were meeting and headed east towards Pine Ridge. As the caravan of 
cars approached town, the federal agents on guard at the tribal offices nervously began 
radioing to each other about the approaching cars. Clearly AIM had prepared for the 
stand everyone anticipated. Instead, the guards watched in confusion as the caravan drove 
straight through Pine Ridge without stopping.16 Upon arriving in the village, many of the 
200 occupiers went after the Wounded Knee Trading Post, one of the few buildings in 
town. Owned by the non-Native Gildersleeve family, the business had a history of 
complaints and was the site of an AIM protest the year before. Indians living in Wounded 
Knee asserted that the Gildersleeves engaged in a variety of exploitative business 
practices, opened mail in search of checks and money, and profited from the history of 
Wounded Knee by operating a museum and selling souvenirs to tourists.17 The confused 
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agents in Pine Ridge learned of the burglary at Wounded Knee, and FBI agent Joseph 
Trimbach ordered the erection of roadblocks around the town by 10:00 PM.18 
AIM and OSCRO released a set of three demands to John Terronez, a field representative 
for the US Department of Justice’s Community Relations Service, who was present 
during the initial takeover. According to Terronez, the activists wanted Senator William 
Fulbright to convene a hearing of the Senate’s foreign relations committee to address 
treaty issues; a hearing by Senator Kennedy’s subcommittee on Administrative Practices 
and Procedures to investigate the BIA and Department of Interior; and a Senate 
subcommittee on Indian Affairs investigation on the Sioux Reservations in South 
Dakota.19 In addition, AIM gave the US government two options to end the conflict: they 
could either negotiate the demands or “wipe out the old people, women, children, and 
men, by shooting and attacking us.”20 These demands are an important point to 
emphasize. By opting for pan-Indian demands instead of explicitly calling for the 
removal of Dick Wilson from office, AIM effectively recast the purpose of Wounded 
Knee from a local issue into a national one. 
News reports of the incident were almost as swift as the government’s response. 
Accounts of “Indian Militants” seizing the town and holding “hostages” appeared in 
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newspapers across the Midwest the following day. Carter Camp, a Ponca Indian from 
Oklahoma and an AIM leader, told the Saint Louis Post-Dispatch that the occupiers had 
the “men and the weapons to hold Wounded Knee.” Camp went on to say the group had 
“high-powered” rifles and that the participants would “die if necessary.”21 Within days 
the incident made national news with reports of “hostages” in Wounded Knee. South 
Dakota’s Senator James Abourezk promised to negotiate with Indians once they freed the 
hostages. Both Abourezk and George McGovern, South Dakota’s other senator, flew to 
Wounded Knee on March 1 to seek the release of those Wounded Knee residents still 
inside the village. AIM claimed the eleven residents were free to come and go, but Means 
provided a list to Trimbach on the first day of the occupation that read “Hostages, 
Wounded Knee, South Dakota” and described the eleven as “prisoners of war.”22 In his 
autobiography, Means also states Father Paul Manhart had his hands bound following his 
discovery in the church’s choir loft.23 Nevertheless, the residents all told the senators they 
were not hostages, and some refused to leave the village. Following the meeting between 
AIM and the two senators, the New York Times reported that the “Indians at Wounded 
Knee Free 11 Held for 2 Days” and that the residents had been told they could go two 
hours before the meeting with the Senators.  
Contrary to Camp’s earlier claims about “high-powered rifles,” the two senators 
only saw a small number of weapons in the village on their visit and added “they were 
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not very much in evidence.” The next day, however, Ralph Erickson, special assistant to 
the Attorney General, stated the Indians possessed an M-60 machine gun, adding, “We 
are not optimistic at the progress today.”24 Claims also surfaced that either the Indians 
mounted the weapon in the bell tower of the church or on a vehicle they drove around the 
village. With the reports of heavy weaponry in Wounded Knee, the Justice Department 
ordered heavier armaments closer to Wounded Knee in order to “match theirs.”25 The 
government stationed army-supplied Armored Personnel Carriers (APC)—tanks without 
mounted weapons—on the roads surrounding Wounded Knee. While the occupiers 
possessed one AK-47, a souvenir an Indian veteran brought back from Vietnam, most of 
the weapons inside the village were like the .22 caliber rifle with “a stock held together 
by tape” that New York Times journalist John Kifner saw on his March 4 visit to the 
village.26 In contrast, government forces at Wounded Knee would ultimately utilize 
upwards of fifteen armored personnel carriers and would request 200 CS grenades, M-79 
grenade launchers with 100 rounds, 600 rounds of CS gas and 600 rounds of red smoke, 
750 pounds of dry CS and air delivery canisters along with helicopters and military 
advisors to support efforts to end the occupation.27 
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The government, however, saw little threat from the small band of Indians. On 
March 4, the Directorate of Military Support (DOMS) noted in a report to DOMS head 
Major General Rollan Gleszer that the seizure of the isolated village posed no threat to 
the reservation, state of South Dakota, or the Nation at large. Furthermore, the report 
stated the occupants showed little sign of wishing to inflict serious harm on anyone in the 
village or the government forces surrounding it. Instead the report concluded the biggest 
issue with the takeover was that it was “a source of irritation if not embarrassment to the 
Administration in general and the Department of Justice in particular.”28 With the US 
government doing little to end the conflict, Dick Wilson offered up the first threat to end 
the occupation himself, declaring that he had an army of 800 to 900 men ready to enter 
the village. When questioned on the statements, Wilson said, “I will not be responsible 
for holding my people back” and even offered to join them with his own gun.29 Ongoing 
negotiations between Erickson and Wounded Knee broke off on March 6, when Dennis 
Banks publicly burned Erickson’s proposal. The following day Erickson called on the 
occupiers to send out the women and children by dark the next day and left South Dakota 
for Washington. The ominous statement seemed to be an ultimatum, and the occupiers 
prepared for a confrontation by donning red war paint and receiving blessings from a 
medicine man. After a day of high tensions inside Wounded Knee, darkness fell, and 
nothing happened. While many saw the statement as a demand, Erickson and other 
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anonymous officials claimed that there was no implied threat and that the government did 
not plan to forcibly end the conflict.30 
Following the tensions, the government removed some roadblocks surrounding 
Wounded Knee and hoped that this gesture would encourage people inside the village—
both occupiers and the media—to leave. With media coverage and support dwindling, the 
government hoped the affair would lose steam and disappear. While some inside 
Wounded Knee acted as the government hoped, far more people flooded into the village. 
Meanwhile the occupiers declared the encampment the “Independent Oglala Nation,” 
and, according to the New York Times, put themselves on “war footing” with the US 
government.31 Over the course of the occupation, the Independent Oglala Nation would 
issue informal “passports,” create a border patrol, and, according to one report, swear in 
349 new citizens, half of whom were not Oglala Sioux.32  
That same day six postal service inspectors tested those claims by trying to enter 
the village to check reports of mailbox tampering at the trading post. The groups quickly 
captured the inspectors and held them at gunpoint. Russell Means responded to the 
capture by saying any “spy” found in the village would be killed by firing squad. 
However, the group released the inspectors a few hours later after parading them in front 
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of news cameras.33 All of the talk and an injury to an FBI agent later in the day prompted 
head US Marshal Wayne Coburn to reinstate the roadblocks and declare the government 
would be “more hard-nosed” about the affair.34  
When the two parties resumed negotiations on March 13, Harlington Wood, an 
assistant attorney general for the Justice Department, replaced Erickson. Instead of 
meeting in a tipi situated in the “demilitarized zone” between the opposing sides, as 
Erickson had done, Wood requested to hold talks inside Wounded Knee. AIM granted the 
request, and a formal escort that included two horseback riders, Means, Camp, and 
Leonard Crow Dog (the spiritual leader of the movement) escorted Wood to the village, 
followed by a dozen “warriors.”35 The thirty-seven point proposal offered by Wood 
required the end of the occupation and the condition that all indicted individuals submit 
to arrest, but promised a later meeting with the Interior Department in Sioux Falls. 
Unfortunately, Interior Secretary Morton had destroyed any chance to end the conflict the 
previous weekend. He declared that the government would not “bow to threats by 
militant Indians,” promised “nothing will be gained by promoting a national guilt 
complex” or by “blackmail,” and dismissed the occupiers as “renegades,” “youthful 
adventurers,” and criminals following in the footsteps of the “black militant 
movement.”36 On the 18, following a firefight that injured a medic inside Wounded Knee, 
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the head of Wounded Knee’s security forces, Stanley Holder, publicly burned the 
proposal, decried it as “surrender,” and stated the group refused to “be caged like 
animals.”37 
The following week saw increased firefights and a further tightening of the 
security perimeter. High-powered search lights, flares, and machine gun tracer bullets 
from the government forces lit the night sky at Wounded Knee over the next ten days. On 
March 25, the occupiers secured a victory against the roadblocks when Federal Judge 
Andrew Bogue ordered the government to allow six lawyers and carloads of food into 
Wounded Knee each day until the end of the month.38 The order prompted Dick Wilson, 
increasingly marginalized during this period, to put out a new call for “fellow patriots” to 
sign up to defend the reservation from the “major Communist threat” AIM presented. The 
open call for support promised to make Wounded Knee “another Little Big Horn.”39 In 
addition to expressing ire at those inside Wounded Knee, Wilson argued the occupation 
only continued because the media wanted it to. Reflecting President Nixon’s views of the 
media in Vietnam, one of Wilson’s newsletters from late March noted, “No news reporter 
or TV cameraman has ever won a war, but they can destroy a nation by the propaganda of 
lies and hate that they broadcast for every crackpot, screwball, and Communist-front 
organization who wants to take a swat at our American way of life.”40 While the court 
order required the federal government to let lawyers and supplies through, Wilson’s 
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vigilantes refused to comply, claiming it did not apply on the Sioux Reservation. In 
response, the group formed a roadblock outside of federal lines, the vigilantes turned 
back AIM’s lawyers and supplies, and federal officials did nothing to remove the 
roadblock. Wilson’s “Oglala Warriors” swore to “starve them out” and shot down the 
telephone lines leading into Wounded Knee, effectively cutting off communication to the 
village.41 
The imposition of Wilson’s roadblocks was not the most pressing issue the 
occupation faced. Following government orders, NBC, the last remaining broadcast news 
network inside the village, pulled out. A cameraman with the network described the 
situation as “pretty tense,” and the New York Times followed up the statement with 
reports that Dennis Banks threatened to “shoot his way out of Wounded Knee if food 
were not made available.” Banks, an Ojibwe Indian from the Leech Lake Reservation in 
Minnesota, looked like a guy who was not joking. He regularly addressed the groups 
inside Wounded Knee with a headband and a gun strapped to his hip, an image the Times 
ran earlier in the month alongside Morton’s comments about Wounded Knee. The 
situation intensified when a bullet paralyzed US Marshal Lloyd Grimm from the waist 
down. News reports claimed the shot came from an Indian bunker 500 yards from 
Grimm’s, but questions remained about where the bullet came from.42 In addition to the 
sporadic gunfire coming from Wounded Knee and the potential for crossfire from another 
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government bunker, Wilson’s vigilantes and white ranchers fired off rounds in the hopes 
of provoking a firefight and ending the occupation.43 It was later revealed at the trials of 
Banks and Means that a member of the Ranchers’ Protection Association, William 
Leavitt, had been planning to drop explosives on some of the demonstrators at Wounded 
Knee.44 Another white resident sent a letter to Senator Abourezk arguing if the 
government continued “mollycoddling” and giving blackmail payments to AIM while not 
guaranteeing the safety and security of property, vigilante committees would be needed.45 
Meanwhile the firefight at the village continued into the next day and approached 
“open warfare,” and Kent Frizzell, now heading the government’s negotiations, 
proclaimed, “The fun and games are over.”46 The news also included reports that Dennis 
Banks and Russell Means, de facto heads of the occupation, fled the town overnight. 
While the two left to meet with supporters on the neighboring Rosebud reservation and 
later returned, discord appeared to be growing inside Wounded Knee. The following day, 
reports appeared that a hundred Indians inside Wounded Knee wished to surrender but 
were being held at gunpoint by the “hard-core dissidents” headed by Means and Banks. 
Frizzell described the split, controlled by medicine man Leonard Crow Dog and OSCRO 
leader Pedro Bissonette, as a “Mexican standoff,” with Banks and Means eventually 
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taking full control.47 Carol Sullivan (née Talbert), an anthropologist from Syracuse 
University who was inside Wounded Knee at the time reporting for the Syracuse New 
Times, argued the reports were false, and there was no divide within the camp.48 
Regardless of the level of dissent within the village, the split, along with government 
claims that a plane dropped a .50 caliber rifle and dynamite land mines into the village 
the previous day threatened to end any chance of peacefully ending the incident.  
Negotiations began again on March 31, when Frizzell met with thirteen members 
of the Oglala Sioux Nation, two from AIM, four from the legal defense fund established 
to assist the movement, and Indian treaty expert Hank Adams, in a tipi in the 
“demilitarized zone” between the two sides.49 With the negotiations ongoing, a Harris 
Poll on April 1 indicated 51% of Americans supported the occupation, with wide support 
for all of the Indians’ demands. Highest levels of support were found among the young 
(under 30), college-educated, those living in middle-class east coast suburbs, African 
Americans, union members, and Catholics.50 
The negotiations continued into the first week of April with little progress. Treaty 
rights, the removal of Dick Wilson from office, and the time and manner with which the 
occupiers would lay down their weapons and surrender continued to divide the sides. 
While the talks continued, small amounts of gunfire could be heard each night, but the 
reservation as a whole slipped back into a “sleepy routine.” Government bunkers were 
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becoming increasingly “homey and elaborate,” equipped with stoves, fireplaces, and 
sleeping quarters. Wilson’s vigilantes, equally bored, spent most of their time playing 
horseshoes and firing off random gunshots.51 While the tribal roadblock was in a legal 
gray area, it received support from superintendent Lyman, who “stole” cases of C-rations 
to supply the roadblock.52 Lyman, a staunch supporter of Wilson, felt that the whole 
affair would have been over the night it began had the BIA police and Wilson’s vigilantes 
been allowed into the village to deal with the trouble themselves.  
By April 5, it looked as if Kent Frizzell had accomplished what none of the other 
government officials could, bring an end to the siege. Frizzell, the Assistant Attorney 
General, Land and Natural Resources division, and nominee for the Interior Department’s 
Solicitor General, accepted almost all of the occupiers’ demands, most significantly a 
meeting with the White House. The agreement won Frizzell wide praise, including his 
hometown newspaper, Hutchinson News (Kan.), which suggested that Frizzell keep his 
saddlebags packed, as Cambodia could be next, but it found little support in parts of the 
Midwest.53 The Omaha World Herald decried the “dilly-dallying” by the US government 
that had the possibility to “encourage militant Indians to make land grabs at numerous 
scattered locations.” The editorial followed news reports that Indians seized land near 
Onawa, Iowa, in a protest similar to Wounded Knee. A federal memo from March 27 also 
expressed a fear of potential Wounded Knee-style takeovers in Oklahoma and Tennessee 
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by “militant Choctaw-Chickashas” and “activist Cherokees.”54 Unless the government 
took a hard line against the occupation, the paper wrote, “Tedious times are in 
prospect.”55  
Yet, the possibility of a widespread takeover movement seemed fractured by 
conflicts within Indian Country over the effectiveness of AIM’s protest. For instance, in 
Washington state, which had seen some of the first direct action Indigenous rights 
protests in response to the state’s restriction on treaty fishing rights, one Puyallup activist 
noted in late May that area Indians planned to “secure the Cascadia Juvenile Reception 
Diagnostic Center” but told a newspaper the event was a local matter trying to resolve 
“local needs and objectives” rather than a project of the American Indian Movement.56 
As a result, even before the end of the highest profile event in AIM’s history, the 
organization was already deeply divisive within Indian Country, and Wounded Knee 
itself was being misunderstood by those who should have been most supportive of the 
event. 
With the agreement signed, Means led a delegation out of Wounded Knee to meet 
with the Nixon Administration in Washington, DC. The group made a stop in Rapid City, 
where, as agreed, federal agents formally arrested Means under a grand jury indictment 
from the previous month. After being processed and posting bond, the group departed for 
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Washington, D.C., the following day. Upon arrival, it quickly became clear that the 
White House would not open negotiations. The White House believed the agreement 
called for the occupiers to surrender their weapons before the meeting, while Means 
claimed surrender would only happen once the meeting had begun.57 The administration 
refused to move on the issue and, in an impromptu news conference, Means claimed the 
government “flat out lied to us.”58 Dennis Banks, still in Wounded Knee, refused to 
surrender arms claiming the government “violated every paragraph in the agreement.”59 
The talks remained at an impasse until they formally ended on the 11th with the 
government’s decision to cancel the meeting in Washington.60  
The ceasefire continued for another week before the conflict again descended into 
all out warfare. April 17 opened with an airdrop of provisions by three small, single-
engine planes. Supplied by the anti-war movement, which had begun to view support for 
the occupation as part of the movement’s larger aims, the packages contained food, but 
government forces claimed to observe long cylindrical cases believed to hold rifles.61 A 
FBI helicopter responded to the drops by shooting at group of residents collecting the 
packages, prompting Wounded Knee’s security forces to sporadically return fire. While 
the helicopter retreated, the government bunkers around Wounded Knee commenced a 
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sustained assault on the village. Frank Clearwater, an Indian from North Carolina who 
had been in the encampment less than a day, got shot twice in the head just as he awoke. 
The bullets knocked Clearwater unconscious almost instantly, and he never regained 
consciousness. He remained in the village for forty-five minutes due to continued gunfire 
from government forces. Eventually, medics moved him the half-mile to the medical tent 
but had to wait another hour for a helicopter to take him to a hospital in Rapid City, 
where he died on April 25. 
With the increased hostilities, Assistant Attorney General Stanley Pottinger, the 
lead negotiator following Frizzell’s failed April 5 agreement, stated that the government 
hoped to end the conflict peacefully but left a “forceful taking” of the village on the 
table.62 Two days later George McGovern’s staff released a letter the senator sent to 
Attorney General Kleindienst asking for the village to be cleared before “angry private 
citizens” did it themselves. McGovern went on to write that “time is running out on the 
containment policy followed by the Justice Department.”63 Shortly afterward, as 
Pottinger prepared to return to Washington, the New York Times stated he compared the 
deteriorating situation at Wounded Knee to Vietnam and quoted him saying the 
government could not pull out because “there would be a blood bath among the Indians.” 
Francis Randall, an Oglala tribal leader, threatened to drive all the “Chicanos, Negroes, 
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Russians, and Cherokees,” off the reservation in two weeks unless the US government 
ended the occupation.64  
Coincidentally, government plans to retake the village leaked to the press around 
the same time. The plans called for helicopters to drop warning pamphlets notifying the 
village of the impending assault. When the time came, the helicopter would disperse the 
large quantities of tear gas the Department of Justice had requested over the area and 
marshals would storm the village.65 On April 23rd the US government momentarily 
shifted its focus from the occupiers inside Wounded Knee to Wilson’s ongoing roadblock 
after Wilson’s vigilantes prevented members of the Justice Department’s Community 
Relations Service from entering Wounded Knee. Head US Marshal Wayne Colburn 
ordered the roadblock destroyed and the vigilantes stationed at it arrested. The 
government actions only infuriated Wilson more, and he threatened bloodshed should the 
government continue to prevent the re-establishment of the tribal roadblock.66 Wishing to 
avoid a confrontation between the government and another group of Indians, the FBI set 
up a new roadblock on the site and quietly invited Wilson’s men to help staff it.67 
While the official end to the occupation of Wounded Knee would not come until 
the 8 of May, the twenty-four-hour period between April 26 and 27 signaled the end for 
most of those involved. Not only had Frank Clearwater passed away the day before, but 
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the two days also witnessed the most intense firefight of the occupation and another 
fatality. With a limited supply of ammunition, the occupiers of Wounded Knee attempted 
to honor the latest ceasefire. Unfortunately, with outside vigilantes trying to instigate a 
firefight and the growing tension among government forces, any attempts to prevent 
shooting were bound to fail. At 11:00 PM on the 26, an unexpected countdown 
commenced over the government radios followed by close to fifty aerial flares lighting up 
the night sky.68 Gunfire from the government bunkers followed, and the small supply of 
ammunition in Wounded Knee left the occupiers with little to do but hope the rain of 
bullets would eventually stop. By the time shooting had ceased at noon the next day, 
20,000 rounds had poured into the village, one of which killed Buddy Lamont instantly.69 
The Vietnam veteran and Oglala Sioux tribal member’s death all but sealed the fate of the 
occupation. Following the firefight, the village had no power, telephone or running water, 
and food supplies were almost exhausted.70 Additionally, they suffered from a leadership 
vacuum. Russell Means never returned to Wounded Knee following his trip to 
Washington; instead he opted to conduct a cross-country speaking tour. While speaking 
in Los Angeles, federal agents arrested Means for violating his parole, supposedly for 
refusing to take back a statement about the “military taking over western South Dakota” 
earlier in the trip.71 Authorities also arrested OSCRO head Pedro Bissonette around the 
same time in Rapid City. 
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While the government stocked up on supplies in preparation for a potential assault 
on the village, AIM and the remaining occupiers turned their attention to Frank 
Clearwater’s burial.72 Morningstar Clearwater, Frank’s wife, requested the burial be 
inside Wounded Knee, but Wilson and his supporters on the tribal council rejected the 
request. Instead, the council passed a resolution that barred the funeral from occurring on 
tribal lands and secured support from the FBI and US marshals to enforce the law.73 
Following a wake on Pine Ridge, the group buried Clearwater on Crow Dog’s property 
on the neighboring Rosebud Reservation. 
Negotiations between the sides resumed on May 1, this time in two old school 
buses situated outside the town. This left Frizzell, who had returned to conduct the new 
round of negotiations, in a tough spot. The Oglala appointed to represent Wounded Knee 
continued to demand a meeting with White House officials. This proved complicated 
following Nixon’s Watergate address the previous night. Wounded Knee had largely 
disappeared from the national news by this point, and with Watergate threatening the 
Presidency, the administration had little time to deal with the occupation. Following two 
more days of negotiations, the White House sent a proposal that promised to hold a 
meeting on treaty rights at Pine Ridge in two weeks and look into the complaints against 
Dick Wilson.  
The proposal was short on specifics and would have been rejected earlier in the 
occupation, but with little negotiating power left, those inside Wounded Knee accepted. 
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With a new agreement in place only two issues remained—the surrender of arms and the 
burial of Buddy Lamont. Like Clearwater, the occupiers requested to bury Lamont inside 
Wounded Knee. Unlike Clearwater, Lamont’s Oglala citizenship prevented Dick Wilson 
from stopping the burial. While Wilson’s council attempted to restrict the funeral to eight 
or ten close family members, nearly one hundred people attended the funeral on May 6.74 
That night the two sides agreed to formally end the occupation on May 8.75 The end 
could not come soon enough for all involved. The marshals left on guard in the bunkers 
openly complained about being unable to do their jobs and enforce the law.  
Inside Wounded Knee, Dennis Banks and Carter Camp were the only remaining 
leaders, neither of whom would be present on the 8. Camp and Leonard Crow Dog 
surrendered a day early, and Banks escaped the night before the occupation’s end.76 The 
occupation concluded when the federal government lowered the AIM flag and raised the 
American flag. Additionally, the agents fired off assault rifles, and used the few 
remaining Indians as makeshift mine detectors.77 The government managed to find only 
fifteen old and broken weapons inside the village. While Banks and others who left under 
the cover of darkness took some weapons with them, the weapons the government found 
were a good representation of the Wounded Knee arsenal. Nevertheless, Richard 
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Hellstern, assistant attorney general in the Justice Department, called the collection “a lot 
of crap” and argued the group violated the arms dispossession agreement.78  
Much like the beginning, Wounded Knee ended with little fanfare outside the 
immediate village. News networks returned to cover the ending but were kept away from 
the village. The proposed meeting between the White House and the Oglalas took place 
on the 17, but the meeting was little more than a “symbolic solution for a symbolic 
occupation,” according to White House aide Brad Patterson.79 Following the end of the 
occupation, little remained of Wounded Knee besides the foundation of the church and a 
few odd buildings, but the area continued to draw tourists in the months that followed.80 
While Wounded Knee was supposed to be a protest on corruption in tribal government 
and potentially provided an opportunity to reassess tribal governments, Wounded Knee 
largely ended up being covered from two competing narratives derived from the Vietnam 
War. The first viewed the occupation and Vietnam as necessities to drive out illegal 
factions and reassert law and order. The second viewed the occupiers as partners with 
oppressed peoples engaged in solidarity struggles across the Third World and Vietnam in 
particular. 
 
“Not just now, Mr. Wayne…perhaps later…” 
Vietnam and Wounded Knee were thousands of miles apart, but for many people, 
most importantly those inside the hamlet, the two affairs had striking similarities. At the 
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same time soldiers in Vietnam attempted to frame their service in reference to the Indian 
Wars of the nineteenth century, observers of Wounded Knee drew parallels with the 
ongoing war. Put simply, while soldiers attempted to recreate the Old West in Southeast 
Asia, Vietnam appeared in South Dakota. While the government’s overwhelming 
firepower made it easy for the occupiers to compare themselves to the national liberation 
movement in Vietnam, outside observers invoked the war to describe the incident while 
making political points about government failures in Vietnam. 
Of all Hollywood actors, no one is more synonymous with the western genre than 
John Wayne. While Wayne appeared in non-westerns, a majority of his 172 films were 
westerns.81 A well-known Republican and anti-Communist who famously rode an 
armored personnel carrier through an anti-war protest at Harvard, Wayne starred in, and 
co-directed, the only major pro-Vietnam War movie, 1968’s The Green Berets.82 
Although The Green Berets attempted to justify the war in Vietnam, it was really a 
western movie set in Southeast Asia. The film changed the classic cowboys and Indians 
theme that made Wayne famous into a battle between US Marines and the National 
Liberation Front.83 The Green Berets’ mixture of the western and war movie seemed an 
appropriate mixture for the moment. As John Wayne fought for democracy on screen, 
American soldiers made regular patrols into “Indian Country,” a term they used to 
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describe any area in Vietnam outside of American control. A battalion commander later 
described part of an operation as an “old John Wayne Indian” movie, adding, “We were 
in a circle; they kept charging; they just kept getting killed.”84 General Maxwell Taylor 
also invoked the old narratives when he testified before Congress and stated America’s 
pacification attempts failed because “it is very hard to plant the corn outside the stockade 
when the Indians are still around.”85 Soldiers serving in Vietnam regularly invoked the 
memory of Colonel George Armstrong Custer, the “boy general,” to “imagine themselves 
caught in a hostile racial space, to embody his supposed heroism in that space, and to 
avenge his death.” One Saigon latrine included a message that read, “We’ll bring peace to 
this land if we have to kill them all — General Custer.”86 While Native Americans served 
in Vietnam in greater numbers per capita than any other group, the use of “Indian 
Country” to describe enemy territory directly connected Indians with the NLF.87 
In the real Indian Country of Pine Ridge, Americans witnessed a “modern-day 
Indian uprising” that some argued could only happen with communist support, implicitly 
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linking domestic events with the war in Southeast Asia and the wider Cold War.88 The 
use of the historical references to the Indian Wars of the nineteenth century not only 
framed Vietnam in a racial context, for many it spoke to the inevitability of the war’s 
conclusion. Yet, no matter how much work the US seemed to do in Vietnam, there 
always seemed to be another outbreak of violence. As historian Philip Deloria explains, 
terms like “uprising” and its companion, “outbreak,” described “armed resistance, a 
rebellion that would never produce renewed autonomy, a pocket of stubbornness in the 
midst of the sweep of American empire.”89 In 1973, outbreak and uprising could 
represent Vietnam, South Dakota, or both. Like the war in Vietnam, the occupation of 
Wounded Knee played out in the homes of millions of Americans as they sat down to 
watch the evening news or read the newspaper.  
Previous Native rights protests gave Americans some idea about the growing 
movement, but none took place in what people traditionally defined as “Indian Country.” 
Wounded Knee not only took place on Pine Ridge, real Indian Country, but the starkness 
of the landscape reflected Hollywood’s imagined Indian Country. Unlike Hollywood, 
Wounded Knee was very much a real event with live ammunition and deaths. Yet, in 
covering the event, many news outlets emphasized its sensationalistic aspects. In order to 
sell newspapers or attract viewers, reporters and photographers covering the protest 
turned to familiar imagery, either the detribalized and stoic Hollywood Indian or the 
ongoing war in Vietnam, both of which embraced ideas that involved the “other,” 
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whether the Vietnamese or the Indian as an impediment to the national spread of 
democratic ideals. 
 While Wounded Knee was extensively documented on television and in 
photographs, at least during the first half of the incident, these only tell half the story. As 
visual historian Dona Schwartz argues, the camera does not take the picture, the 
photographer does.90 The photographer taking the picture makes a variety of decisions 
and composition choices that affect what the camera saw before taking the photograph. In 
many incidences these choices seek to capture a photograph or video that will attract 
attention. At the same time that cameramen or photojournalists may seek out eye catching 
and sensational imagery, that also many times, both by choice and unwittingly, mirror 
historical imagery and ideas. In this sense, “history takes on the character of spectacle. 
But this pictorial spectacle is a kind of rerun, since it depends on prior spectacles for its 
supposedly ‘raw’ material.”91 Historian Martha Sandweiss highlights these sentiments, 
writing that understanding photographs depends on the “viewer’s understanding, an 
intellectual or visceral empathy shaped through culture, through experience, through the 
memory of other images.”92 Thus, the photographs of any event, including Wounded 
Knee, can have far different meanings for many different people and generations. 
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For many people who experienced Wounded Knee either in person or through 
news reports, the event seemed to have obvious parallels with the war in Vietnam. Time 
magazine and other weekly news magazines regularly compared the two events, writing 
that Wounded Knee had “too many studied parallels to the Viet Nam War, including a 
‘demilitarized zone’ and ‘cease-fire observers.’”93 Iona Andronov, a reporter for the 
Soviet-backed New Times, wrote that her experiences inside Wounded Knee reminded 
her of Southeast Asia, only “this time the trench…was thousands of miles away from 
Indo-China.”94 The newspaper of the radical Chicano movement Veneceremos noted in a 
supplement covering Wounded Knee that the smuggling of goods into the village at night 
had been nicknamed the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Pine Ridge’s version of the Cambodian 
smuggling route used to link North and South Vietnam.95 The occupation was, as US 
News and World Report labeled it, an “internal Indian affair,” but as Ken Tilsen (an 
attorney representing the protesters) argued, it involved a corrupt government of 
“natives” who gained the support of the United States and used the resources to repress 
their fellow citizens in the interests of the United States. Tilsen concluded, “The best 
analogy to Pine Ridge is South Viet Nam.”96 
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The U.S. government argued the actions in Vietnam were necessary to prevent 
Communist North Vietnam from overtaking South Vietnam and undermining the 
government’s containment strategy. Many, however, questioned the relevance of being 
involved in Vietnam for American foreign policy and security. This skepticism is 
highlighted in a scene at the beginning of Wayne’s The Green Berets where a reporter 
questions a marine about why we are fighting in South Vietnam. After some prodding the 
sergeant expands to include atrocities in Vietnam including the extermination of civilian 
leadership, the murder and torture of innocent women and children. Yet, one of the 
reporters responds, why are we fighting for this government, one that has not had a free 
election and does not have a constitution? The sergeant in charge responds that the 
American government did not form a constitution instantly, but developed one only after 
thirteen years of fighting and work. The response receives a round of applause and the 
reporter, sensing defeat, tensely responds that many people feel the war is simply 
between the Vietnamese people, adding “it’s their war let them handle it.” In response, 
the sergeant grabs guns from Russia and China and ammunition from Czechoslovakia, all 
supposedly found in Vietnam, and dumps them on the table in front of the reporters. 
According to the sergeant, the weapons are a clear sign that “what’s involved here is 
Communist domination of the world,” which again earns wide applause from the military 
families.  
The rationale, however, fell flat both in the movie and real life, and by August of 
1968, a majority of Americans viewed the Vietnam War as a mistake.97 Americans raised 
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similar questions about why the federal government became involved in the intra-tribal 
affair at Wounded Knee. Why were these men in the middle of Pine Ridge, if the conflict 
was nothing more than “a power struggle between two competing Indian factions?”98 
What did the government get for the millions of dollars it spent during the standoff?99 For 
the most part the money bought weaponry and paid government agents to staff the series 
of bunkers that surrounded the village. One photograph taken in a government bunker 
includes four US Marshals looking out over Wounded Knee. Surrounding the men are 
multiple weapons including at least one M-16 and a double-barreled shotgun. The bunker 
looks to be little more than a barren patch of ground with a few hay bales and a cut down 
tree. In contrast to this photograph is another that appeared in the New York Times Unlike 
the previous photograph, the New York Times one has a relaxed air to it with a marshal 
relaxing in a bunker that included a stove. While the U.S. marshals slept in motels in 
Rapid City or other neighboring towns when off-duty, the New York Times claimed the 
government’s bunkers were “elaborate and homey” and provided variety necessities and 
small amenities for the agents on duty.100 
“Why the men are at Wounded Knee” neatly mirrors the government’s reasons for 
being in Vietnam. In addition to the Indians occupying a town and supposedly holding 
people hostage, the government alleged the group had a hefty arsenal at their disposal. 
Claims of automatic weapons, some claiming the group put a machine gun in the church 
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steeple, others claiming they mounted it on a vehicle, sparked fear that the movement had 
serious backing, potentially even coming from foreign governments. A waitress in 
Gordon, Nebraska, a Pine Ridge border town, stated a truck driver with military 
experience went to Wounded Knee and heard machine gun fire, adding “you can’t buy 
machine guns in this country, so that just goes to prove they’re coming from Russia.”101 
The anti-communist John Birch Society used the lone AK-47 in the village and Dennis 
Banks’s statement that AIM “greatly prized” support from Moscow as proof of 
communist involvement.102 Dick Wilson, an ardent anti-Communist who showed John 
Birch Society films at tribal council meetings, responded that Wounded Knee was 
“beachhead” in a “major Communist thrust” into the reservation and the country.103 Carol 
Sullivan, the Syracuse anthropologist, notes that a formal John Birch Society pamphlet 
entitled “Renegade” was distributed around the reservation, undoubtedly with support of 
some kind from Dick Wilson.104 As historian Marilyn B. Young writes, one of the axioms 
of Cold War America was that Communism was always “indifferent to human life, 
individual values, ordinary moral scruples” and worked to completely subvert “the 
machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet 
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world….”105 Under this narrative Wounded Knee was more than a small group of Indians 
occupying a remote reservation town, it was part of the larger Cold War. 
Additionally, Jesse Helms, the conservative Senator from North Carolina, argued 
on the Senate floor that tribal sovereignty and “retrocession of U.S. citizenship” would be 
a step backward from which the Indians would never emerge into the modern world.”106 
Wilson made similar statements, arguing that the occupiers hoped to return the 
reservation to the old system, before the Indian Reorganization Act of the 1930s allowed 
the reservation to rule itself. While many traditionalists on Pine Ridge disliked the IRA 
and argued it fostered paternalism over self-rule, Wilson contended AIM wished to go 
back to the system in which the BIA representative dictated every action that happened 
on the reservation.107 Much as the Hollywood Indian stood as a physical impediment to 
democracy and western expansion, AIM and their demands for tribal sovereignty were 
written off as backward steps for Native Americans. In response, the government 
employed a wait and see strategy, hoping the occupiers would lose support or run out of 
supplies and to surrender on their own. While U.S. marshals, FBI agents, and some BIA 
police appeared to coordinate the government’s response, US Army “observers” took 
command as a test of a secret government civil disturbance plan developed in 1968.108 
Colonel Volney Warner, chief of staff for the 82nd Airborne, and Colonel Jack C. Potter, 
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deputy Chief of Staff for logistics of the Sixth Army, jointly directed the implementation 
of the strategy, codenamed “Garden Plot,” at Wounded Knee. As the army secretly 
carried out the plan, the military attempted to downplay their involvement by having the 
two commanders wear civilian clothes and covered up some army marking on supplies 
they provided the federal agents.109 Furthermore, the FBI and U.S. marshals pushed the 
military to provide 2,000 regulars to end the occupation, but the commanders rejected the 
plan. Already suffering from the Vietnam War, the army did not wish to create “martyrs” 
in a conflict they called an irritation and embarrassment for the Nixon Administration but 
not a threat to the nation.110 Even though the army did not think much of the affair, it 
provided an abundant amount of support for it. In addition to necessities such as blankets 
and C-Rations, the army supplied fifteen Armed Personnel Carriers (APCs), 100,000 
rounds of M-16 ammunition, 1,100 flares, and twenty sniper rifles. Additionally, a 
reconnaissance plane recently back from Vietnam and in possession of the Nebraska 
National Guard flew one mission over the village.111 When the plane made its one flight 
over the village, the occupiers feared they were either being bombed or napalmed.112 
As the tracer rounds and flares lit up the night sky over Wounded Knee, the APCs 
patrolled the boundary looking for anyone attempting to sneak in or out of the village. 
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The large vehicles, essentially tanks without mounted weapons, used regularly in the 
Vietnam War. In Vietnam one APC model, the M-113, initially demoralized the 
American opposition. Equipped with heavy armor and a .50 caliber machine gun that 
could penetrate nearly anything, the M-113s posed a serious problem for the NLF as they 
had no weapons to penetrate or stop the machines.113 Japanese photographer Kyoichi 
Sawada famously captured an M-113 dragging the body of an NLF fighter for burial in a 
1966 photograph that won the World Press Photo of the Year. At Wounded Knee, one set 
of U.S. marshals decorated their APC with a macabre hood ornament that spoke to the 
sordid history of the APCs in Vietnam. Captured just over a month into the occupation, 
the marshals affixed a cow skull to the front of the APC that read simply “death 
machine.” 
Luckily for the occupants of Wounded Knee, the APC never lived up to its 
reputation, and very few caused much damage, although one APC drove over and 
destroyed an AIM bunker.114 Instead, the profuse amounts of government machine gun 
rounds presented the serious threat to the village. During the night of April 26 and 27, the 
government shot thousands of rounds into the village. While primarily directed at AIM’s 
bunkers, ricochets and the tendency of the marshals to shoot at anything that moved 
placed the village under a regular hail of gunfire. AIM’s bunkers could withstand a good 
amount of the gunfire thanks to improvements made by occupiers with Special Forces 
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training, but the village’s buildings had much thinner walls that the bullets easily 
pierced.115  
The decision to wait out the occupation instead of overrunning the village sparked 
criticism by some, who felt the policy not only encouraged the occupiers to keep up the 
protest, but to also start others across the country. Conservatives, following a decade of 
protests by various groups, wanted the containment strategy to end and wanted to see the 
government’s APCs move in and clear the town out. The National Review argued that the 
“soft-headed approach” would do little besides guarantee “future violence and 
insurrection.” The magazine went on to decry Nixon for being vocal on law and order, 
but only carrying “a very small stick” in response to Wounded Knee.116 In another 
editorial, the magazine demanded the government “end the clowning around on both 
sides” and “re-establish control over the ‘occupied’ territory at Wounded Knee.”117 Bob 
Wiedrich, a columnist for the Chicago Tribune, devoted multiple columns to criticizing 
the government policy. Wiedrich claimed “Radical Whites that could care less about the 
tragic lot of many…Oglala…” exploited the occupation because they needed a new cause 
with the end of the war in Vietnam. Wiedrich further claimed the radicals inside 
Wounded Knee “played on the ancient religious beliefs…by suggesting medicine 
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bags…will protect the militants from bullets,” a deliberate reference to the 1890 ghost 
dancers who believed their shirts protected them from bullets.118 
The village did in fact feature numerous non-Natives, many of whom got into the 
village when the government initially lifted the roadblocks. The occupation hesitantly 
welcomed the new supporters—comprised of white leftists from the counterculture and 
anti-war movements, as well as a smattering of blacks, Chicanos, and other minorities—
but made it known it would throw out anyone who did not pull their own weight.119 
Nevertheless, the presence of non-Natives inside the village continued to undermine 
occupiers’ claims about their Indianness. When Frank Clearwater died, a government 
spokesperson told the Associated Press, “we tend to believe he is a white man and not an 
Indian.” The report also quotes the spokesperson as saying Clearwater previously 
represented himself as a white man named Frank Clear.120 Regardless of Clearwater’s 
Indian background (or lack thereof), the use of radical non-Natives called into question 
the authenticity of the Natives demands and their competence to command a protest. 
Hank Adams, the important treaty expert who helped negotiate the settlement testified 
before Congress during the occupation that a large segment of the non-native support 
came from people “who have failed, to ‘get in on’; and become credibly joined in a 
‘Third World’ or ‘American revolution’” and “formed a frontline of support for any 
Indians who will operate as their surrogate ‘revolutionaries’.” These individuals tended to 
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undermine attempts at a peaceful resolution because they continued to seek confrontation, 
for whatever reason, other peaceful settlements.121 
Public support for increased government actions, however, proved relatively 
small. Of the numerous letters and telegrams Kent Frizzell received, less than five 
demanded a quick conclusion to the occupation. B.A. Christie, a resident of South 
Dakota, wrote Kent Frizzell one of the few telegrams supporting increased government 
action at Wounded Knee. Writing at the end of March, Christie asked, “How could we 
beat Vietnam away over there when a local situation like Wounded Knee by a half dozen 
SOBs can’t be taken care of?”122 Ohio Judge Kenneth Sater called Frizzell “more futile 
than Kissinger” and demanded the government provide Wounded Knee an ultimatum, 
“24 hours to surrender, lock, stock, and barrel, or else…”123 Time magazine published 
two letters to the editor that took a critical view of the government’s policy and invoked 
historical imagery. Peter Peel, from Los Angeles, simply wrote, “Negotiate. Hell! 
Where’s the Seventh Cavalry?”124 The Seventh Cavalry was Custer’s old command and 
the unit that carried out the 1890 massacre. Edward C. Mann from Michigan asked if the 
government had “forgotten how to deal with Indians,” arguing it should “promise them 
anything but give them a scrap of paper.”125  
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Although commentators, the public, and the different federal entities at Wounded 
Knee argued over the best strategy to end the occupation, the day-to-day realities of the 
occupation took a toll on the federal agents. In another editorial for the Tribune, Wiedrich 
wrote the agents at Wounded Knee were “hapless pawns of a government too paternal 
and too distant to recognize a phony Indian uprising when it saw one.”126 The issues for 
the marshals ranged from average boredom (an issue than plagued those inside Wounded 
Knee as well), to various reports of agents seeing ghosts, hearing disembodied voices, or 
reporting gunshots when there were none. At least one marshal had to be removed from 
duty after he hallucinated hordes of Indians overrunning his bunker, and he opened fire 
on the phantom Indians.127 The Native Americans attributed the visions and reports of 
disembodied voices to their ancestors from the 1890 Wounded Knee massacre providing 
spiritual protection during the potential second massacre. However, it also in many 
respects speaks to developing myth from Vietnam, excessive drug use by soldiers.128  
While there is no evidence that the marshals regularly engaged in drug use, they 
did spend their time in the bunkers engaged in strange activities. At some point during the 
standoff, a pregnant dog on the reservation gave birth to a litter of puppies, and each 
federal bunker received a puppy to care for. As final surrender approached, the marshals 
had little to do and spent their time conducting mock raids—even using tear gas—on 
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other bunkers in the hopes of capturing the bunker’s puppy.129 Another photograph taken 
during the occupation further captures the oddity of the affair. The photograph depicts a 
marshal, again clothed in a camouflage jumpsuit, sitting in the middle of a bunker loading 
or cleaning an M-16. Around him are another ten M-16s, lined up on top of the bunker’s 
sandbags and seemingly ready for use at a moment’s notice. The weapons in that bunker 
alone more than likely outclassed the entire stockpile inside Wounded Knee, even if 
people smuggled out weapons or never turned some over to the federal government. 
The most striking thing about the photograph, however, is not the amount of 
weapons, but the smile across the marshal’s face as he goes about loading the weapon. It 
is impossible to tell what the smile is in response to, but when combined with the 
numerous weapons around him, the photograph has a sinister look to it. When Lieutenant 
William Calley went on trial for the My Lai Massacre, the prosecutor asked what he 
thought he did in the village. Calley responded that they “weren’t in My Lai to kill 
human beings. We were there to kill ideology that is carried by—I don’t know. Pawns. 
Blobs. Pieces of Flesh, and I wasn’t in My Lai to destroy intelligent men. I was there to 
destroy an intangible idea.” Others present at My Lai later invoked “the Indian idea…the 
only good gook is a dead gook.”130 Some marshals at Wounded Knee had a very negative 
impression of the Indian occupiers, caricaturizing them as classic savages and fantasizing 
about what they would do when they captured one. Describing the situation in front of 
him, the marshal said, “They’re still roamin’ out there, the Injuns. They’d love to get a 
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whitey.”131 Two months later, as the conflict came to its bloody end, another U.S. 
marshal stationed in a government roadblock threatened to cut off the hair of any “long-
haired hippie dudes…with long black hair with pigtails” the government search party 
managed to capture.132 For Marshal Jim Crawford the inability to arrest those inside 
Wounded Knee continually created frustration. According to Crawford, “These people 
down there have broken the law, but we’ve not been permitted to go in there and get 
them.”133 Was the marshal in the photograph cleaning his gun and joking about how 
quickly he could end the occupation if given the chance? At least some of his fellow 
officers were. 
The weary marshals got their wishes when the occupation ended on May 8. As the 
FBI inspected the village to ensure everyone was out, the America flag replaced the AIM 
flag that had flown over the village during the occupation. The government declared the 
village secure with an announcement over the government radios followed by five 
gunshot volleys.134 Interestingly, by ending the occupation this way, the federal 
government partly endorsed the “war footing” AIM claimed when they declared the 
village the Independent Oglala Nation. For Native Americans, especially those inside 
Wounded Knee, the imagery from the end of the siege spoke of imperialism, domination, 
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and conquest. For some Americans it invoked pride, honor, and dignity. It also spoke to 
something the United States government was unable to do in the real Vietnam War–win.  
The Green Berets climaxes with the NLF overrunning Dodge City and forcing the 
Americans to abandon the fort. As the Americans and the friendly Vietnamese flee the 
fort and wait for air support, the NLF begin looting the bodies of dead soldiers inside the 
fort. Whooping and yelling the whole time, they rip boots, shirts, watches, and anything 
else they can off the bodies. Eventually, the Americans retake the fort, and as men 
solemnly go about arranging bodies for removal, the officers survey the damage, ending 
underneath the flagpole with the NLF flag still flying. As Wayne’s character, Colonel 
Mike Kirby, looks up, the camera cuts to the flag, and tense, high-pitched music replaces 
the quiet solemn music that had been playing. Kirby angrily grabs a knife and cuts down 
the flag, the first step in starting to rebuild the fort. The scene ends with Kirby stating the 
men will get some sleep then start all over again in the morning. While the scene attempts 
to convey the determination of the United States to win the war in Vietnam, it also 
highlights the futility of the whole affair.  
Just as John Wayne lost the war with the Green Berets, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General Richard Hallstern used Wayne to joke about government forces not forcibly 
retaking the village, quipping “I am prepared to state categorically and unequivocally that 
John Wayne is nowhere upon this Reservation and we have no intentions of calling him 
in…at this time.” There would be no tank or horse rides through Wounded Knee this 
time.135 Pat Oliphant, the political cartoonist who was working at the Denver Post at the 
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time, satirized the government attempts to end Wounded Knee with a cartoon that 
included Wayne, gun in hand, on his horse ready to ride into Wounded Knee. Instead, the 
line of FBI men in front of him tell him simply, “Not just now, Mr. Wayne…perhaps 
later…."136 In contrast to Wayne’s 1974 appearance at Harvard Yard in an armored 
personnel carrier, in 1973 there would be no grand charge or attack. For most Americans 
the Western marked a bygone era, one in which the divisions between good and evil were 
much more clearly demarcated. In contrast, by the late 1960s and early 1970s many were 
reassessing who exactly were the heroes and villains. 
 
Bury My Heart: The New Indian History 
Woody Kipp, a Blackfoot Indian and Vietnam veteran, attempted to sneak into 
Wounded Knee with a group of other Indians when an armored personnel carrier on 
patrol spotted the group. As they hid from the APC’s spotlight in a snowy ravine, a 
popping sound filled the air overhead. Kipp instantly knew the sound, writing in his 
memoir that, “I had heard it every night for twenty months in Vietnam as the security 
forces defended the air base at Da Nang.” As he lay in the ravine listening he realized that 
the Vietnamese who looked at his dark skin and stated they were the same were right. 
Suddenly in his own country, he “was the gook now.”137 Another Indian Vietnam veteran 
related a similar sentiment, arguing that he joined the Marines because he thought it was 
the “Indian Way.” Yet, after arriving in Vietnam, he realized “that instead of being a 
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warrior like Crazy Horse, I was a scout used by the army to track him down. I was on the 
wrong side of everything I wanted to believe in.”138 Kipp’s powerful comments highlight 
the ways in which, even for many Native Americans, the original purpose for the 
occupation quickly became lost in discussions of pan-Indian issues or the ongoing war. 
Kipp writes that many Indians supported the movement because “they knew something 
was fundamentally wrong with life on the reservation” even if they could not fully 
articulate the issues.139 Thus, for many Native Americans the protest became another 
attack against the government’s Indian policy and not the impeachment of Dick Wilson. 
At the same time, many non-Natives “fought their way through the myths of American 
History” looking for precedents to the Vietnam War and “‘discovered’ the Indian.”140 
The period of the late 1960s and early 1970s saw a rewriting of the narrative, both in 
books and the screen, that portrayed the United States and whites as the savages, while 
Native Americans and the Vietnamese became the resilient heroes. In turn, Wounded 
Knee became a way to avenge past injustices for both Natives and non-Natives. 
Less than a year after the takeover of Alcatraz by a group of American Indian 
activists began, Dee Brown’s Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the 
American West appeared in print and remained on the bestseller lists for over a year; in 
the process it became one of the top-selling books on college campuses across the United 
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States.141 Brown chronicled the history of Native Americans and the various treaties, 
massacres, and ill treatment by the American government roughly between the end of the 
Civil War and the Wounded Knee massacre in 1890. Americans, according to Brown, 
“Have always looked westward when reading about this period should read this book 
facing eastward.”142 Brown’s history was so poignant that many took him to be a Native 
American. During an early telephone call, his publisher asked the author he had yet to 
meet in person if he was an Indian. Brown replied, “Yes and no. Indian is a state of 
mind,” and added in a later interview, “I prefer their view of the world…Indians have a 
kinship with nature. They don’t make rivers dirty and foul up the air. In fact, I believe 
that it is now within their power to save the white man.”143 
Brown’s views on Native Americans mirrored those of the counterculture 
movement that wholeheartedly embraced Native Americans. In addition to 
environmentalism, Native Americans served as “perfect foils to all that these 
predominately Anglo Americans disdained about their parents’ lives.” For the youth of 
the counterculture, Indians embodied “genuine holdouts against American conformity” 
with their spirituality, ecology, and communal living.144 While the renewed embrace of 
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Native Americans brought attention to their causes, it also troubled many Native 
Americans. Vine Deloria Jr., in his popular Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian 
Manifesto, argued that “because people can see right through us, it becomes impossible to 
tell truth from fiction or fact from mythology. Experts paint us as they would like us to 
be. Often we paint ourselves as we wish we were or as we might have been.”145 This fact, 
as he would later write in an editorial in the Los Angeles Times during the occupation of 
Wounded Knee, prohibited Native Americans “from having a modern identity” and 
forced them to be “unreal and ahistorical.”146  
Even though thousands of Indians lived in the nation’s urban centers, many felt if 
they wanted a voice they had to turn to tactics like Alcatraz or Wounded Knee and don 
the ceremonial headdresses and buckskins that characterized most portrayals of Native 
Americans. In addition to promoting myths and stereotypes, the renewed embrace of 
Native Americans was, at times, a shallow parallel between historical Indians and the 
ongoing crisis in Vietnam. In the introduction to Bury My Heart, Brown wrote that the 
new history was not “cheerful…but history has a way of intruding upon the present, and 
perhaps those who read it will have a clearer understanding of what the American Indian 
is, by knowing what he was.”147 While Brown may have meant the occupation of 
Alcatraz, many reviewers used the book to pull in the war in Vietnam. R.Z. Sheppard, 
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reviewing the book in Time magazine, wrote that, “Decades of worthless treaties, search-
and-destroy missions, pacification programs, enforced relocations and free-fire zones 
ended at Wounded Knee,” all of which were terms repeatedly used by the military to 
describe missions in Vietnam.148 A review in Newsweek called the book “A damning case 
against our national roots in greed, perfidy, ignorance, and malice,” and newspaperman 
Elliot Arnold commented to the book’s publisher that, “Anyone who wants to know the 
historical genesis of My Lai should read this book.”149 While reviewers compared the 
history in Brown’s book to Vietnam, a group of Hollywood directors made no attempts to 
hide their comparisons between Native Americans, the counterculture, and the war in 
Vietnam. 
Revisionist Westerns: Indians as the Vietnamese and the Counterculture 
In the early 1970s movie studios released a string of movies now termed 
revisionist westerns. Instead of emphasizing John Wayne style characters, the new films 
promoted more Native Americans, women, and anti-war heroes. The revisionist westerns 
not only pushed the audience to side with the Indians, they drew overt parallels to the 
ongoing war in Vietnam. The most obvious and violent of the three, Soldier Blue (1970), 
depicted the 1864 massacre of Black Kettle’s Cheyenne by Colorado regiments at Sand 
Creek. After researching the massacre and Native American history, director Ralph 
Nelson became enraged at America’s Indian policy, writing that the Native Americans 
“helped Pilgrims, showing them how to grow corn and other crops. Their reward—
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extinction.”150 Nelson’s final product combined the Sand Creek and Wounded Knee 
Massacres into one of the most realistic depictions of violence to appear on the movie 
screen.151 Importantly, Nelson’s main point in creating Soldier Blue was not to attack the 
government’s Indian policies, but rather its Vietnam policy. As Jacquelyn Kilpatrick 
argues, Nelson used “Indians as a metaphor, an exotic one by which an audience could 
feel sympathy from a distance.”152 According to Nelson, Soldier Blue was meant to show 
“the true face of war…how it changes normally peaceful men into savage beasts.”153 
Soldier Blue’s climax, in which the Colorado regiments raid Spotted Wolf’s camp, drew 
attention not only for its vivid depictions of violence and rape but also because of the 
extraordinary parallels between the images on screen and the infamous photographs of 
the 1968 My Lai massacre. In one famous segment from the movie’s climatic scene, a 
boy attempts to hide in a tipi only to be shot through the eye by a bullet. At the same 
time, the village’s women and children attempt to seek shelter in a ravine near the camp 
only to become trapped and shot one by one. 
The imagery in Soldier Blue and My Lai is so similar that many viewers and 
critics argued Nelson drew inspiration for the concluding scene from the events in 
Vietnam. However, as P.B. Hurst documents in his book The Most Savage Film, Nelson 
was aware of the events prior to shooting the concluding act in the ravine, but the film’s 
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completed script included the scene prior to the My Lai photographs appearing in 
December 1969.154 Nevertheless, Nelson and the film’s promotional team used the 
parallels as a selling point for the film. In a promotional packet for the film, Candice 
Bergen, who played a white woman living with the Indians, described the film as “a fable 
on Vietnam.”155 On the day of the film’s New York release, the production company sent 
“Indians”—whites wearing Indian headdresses and attire—into the streets with posters 
asking, “Why Soldier Blue?” which the promoters hoped would lead people to draw 
connections between the violence on the screen and the war in Vietnam. The film met 
with mixed reviews from critics, but it also brought in a record opening day gross for the 
Ziegfeld Theater, where it premiered.156 
Another important revisionist western, and the most successful commercially, was 
Arthur Penn’s Little Big Man (1970). The film depicts Jack Crabb, a 121-year-old white 
man recounting his story of moving between white and Indian society after being adopted 
by a group of Cheyenne Indians. Over the course of his life Crabb found himself present 
at such events as the Washita Creek Massacre and the Battle of Little Bighorn, all the 
while unable to fit in with much of white society. Overall, Penn’s Cheyennes relate less 
to the oppressed Vietnamese or real Native Americans than to the burgeoning 
counterculture movement in America. The movie includes a homosexual Indian, sees 
Jack Crabb form a polygamous marriage with an Indian wife and her three sisters after 
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their husbands die, and includes a “contrary”—an Indian who does everything 
backwards. 
In a similar vein, A Man Called Horse (1970) utilized the work of George Catlin 
and Carl Bodmer to provide little more than a white savage fantasy about being able to 
cast off the ills of the modern world and become an Indian. After being captured by a 
band of Sioux John Morgan agrees to take part in a sun vow to prove his courage. 
Following a day standing outside, Morgan is brought to a ceremonial lodge where his 
chest is pierced and he is hoisted up into the air. As the pain becomes overbearing, 
Morgan slips into a psychedelic vision in which Morgan’s European clothes are stripped 
away, leaving him a true man who can now embrace his Indian princess. The movie 
concludes with Morgan replacing the village’s chief after his death in battle and 
successfully defending the village from a rival tribe by employing the European two-
volley line. Morgan is nothing more than a new version of Natty Bumppo from James 
Fennimore Cooper’s Leatherstocking Tales or Buffalo Bill. Each either cast off or lived 
outside white society, where they manage to become better Indians than the real ones 
while retaining the “benefits” of white society.  
In addition to portraying white society as corrupted, violent, and hypocritical, 
Little Big Man also flips the narrative when it comes to George Armstrong Custer and the 
Battle of Little Bighorn. Crabb first encounters Custer as his business is being cleared out 
after Crabb goes bankrupt because he was too gullible for white society. Custer proclaims 
that Crabb should “go west!” The proclamation is one of Custer’s many “truths,” 
statements that are little more than pronouncements by a clearly insane man. Crabb 
ultimately goes west with his wife but ends up enlisting with Custer after she is captured. 
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The film concludes with the Battle of Little Bighorn when Custer ignores all advice from 
his subordinates and Crabb and charges into battle. Unfortunately for Custer, there is no 
heroic last stand; instead, the general hallucinates making a speech to Congress as his 
men are killed all around him. Penn makes his most overt connection with Vietnam when 
he has Custer lash out at his second in command for his “self-righteousness” in 
questioning Custer’s orders to kill the Indians’ ponies. The film then cuts between shots 
of the men slaughtering not only the ponies, but also the women who attempt to flee the 
violence only to be shot in the back. The massacre concludes with Crabb’s Indian wife 
dying as she tries to flee the village with the couple’s baby on her back. Interestingly, 
Penn chose to cast Aimée Eccles, a native of Hong Kong, for the role, further connecting 
Penn’s Native Americans with the Vietnamese.157 Penn undoubtedly wished viewers to 
draw parallels between Custer and William Calley, the Army officer convicted for his 
role in My Lai, as Penn stated: “the film is contemporary because…history does repeat 
itself.”158 
 
The New Popular History and Wounded Knee 
The popularity of Dee Brown’s book and the string of revisionist westerns, along 
with previous support for native occupations such as the occupation of Alcatraz and the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs building, influenced the governmental and public responses to 
the occupation. A national poll found a slim majority of Americans, fifty-one percent, 
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supported the occupation, with the highest support coming from the young, well-off 
Easterners, along with minorities, Catholics, and union members.159 With the popularity 
of the occupation amongst college students, government officials feared the coming 
spring breaks would create a “Woodstock of the North,” or as Vine Deloria, Jr. labeled it, 
“the last rock festival and clan gathering of the New Left.”160 The influx of support not 
only threatened to prolong an occupation that was in its third month, but Dick Wilson’s 
growing resentment towards the government’s policy created the potential for serious 
violence. Wilson and the Tribal Council argued the reservation had been “invaded” by a 
large number of non-natives, explicitly noting support from the National Council of 
Churches, and the tribal court banned all non-residents from the reservation on March 
16.161 The potential support, while welcomed by the occupation, also posed a problem. 
An increase in the number of non-Natives, many failing to fully comprehend the complex 
issues involved in the occupation, threatened to overrun a Native protest and open the 
door for a government crackdown. While some non-Natives took part in the occupation, 
the biggest direct action from non-Native supporters came during several airdrops 
sponsored by anti-war organizations. 
While few non-Natives found their way to Wounded Knee, many sent donations, 
letters of support, and lobbied government negotiators for a peaceful and just conclusion 
to the occupation. Over the first week of May, as the United States prepared for the end 
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of the occupation, rumors spread, via a coordinated phone campaign across the country, 
of a government plan to forcibly retake the village. While Hank Adams felt the 
occupation had until at least the second half of May to end the occupation without a 
threat of a forceful retaking, the rumors prompted an influx of telegraphs to Kent Frizzell, 
the government’s lead negotiator, from across the country.162 Most of the messages over 
the period came from standard leftist and liberal groups, primarily anti-war, black 
liberation, and Native-allied groups. Nevertheless, telegrams also came from people like 
eleven-year-old Roberta Dunn from Philadelphia. Dunn, an African American, wrote to 
Frizzell that, “The Indians are really being treated wrong. I have been treated wrong but 
not as wrong as the Indians have.”163 Others such as Eunice Wahlberg, from Dearborn, 
Michigan, invoked the new wave of supportive Native American movies and books. 
Wahlberg asked Frizzell if he had read Bury My Heart, “If not, do read it. Let’s not 
commit further bloodshed–or starve babies.”164 A day later, Claire Michaels from Santa 
Monica sent a telegram that read in part, “Starving children is to follow Watergate? 
Americans are quickly becoming the World’s number one monsters–can’t you see 
that?”165 Lynn King made a veiled reference to My Lai in her letter when she wrote, “We 
need no second massacre to demonstrate the enlightened humanitarian values of the 
United States.”166 
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The communications Frizzell received highlight the fact that while many 
supported the Native Americans in the event, the cultural events of the past months and 
years heavily influenced the discourse. Frizzell received a few letters prior to early May, 
but it was not until the rumors of an invasion became public that people voiced their 
opinions on the occupation en masse. As noted, the threat of an invasion was minimal at 
best given the disastrous public relations that would result. Nevertheless, the thought of a 
second Wounded Knee (or My Lai) drove people to the local Western Union office faster 
than at any other point during the seventy-one-day standoff. While some people implored 
Frizzell and the government to give the Indians a “fair deal,” most failed to mention any 
of AIM’s or OSCRO’s demands. Preventing the nineteenth century or Vietnam from 
repeating in South Dakota overshadowed sovereignty, the removal of Dick Wilson, and 
the other demands. As non-Natives attempted to comprehend the occupation in terms of 
history, Native Americans attempted to deal with what the occupation meant for them. 
While non-Natives had little connection to whatever happened at Wounded Knee, Native 
Americans had numerous connections to an occupation that for some seemed to be 
growing more absurd by the day. 
 
“We Have Been Nearly Destroyed Emotionally by the Incident”: Wounded Knee for 
Native Americans 
The Chicago Tribune Magazine quoted Colin Smith, a reporter covering 
Wounded Knee for the London Observer, saying, “If only someone would say, ‘When 
the moon comes over the mountain and the leaves fall off the trees on the night when the 
cherries turn red, we will attack the long rifles.’ All I hear is, ‘Yeah, man…cool it…and 
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we will study this procedural matter.’”167 The quote exemplifies the argument Vine 
Deloria made in his Los Angeles Times editorial that as Indians began “to emerge as 
modern people…the press embraced Chief Red Fox.”168 Red Fox, a nephew of Crazy 
Horse and a Sioux performer who appeared in various Nickelodeons and Buffalo Bill’s 
Wild West, gained notoriety when he pretended to scalp King Edward VII of England 
during a London performance of the Wild West. In his memoirs released in 1971, Red 
Fox admitted there was a “strain of suppressed malignancy” in his veins when he thought 
of all his ancestors accused of scalping White men while he stood over the King hitting 
him with a rubber tomahawk.169 Interestingly, Red Fox became an Indian activist late in 
his life and devoted the final chapter of his memoir to chronicling the various injustices 
heaped on Native Americans over the years. Nevertheless, for Deloria, the “crazy 
insurrection” that aroused White America, almost emotionally destroyed Native America 
and left Indian “lives, culture, and identity…twisted and shaped by this event in a manner 
and to an extent that white Americans will never understand.”170 
In part, the tensions stemmed from the divide between Indians who believed 
something needed to be done in relation to Native treaty rights, but did not support the 
protests of AIM and the OSCRO. The divide appeared in the previous occupations of 
Alcatraz and the Bureau of Indian Affairs building in November 1972. During fish-ins in 
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the Northwest that protested restrictions on tribal fishing rights, locals derided the 
National Indian Youth Council as “college kids in sports jackets who showed up merely 
to make themselves look good.”171 One Oglala woman interviewed during Wounded 
Knee angrily stated that she did not “need Russell Means to come in here and tell me how 
to be an Indian.”172 Writing in 1983, poet, novelist and cultural critic Gerald Vizenor, a 
White Earth Ojibwe, argued that the American Indian Movement, and Banks in 
particular, “gained fame and relative wealth on the collective name of the tribal poor and 
on the ideologies of oppression.”173 Vizenor also attacked the movement for pulling its 
“radical rhetoric” not from traditional tribal sources, but rather from their time in prison. 
In addition, Vizenor argued that the movement’s members looked like they derived their 
look in part from Edward Curtis’s iconic portraits of Native Americans. The members 
“never seem to smile, an incautious throwback to a stoical tribal visage when camera 
shutters and film speeds were slower.”174  
The movement did have its supporters throughout Indian Country, however. One 
elderly resident of Pine Ridge noted in response to the occupation that, “I’ve lived 77 
years and my reservation has been in total darkness. It’s had a blanket thrown over it–
we’re living in darkness. And somewhere these young people who started AIM came to 
our reservation and turned the light on. Now the light is on our reservation and the light is 
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getting bigger and now we can see things.”175 In response to their critics, many Native 
Americans involved in the protests contested the radical classification and argued that the 
movement was not what it was portrayed in the news media. Leonard Crow Dog, the 
movement’s spiritual leader, argued that the movement was not fighting white people, but 
“the white man’s system.”176 Leonard’s future wife, Mary Crow Dog, added in her 
memoirs that she never considered herself a radical or revolutionary. Instead, she and 
others wanted to “be left alone, to live our lives as we see fit. To govern ourselves in 
reality and not just on paper.”177 Grace Black Elk furthered the comments when she 
argued that the FBI surrounding Wounded Knee was “more militant—they’re military,” 
adding that while she was an AIM member, “we’re not militant—unless we’re forced to 
be.”178  
Although AIM strove for non-violence, they found the media only paid attention 
to them when they “got rowdy” and not when they “behaved nicely.” Annoyed by this 
fact, Russell Means once angrily asked reporters, “What do we have to do to get some 
attention? Scalp somebody?”179 For many in AIM, Wounded Knee arose, in part, out of 
failures to achieve reforms from within the system. Instead, many now felt they had 
nothing to do but put on the headdresses and “get rowdy.” 
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AIM conducted a highly theatrical protest that emphasized first and foremost pan-
Indian tribal sovereignty and attacked years of government policy. The demands for tribal 
sovereignty posed an issue for AIM when they did demand the removal of Dick Wilson 
from office, as it seemed the organization contradicted itself by asking the federal 
government to get involved in a tribal affair. Additionally, many questioned how far the 
group’s demands to be left alone went, namely, the fact that AIM wanted government 
funds for programs on the reservations. The important thing to understand about the 
requests of AIM and other Indian rights activists is that they did not want total 
sovereignty (an independent nation). Instead, they wanted to create a “protectorate status 
for all Indian nations.”180 Instead of having the BIA or another government organization 
divide up and allocate funds, all the money would be provided to tribal governments who 
would have complete say over where and how they distributed the money. In a Senate 
Indian Affairs subcommittee hearing, Means explained the new distinction to a confused 
South Dakota Senator James Abourezk as something akin to the relationship between San 
Marino and Italy in regards to San Marino’s armed forces. San Marino, an independent 
enclave wholly inside Italy, has ceremonial armed forces, but Italy’s army, through an 
agreement signed by the two, provides for its national defense.181 
Surprisingly, during the early seventies, the movement’s demands seemed to have 
the support of President Richard Nixon. While Nixon is remembered for Watergate and 
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as a Cold Warrior, his administration had favorable policies towards Native Americans. 
Most notably the administration fully disavowed the policy of termination. The policy 
had fallen out of favor in the preceding years, but in a July 8, 1970, speech, Nixon stated 
the premise behind the act, that the United States government took on the trustee 
relationship as an act of generosity and could end the relationship whenever it felt like it, 
violated the solemn obligations and treaties the government signed with tribes. In 
addition, Nixon acknowledged the disastrous effects the policy had on the tribes who 
went through it and the fear it caused in tribes not yet terminated. Nixon promised 
increased Indian control of federal programs and schools and argued, “Self-determination 
among the Indian people can and must be encouraged without the threat of eventual 
termination.”182 The administration also pushed for, and secured, the return of the Blue 
Lake and land to the Taos Pueblo in New Mexico. Teddy Roosevelt took the area, which 
the tribe considers sacred, in the early part of the twentieth century when he created the 
Carson National Forest. However, Nixon’s policies, while beneficial for Native 
Americans, were highly calculated political moves. The Republican Party fared poorly 
with minority voters, and the administration hoped the policies would bolster their image 
and boost party support. The policies allowed the administration to go after white 
sympathy votes, claiming the policies showed the administration worked to improve the 
lives of minorities.183 The policies found support with some Native Americans, but 
looking back, Phillip Deloria writes, they were “misleading in that they encouraged the 
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hope of many Indians and their non-Indian friends that the key to the solution of Indian 
problems is to convince someone high enough in government to become an Indian 
advocate…”184  
Whatever Nixon and the administration felt about Native Americans, protests 
such as the occupation of Alcatraz and the Bureau of Indian Affairs building in 
November of 1972 eroded any goodwill the administration had. When AIM attempted to 
set up a meeting with the administration in the fall of 1972, as part of the Trail of Broken 
Treaties protest, Nixon angrily replied that he did more to help Native Americans than 
any president in the last century and did not feel a meeting with the group was 
warranted.185 After failing to secure a meeting with the President, the group tried to get 
meetings with members of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Interior Department. 
However, the attempts ended up with the group occupying the BIA offices, which they 
renamed the Native American Embassy, for a week.186 By Wounded Knee, the 
administration was ready to take a hardline approach. However, the skillful use of 
Wounded Knee and the history it invoked prevented the government from quickly ending 
the occupation once it began. Thus the government ended up in negotiations that looked 
like a modern version of the sessions that led to the Fort Laramie Treaty, the legal basis 
for many of AIM’s claims. 
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Many of the 1973 negotiations, including those that led to the first agreement to 
end the conflict, took place in a tipi the occupiers erected outside the village. When Kent 
Frizzell and other government negotiators entered the tipi they sat on the same ground as 
the Native Americans. Some government officials involved in the proceedings mocked 
the various ceremonial practices, saying, “Imagine having to sit on the earth around a 
buffalo skull in order to talk to those people.”187 For his part Frizzell regularly embraced 
the idea and tried to use his Midwestern background to connect with the groups. In 
response, the Wichita Eagle published a cartoon depicting Frizzell attempting to gain a 
meeting with Nixon in a business suit and a feathered headband.188 While government 
officials mocked the negotiation ceremonies, the occupiers mocked the government for 
what they felt was an excessive amount of force. In one instance the group spray-painted 
an old beat-up Chevrolet van with “APC” on the front and “Official AIM use only” on 
one of the doors. This “APC” served as the village’s official “AIM Personnel Carrier” 
and transported members to meetings in the neutral tipi.189 In another instance, an 
occupier rode out to a government APC in an old Datsun and started hitting the sides of 
the armored vehicle and “counting coup,” imagery that invokes memories of outmatched 
plains tribes of the nineteenth century attempting to count coup as white soldiers shoot at 
them with guns.190 Means also regularly pointed out the government’s firepower 
advantage and the history all too familiar to many non-Natives when, as he said in one 
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The occupation of Wounded Knee came at the tail end of the Vietnam War and 
followed a decade that witnessed mass protests and the formation of new political 
identities. Whether it was conservatives wishing for law and order to finally take 
command or counter-culture influenced by a wave of movies and books that portrayed 
Native Americans far more favorably than previous narratives, Wounded Knee became 
something different to everyone who viewed it. While these cultural references increased 
the exposure of Native Americans, they also built upon a variety of stereotypes that 
obscured many of the underlying issues AIM and the occupiers of Wounded Knee fought 
to resolve. Wounded Knee became a “crazy insurrection” that fascinated and amazed 
white audiences caught up in the new history of Native Americans and parallels to 
oppressed groups in struggles of national liberation, but their understanding of the crisis 
only went so deep. The occupation got support, but it was not enough to overcome the 
Nixon administration’s determination to draw the line on what it would do for Native 
Americans. In the years following Wounded Knee the government would increase its 
campaign to weaken and destroy the organization, while many non-Natives lost Wounded 
Knee’s true history, replacing it with a murky story of an uprising and the murder of FBI 
agents. Wounded Knee, however, was not the end for American Indian activists in the 
United States. While the Department of Justice and the FBI sought to crack down on 
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AIM, activists increasingly began looking outside the U.S. for the next place to make 
their stand. In a 2011 speech at Augustana College, Russell Means reflected on Wounded 
Knee and noted the occupation “was the spark that started the worldwide indigenous 
revolution.”192 The next year activists from across the US and the world would meet on 
the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation to form the International Indian Treaty Council. At 
the same time AIM dealt with in-fighting, highly publicized trials that drained resources, 
and declining public attention, indigenous activists began the process of securing 
representation at an international level, creating a stark contrast between the discord that 
usually typifies AIM of the 1970s and some of the greatest unity and success in the 
history of indigenous activism.
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DISUNITY AT HOME, ALLIANCES ABROAD 
 
Some of my friends have made strange alliances. 
But will not say so, or tell me anything. 
The situation makes for a dark situation 
But not so that I can admit that it is night. 
- Jimmie Durham, “Yellow Thunder Red Thunder”1 
 
For its tenth anniversary in 1978 the American Indian Movement released a 
commemorative poster that incorporated a painting by Mohawk spiritual leader Chief 
Lewis Hall. The painting (Figure 1), which grew out of a dream Hall had, included a 
silhouette of an American Indian fighter at Wounded Knee, a U.S. and Canadian flag 
upside-down as a sign of distress, and a clan mother of the Mohawk Nation clearly made 
to mimic the Statue of Liberty, an appropriate invocation that came close to the American 
bi-centennial celebration in 1976. The poster proclaimed the “Red Man’s Great 
International Warrior Society” that was “pledged to fight white man’s injustice to 
Indians” regardless of the location in North America.2 In addition to proclaiming the 
organization would go anywhere in the hemisphere to defend indigenous rights, the 
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alliance with a Mohawk artist connected the group to the most prominent transnational 
indigenous conflict in the United States and centered AIM’s second decade of activism as 
one rooted in international issues while remaining rooted in its history in the United 
States.3 
 
Figure 1: AIM 10th Anniversary Poster 
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Following the end of the Wounded Knee Occupation, the small hamlet returned to 
a quiet part of the reservation, albeit one filled with burned out buildings and bullet holes. 
In the months and years that followed the American Indian Movement found itself 
confronting how it moved forward while at the same time dealing with a copious amount 
of legal issues that threatened to fracture the movement into an irrelevant blip in 
American history. Yet the movement was not the “flickering, intermittent presence” that 
some historians have labelled it.4 Instead the 1970s witnessed a growing campaign that 
did move “jerkily, like some drunk guy on the Tulsa highway” but for a time rekindled 
“that hope which can never be extinguished.”5 Regardless of how the evolution 
happened, the decade that followed the occupation of Wounded Knee was not only one of 
the most consequential eras of Native American history in the United States, but also one 
of the most overlooked. AIM never drew the same level of media attention it did with 
Wounded Knee, but the movement never faded; instead, the perceived failures of the 
occupation signaled the way forward. 
Between 1973 and the middle of the 1980s, Indigenous activists sought to engage 
the international community as a way of working around negotiations with the United 
States government that were seen as having achieved little progress in the previous 
twenty years and had only secured a relatively minor meeting with the Nixon 
adminstration after Wounded Knee. Instead, members of the American Indian Movement 
and other indigenous activists formed the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC) on 
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the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation in 1974 to align U.S. Native Americans with 
liberation and decolonization movements that had spread around the Third World during 
the previous decades. The events highlight the issues American Indian activists faced in 
trying to situate Native issues within western concepts and ideas. As Chadwick Allen 
argues, transnational Indigenous activists were “both overtly enabled and intimately 
structured by the complexities of transnational networks, those by-products of the 
histories and ongoing legacies of various colonialisms.”6 Even though membership in the 
United Nations and international conferences and tribunals allowed the formation of 
alliances that sought to bring outside pressure against the United States and compel it to 
make changes in its policies towards Native Americans, the new arena could only do so 
much. In addition to the legal and political processes of securing international 
recognition, the international turn in activism necessitated the formation of political 
ideologies and situating indigenous issues within the dynamics of the Cold War and 
western politics. While indigenous politics in the United States and the western 
hemisphere as a whole were in many ways different from the decolonization struggles 
taking place in Asia and Africa, activists realized they could not move internationally 
without more definitively defining themselves. 
Yet, for all the progress of the 1970s, activist groups at the start of the 1980s were 
still struggling to fully articulate ideological positions that expanded beyond basic ideas 
of opposition to the U.S. government and historical grievances. As a result, as 
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governmental policy shifted under the more conservative Reagan administration, the 
activist landscape was largely bypassed, which undermined an effective and coordinated 
response to indigenous issues of the 1980s. These political discussions in the early 1980s 
were attempts to address this fact and apply the new international ideas to issues in the 
United States including the protests at Big Mountain, protests on the Diné and Hopi 
reservations, as well as the Yellow Thunder Camp seeking the return of the Black Hills to 
the Oglala Sioux. Yet, much of the discussion remained just that, discussion that had little 
applicability to events affecting indigenous peoples on a daily basis. 
While these events do not necessarily translate to concrete advancements, they are 
nonetheless an important part of Indigenous history in the 1980s. Much of the 
historiography on Native American issues after 1973 centers on political histories 
focused on what David Wilkinson called a “bizarre and inconsistent blend of actions” 
that both continued the self-determination policies of the 1970s and also regularly 
undermined those very principles.7 In addition, the principal focal point for studying 
Native Americans in the 1980s was the dramatic rise of casino gaming, which tended to 
overshadow other issues.8 The discussions in the 1980s provide an important 
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counterpoint to the literature on Native Americans and capital development. Finally, 
while scholars long ago discarded the modernity framework that situated indigenous 
cultures as a pre-modern period, the early 1980s witnessed many activists embracing a 
reversion to older life ways that rejected modernity. Even though most Native Americans 
were not willing to embrace these fringe ideas, the discussions at the tribunal serve as a 
way of building on the literature of Native Americans and modernity in the twentieth 
century.9  
 
The International Indian Treaty Council 
In June 1974, while the Pine Ridge reservation was still suffering from the after 
effects of Wounded Knee and the failure to remove Dick Wilson from power, members 
of ninety-eight indigenous nations from around the country, along with a number of 
governmental representatives from various countries, convened a meeting on the 
Standing Rock Sioux Reservation in North Dakota. The meeting created the International 
Indian Treaty Council, a separate organization from the American Indian Movement, but 
one deeply influenced by the connections. The IITC in the Declaration of Continuing 
Independence outlined its plans, which centered upon seeking recognition from the 
United Nations for indigenous issues and seeking to uphold indigenous sovereignty.10 
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The formation of the new organization marked a monumental moment in Native 
activism. While indigenous people had always engaged in international diplomacy, the 
IITC was the first large-scale coordinated effort by activists in the second half of the 
twentieth century to move into the international arena. While there were copious issues at 
home, many Native Americans saw the IITC as a critical change, with Roxanne Dunbar-
Ortiz, an activist-academic who worked with the International Indian Treaty Council, 
going so far as to write later that, “The movement was saved largely by its decision to 
embrace, insist on, and apply international human rights law.”11 While groups such as the 
National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) and the National Indian Youth Council 
(NIYC) had secured victories in the decades prior to the 1970s, the federal government’s 
active attempt to undermine the American Indian Movement through legal proceedings 
and the illegal COINTELPRO program of spying “nearly crushed the indigenous 
movement in the United States.”12 
The IITC rooted its complaints against the United States in historical treaties as 
well as recent UN declarations. Invoking UN General Assembly Resolution 1514, which 
included the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples, the IITC claimed the US was in violation of UN resolutions because it did not 
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“transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or 
reservations.”13 The IITC planned to challenge US policies with a multi-point program 
that involved seeking membership in various international bodies, including OPEC, the 
World Health Organization, International Court of Justice, and UNESCO among others. 
Additionally, as with other indigenous activism of the period, the organization planned to 
send the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie to various nations and request that “those nations 
officially recognize said treaty[’s] place in their archives of international agreements.”14 
Yet, as with others who embraced the Treaty of Fort Laramie, the legal position was at 
times dubious. While utilizing the treaty highlighted the violations in regards to the Black 
Hills and the sovereignty of the Sioux, it was only one treaty. As John Trudell, who 
served as executive director of AIM during the 1970s, noted, “Now we need an 
international treaty, not just the 1868 treaty.”15 
A critical part of the IITC was moving away from the “action” mentality of the 
American Indian Movement and towards a policy-based response to indigenous issues. 
Even though Russell Means attended and spoke on June 14th saying that decisions 
“coming out of this conference are also going to be involved in the spilling of blood” and 
people needed to commit, “even if we need to shoot a white man,” those organizing the 
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formal discussions sought to distance themselves from the rhetoric.16 Three days earlier, 
Julie Bellafonte argued that the media was not covering the conference because they 
wanted an incident and AIM to be “a bunch of renegade Indians.” Yet the IITC did not 
need an incident like Wounded Knee, the proceeding would speak for itself.17 
Furthermore, the IITC was centered upon providing an intellectual exchange, working to 
translate information from the United Nations to local communities and inversely 
ensuring those local communities had a voice on the international stage. Bill Means, in 
the proposal for the 1981 NGO conference on Indigenous Peoples and the Land, wrote 
that after informing the international community about treaty issues, the next major goal 
of the movement was “to bring information and concerns of the international community 
back to the various Indian Nations.”18 The end result of the IITC’s campaign was that in 
1977 the organization received status at the United Nations as a Non-governmental 
Organization (NGO) with Consultative Status within the the Geneva-based Economic and 
Social Council, the first indigenous group to achieve that status.19 
Right after securing NGO status, the IITC served as the sole organizer of the 1977 
Geneva Conference on Indians of the Americas, sponsored by the Commission on 
Human Rights’ sub-committee on Racism and De-colonization. The conference sought to 
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bring together indigenous leaders from around the western hemisphere which the Treaty 
Council hoped would ultimately lead to getting the United Nations “on our side on issues 
of treaty rights and sovereignty so that we can begin to negotiate with the U.S. on a more 
equal basis.”20 In working around the “criminals” of the U.S. government who had 
continually exploited them, IITC members wanted to find support among nations who 
had been exploited by the U.S. in the same manner. Ed Castillo stated in one treaty 
working group meeting that Third World nations “in a world court will understand our 
plight since they have been ripped off by US oil companies, etc.,” and the Treaty Council 
provided sustained support throughout the 1970s to Mapuche Indians in Chile responding 
to governmental policies imposed by U.S.-backed Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet.21 
The conference increased the standing of the IITC, both within the U.N. and with 
indigenous peoples around the western hemisphere and pushed for a more comprehensive 
accounting of indigenous issues within the U.N. 
The development of the IITC came during a period that the United Nations had 
declared the “Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination” and in 
1972 commissioned a report, “Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous 
Populations,” to explore the issues. The report provided a detailed, albeit uneven account 
of the issues related to indigenous peoples and added international support for the 
movement. While commissioned in 1972, the report lingered in an unfinished status for 
much of the 1970s. The first half of the report, written between 1973 and 1975 takes on a 
																																																								
20 Treaty Council News, April 1977. Roger Finzel Papers, Box 2, Folder 21. 
21 Ibid.; Treaty Council News, November 1977. 
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very different appearance from the second half written after 1978. The first half is 
characterized as “dry and legalistic” and paternalistic as the writers did not consult with 
indigenous peoples.22 The second half, coming after the 1977 Geneva summit on 
indigenous peoples, incorporated material from those indigenous activists as well as 
many of the NGOs that were involved in documenting the issues throughout the decade. 
Even though the conference created discussion on indigenous issues and was well 
attended, it did not resolve the fundamental issue for the IITC, which was the countries 
from which the group should seek support. Jimmie Durham, who resided in Europe 
during the Red Power Era, was instrumental in organizing activism at the international 
level. While some within the IITC wished to seek representation with OPEC as a way of 
increasing control of their natural resources, others highlighted the hypocritical nature of 
the effort. Ed Castillo argued that nothing would be gained from “Arab or Eastern 
princes” who oppressed their poorest people. As a result, the IITC would be left to seek 
support from the smallest countries and align itself with countries that would put it in 
direct conflict with conservative elements in American foreign policy. In particular, the 
IITC would look to gain support of the Non-Aligned Movement, comprised of countries 
from Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. While not tied to either side of the Cold War, the 
NAM came under criticism of conservatives in the United States as an alleged communist 
front, with opponents noting the presence of Cuba in the group as well as the Soviet 
Union’s support for many NAM goals. Criticisms of both the Non-Aligned Movement 
and indigenous activities at the United Nations increased with the election of Ronald 
																																																								
22 Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, “How Indigenous Peoples Wound Up at the United Nations,” 
in Hidden 1970s, 122. 
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Reagan in 1980. At the same time that the IITC worked to organize a follow-up 
conference in 1981 on Indigenous Peoples and the Land. The conference saw attendance 
by 134 indigenous representatives, down from close to two-hundred representatives in 
1977, which Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz attributes partly to the Reagan Administration call to 
boycott the conference.23 The dilemma of how to situate itself internationally was only 
part of the issue facing the IITC. In the United States, the IITC and AIM were also 
uncertain of which groups provided the best avenues for support. 
 
Native Activism and the Realignment of the 1970s 
An “AIM Fact Sheet” distributed by the American Indian Defense Committee 
(AID) that claimed AIM “represents a fact of Indian life, but is a leader of the radical left 
as well.” The sheet went on to note that AIM is looked to for guidance by “the Left and 
Third World groups” and quoted Russell Means as saying, “If the labor movement had 
looked to us in the 30’s, perhaps they would not have lost.”24 As noted, AIM pulled in a 
considerable amount of support from non-Natives, especially within leftist groups. In the 
years that followed the occupation of Wounded Knee, some of the groups began to 
debate their relationship with the movement. In the Bay Area a support committee of 
																																																								
23 “International NGO Conference on Indigenous Peoples and the Land,” International 
Indian Treaty Council Report. Finzel Papers, Box 11, Folder 16; Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, “How 
Indigenous Peoples Wound Up at the United Nations,” in Ibid., 126. 
24 Finzel Papers, Box 1, Folder 1. There is no additional information on AID in the 
archival materials. Searches for information on the group turns up a minimal amount of 
information. Materials at the Pennsylvania Historical Society links it potentially to the United 
American Indians of the Delaware Valley (UAIDV), an Indian led group. Russell Means spoke in 
Philadelphia in April 1974 at an event discussing Wounded Knee that was sponsored by AID. See 
The Militant, April 26, 1974, 2. Accessed from 
https://www.themilitant.com/1974/3816/MIL3816.pdf. A finding aid for the UAIDV archives at 




non-Natives felt the critical issue was “the lack of any kind of theoretical statement being 
issued from the Native Peoples providing the basis for support work.” Invoking Mao’s 
statement that “without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolution,” the discussion 
arrived at the idea that not only did AIM need a revolutionary ideology, it needed to 
recognize “a class struggle is a matter of class struggle––a fundamental Marxist-Leninist 
principle;” otherwise, a new movement had to replace AIM.25 
The writer went on to comment that a recent trip to Washington D.C. by a group 
of tribal leaders failed because it was “totally lacking in historical and revolutionary class 
perspective,” which meant it was only going to result in “more frustration, division, 
disunity and more errors.” Furthermore, according to the author, even though the group 
tied itself to the defense of those involved in Wounded Knee, that “outburst of resistance” 
followed in a long history “proven to be errors with the advent of the Paris Commune of 
1871, not to mention Wounded Knee.” Until AIM realized it needed to lead a class 
struggle against the unified enemy capitalism rather than a “race war,” the members of 
the Bay Area Support Committee would be wasting their time and energy, according to 
the author.26 
The paternalistic approach to the movement had no focus on the issue of 
indigenous sovereignty, replacing that long-held aim with a mass proletarian struggle, a 
point expanded on by Len Cavise of Chicago, in letter to the Native American Support 
Committee (NASC), an alliance of non-Native lawyers and legal experts, in November of 
																																																								
25 “Notes from a friend for political discussion: 11/7/75, Barbara,” Finzel Papers, Box 2, 
Folder 3. 




1975 that was distributed at that month’s meeting and deemed “helpful for political 
discussions.” While another letter writer expressed unease about bringing their politics 
into the “‘Indian’ struggle,” Cavise argued “the most serious failing of we non-Indian 
legal workers has been that we did not struggle with the Indian leadership around 
political ideas or that we had no political ideas about the struggle to put forth.”27 Cavise 
added that those people who had travelled to Wounded Knee and kept quiet about politics 
had simply been “guilt tripped” into not saying anything even though “The Indian 
struggle is clearly an anti-imperialist struggle that is just as clearly our struggle. 
(emphasis in original)” Instead, according to Cavise, those in attendance had failed to 
provide guidance, creating the situation of AIM’s leadership being “as screwed up and 
confused as it is.” Cavise also invoked one of the most common complaints leveled 
against AIM—the idea that they were not really Indians. Utilizing Stalin’s definition of 
nationhood presented the fact that “The Indians in the city are not a nation at all but a 
national minority entitled to full democratic rights in the larger society” and meant that 
more research was needed “before coming to a final theoretical position.”28 Yet, Cavise 
also expressed ambivalence about “Soviet social-imperialism” invading the movement 
																																																								
27 Len Cavise letter to BAWKSC, November 11, 1975, Finzel Papers, Box 2, Folder 3. 
28 Len Cavise letter to BAWKSC, November 11, 1975, Finzel Papers, Box 2, Folder 3. 
Stalin’s definition required groups to meet five requirements: “historically constituted, stable 
community of people, formed on a basis of common language, territory, economic life, and 
psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.” Cavise does not explain why Indians 
do not meet the requirement, arguing instead regional autonomy “much like the Chicano peoples 
of the Southwest” is the correct option. 
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because of Clyde Bellecourt’s position on the Committee of the National Alliance, a 
Communist Party-allied group.29 
The discussions with the BAWKSC and the NASC arose in 1975 because both 
groups, comprised of lawyers to assist with the legal ramifications of the occupation of 
Wounded Knee, were reaching the end of their initial commitment made in June 1973 to 
provide support for the post-Wounded Knee trials. In undated meeting minutes, members 
of the NASC outlined potential questions for continuing support for AIM. The group’s 
members outlined three questions to decide on for potentially continuing legal support: 
do they support only groups they fully agree with, do they support groups advocating 
progressive politics but they do not fully support, or do they support groups seeking civil 
rights regardless of the politics of the group. Depending on the answers, the group could 
then discuss whether to provide legal support but withhold endorsement of the politics. 
Yet, the end result of the meeting was that “this is not the best way of determining 
whether we should lend legal support because AIM doesn’t have a political line that can 
coherently be inspected.”30 Ignoring the inclusion of indigenous issues under the “civil 
rights” banner, the outline of the NASC shows a higher level of ambivalence to insert 
their own politics into the movement, yet, coming a year after the formation of the IITC, 
there is no discussion of supporting the international turn in native activism outside of 
amorphous endorsements of supporting anti-imperialist groups. 
																																																								
29 Ibid. Cavise writes that Bellecourt’s membership in the committee was “not because of 
personal ideology but because of his position that AIM will accept help from anywhere.” 
30 Untitled meeting notes beginning with “George, I will send out copies…”, Finzel 
Papers, Box 2, Folder 3. 
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While these voices comprised a relatively small part of those who supported 
Native issues during the period, the Bay Area was one of the main hubs of support for 
indigenous issues prior to Wounded Knee and has remained the same following it. The 
Bay Area Support Committee additionally operated in one of the major urban Native 
American populations, and the discussions should not be discounted. Furthermore, the 
NASC received the endorsement of the IITC, albeit with the note that the organization 
had its issues, in November 1977 for their work building ties to solidarity groups in 
Europe.31 Writing on the countercultural support for Native Americans during the 1960s, 
Sherry Smith argued that non-native support had its limitations but countercultural 
individuals supported natives “in large and significant numbers, which, in turn, caught 
the attention of the rest of the nation.” According to Smith, the Hippie “discovery” of 
Native Americans went beyond previous critiques of superficial and marginal because it 
provided a fundamental shift in indigenous issues.32 Yet just over two years after 
Wounded Knee, liberal supporters were already seeking to impose their views and ideas 
on the movement under the guise of support. 
Furthermore, these sorts of discussions played out within the Wounded Knee 
Legal Defense/Offense Committee (WKLDOC), which was created to provide direct 
legal assistance to AIM’s members following Wounded Knee. WKLDOC provided the 
lawyers and coordinated the legal effort for both Dennis Banks and Russell Means, the 
two most prominent members of AIM to stand trial after the occupation, and succeeded 
																																																								
31 Treaty Council News, November 1977. 
32 Sherry L. Smith, Hippies, Indians, and the Fight for Red Power (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 6-7. 
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in getting them both acquitted of federal charges. In late 1974, Bob Anderson, a leader 
within WKLDOC, wrote a memo to all members arguing that they were “no longer 
objects of history books but the makers of history.” Anderson’s letter opened with a 
discussion of how liberation fighters in Mozambique paused daily to read Mao’s 
quotations, which provided both direction and guidance. AIM, however, was not in a 
position to forcibly retake what had been taken from them, so until that time, the 
movement “will have to fight our way through the maze of an economic-social operating 
world-wide to oppress people for the benefit of a few in Europe and America.” Anderson 
is very explicitly aligning at least the WKLDOC with the larger liberation movement in 
the Third World and pushing for AIM to move in that direction as well. Yet, in 
Anderson’s view two big issues were hindering that shift: the individualistic nature of 
both members of the committee and AIM’s leaders; and the inability of AIM to 
comprehend economic theories and lead people to try and “look-alike the middle class” 
instead of solving actual problems.33 
Letters to WKLDOC included many that invoked economic and political 
struggles of various groups. While the Martin Luther King, Jr. Memorial Clinic’s letter 
during the occupation argued “our enemy is the same…the dog-eat-dog profit system…” 
and the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with American People that claimed the same 
people who sought to undermine AIM carried out crimes against the Vietnamese and 
could “only checked by the struggle and we hope that you will succeed” utilized political 
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111	 
rhetorical, many simply sought information.34 Furthermore, the group gained attention in 
Europe, yet in contrast to other historians who claim the international support for 
AIM/WKLDOC helped it succeed, the committee’s records indicate an overwhelming 
number of superficial correspondence including things like seeking pen pals with “noble 
peoples.”35 International solidarity and forming an ideological basis were critical 
components for many within the organization; yet, the reality at times was less 
successful, WKLDOC at one point was over $12,000 in debt.36 
Both the WKLDOC and the Bay Area support group remained active through the 
rest of the decade and into the 1980s, and the debates gave credence to opposition from 
Native activists about aligning with liberal supporters. Writing in Treaty Council News, 
the official publication of the IITC, Jimmie Durham noted indigenous activism pulled in 
considerable support from non-Native leftists. Yet, Durham found the support a bigger 
issue than a benefit because the “freaks” added nothing substantial and were “hippies 
who just rip us off.”37 Instead, Durham proposed the much more effective way of gaining 
support from non-natives was through the white working class (coal miners, farmers, 
																																																								
34 Unsigned letter from Alabama (Martin Luther King Jr. Memorial Clinic) and Letter 
from the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with American People to Medical Aid to Indochina, 
July 1973. WKLDOC Records, Box 96. 
35 Grace Borowicz Letter from Poland, 1/30/75. WKLDOC Records, Box 95. In 
particular, György Ference Tóth, From Wounded Knee to Checkpoint Charlie: The Alliance for 
Sovereignty Between American Indians and Central Europeans in the Late Cold War (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2016) claims European support was critical during the 
period. In contrast the correspondence boxes in the WKLDOC are largely comprised of letters 
from the United States rather than Europe. It is also difficult to compute donations totals between 
the two and provide a quantitative accounting of the organization’s funding sources. 
36 Letter to Ann Shubert (Alberta Indian Education Center), August 1974. WKLDOC 
Records, Box 95. 
37 Treaty Council News, August 1978, 4. 
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steelworkers) who had legitimate political power in the United States. Durham’s 
invocation of the working class is interesting because even though the early 1970s 
appeared to be fostering a re-energized working class, Durham’s statements came right as 
the “workingman’s era” began to descend into the more conservative Reagan Era. The 
conflict over which non-Native groups and demographics to align with, however, 
emphasizes the attempts of burgeoning international indigenous activism to fit within a 
decade historian Jefferson Cowie labelled “more than a time of mere fads…it was a time 
of fundamental realignments.”38 
At the same time, AIM organized the Longest Walk, one of the few points of 
Native activism post-1973 to be covered in any major detail and generally seen as the 
final coda in AIM’s history. The group organized a march from Alcatraz to Washington, 
D.C., meant to protest anti-Indian bills introduced into Congress.39 Begun in February 
1978, the movement arrived in D.C. in July 1978 and staged a week of protests and 
ceremonies. In their official information pamphlet, AIM notes that “none of the anti-
treaty bills became law,” and “just days after the arrival of the walkers, Congress passed, 
																																																								
38 Jefferson Cowie, Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class 
(New York: New Press, 2012), 3, 11. 
39 One of the most prominent bills to draw attention of Native activists was the Native 
Americans Equal Opportunity Act (H.R. 9054, H.R. 13329), introduced to Congress by 
Washington Republican representative John Cunningham (Seattle) first introduced in September 
1977. The bill would have reapplied policies of Termination, which sought to end the 
government-to-government replacement between the United States and Native American tribes. 
The bill never advanced farther than a committee referral and Cunningham, who was elected in a 
special election after the incumbent resigned to serve as Carter’s Transportation Secretary, lost re-
election the following cycle. George Castile argues that Cunningham’s bill along with anti-Indian 
bills by Washington’s Senator Slade Gorton and Representative Lloyd Meeds were “largely 
introduced for home-state consumption” to build on the Washingtonian backlash to native fishing 
rights victories. Castile, Taking Charge, 47-48. 
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and President Carter signed, the Indian Religious Freedom Act and the Indian Child 
Welfare Act later that year.”40 In contrast, the January 1978 issue of Treaty Council News 
included a front page story entitled “Distraction: Another U.S. Tactic” and stated that the 
Treaty Council followed the advice of elders to move away from working to change the 
U.S. governmental response to native peoples, because “we would not fall into the trap of 
dealing with Congress or with congressional acts in any way. We declared that, as nations 
and peoples, we would deal with the U.S. only through its State Department.” Spending 
time trying to fight bills divided the movement away from the more important purpose of 
finally building a liberation struggle that would gain solid international support. Instead, 
activists “want us to drop all that work which will really get us somewhere and go back 
to twenty years ago and a dead-end fight with congress.”41 Jimmie Durham was 
ambivalent about the protest, arguing it was just a way for people to get their names in 
the press, and it took away energy from serious work “to fight some bills that had already 
been killed.”42 
Durham’s objection to the Longest Walk put the international faction, or at least 
its leader, in conflict with the most prominent Native activist organization in the United 
States. The conflict also manifested the criticism of the IITC that it ignored reservation 
issues and failed to secure victories in its international work. In response, the December 
1977 Treaty Council News recapped the work of the IITC over the past year and the 
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42 “Trying to See Clearly,” Treaty Council News, August 1978, 2; Kay Cole Papers, Box 
9, Folder 2. 
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agenda forthcoming in 1978. The report noted that while many of the events on the 
international level seemed remote to the “day to day survival” of Native Americans 
across the United States, it was critical to work to undue the centuries of colonization. 
The report went on to address those who were “disillusioned” with the progress of the 
IITC, arguing that undoing the wide reach of colonization took time while conceding the 
IITC “did not know exactly what we were getting into, or where it might lead us.”43 
Part of Durham’s opposition to AIM-organized protests may have arisen from the 
fact that he saw AIM and others as opportunistic, at least when it came to international 
work. In the same editorial that criticized the Longest Walk as a waste of time, Durham 
stated that when the IITC was laying the groundwork prior to the 1977 Geneva 
Conference few people wanted to get involved. Then after the conference, “everybody 
and his brother was jumping on the bandwagon,” with most of them out for their own 
ends rather than a comprehensive response to the issues raised.44 One of those groups 
Durham’s called out by name was AIM, which he said jumped on the international 
movement to gain funding for their survival schools in Minneapolis. In the end, for 
Durham, the Longest Walk “drained a lot of time and money that could have been better 
spent” and showed that “It’s easier to demonstrate in Washington than it is to do solid 
work on the reservation.”45 At the same time, in California Dennis Banks felt as if history 
was passing him by, having to watch the Longest Walk depart the state as he could not 
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leave the state due to state charges in South Dakota. Banks, along with many of those 
involved in the Longest Walk and the IITC would continue these discussions into the 
1980s and build on them in response to the election of Ronald Reagan.46 
 
“Warrior Scholars” and the Response to Reagan 
Ronald Reagan’s sweeping victory over incumbent Jimmy Carter in 1980 on a 
platform rooted in reducing government spending, cutting taxes, and reducing what he 
called the “tenancies of excessive government regulation” marked a pivotal shift in the 
politics of the United States.47 Native Americans immediately faced the very real threat 
of cuts to funding that provided critical health, educational, and housing services to both 
reservation-based and urban Indian communities. The new policies presented an issue for 
Native Americans, and many felt they required an immediate response to protect the 
critical funding. As a result, Native activists sought to increase publicity for the situation 
by organizing an unofficial impeachment proceeding against Reagan that would put the 
president on trial for crimes against Native Americans. Yet, even though the conservative 
turn in American politics brought supporters together, the “impeachment” quickly 
morphed into an all-encompassing event to put the United States on trial for crimes 
against Indigenous peoples regardless of whether or not they lived in the United States.  
The American Indian International Tribunal (AIIT) in the early 1980s at D-Q University 
in Davis, California, created a Native-led version of the Fourth Russell Tribunal, held in 
Rotterdam, Netherlands, that sought to informally adjudicate Indigenous human rights 
																																																								
46 “Afternoon Session,” Dennis Banks Statement, American Indian International Tribunal 
planning meetings. Kay Cole Papers, Box 9, Folder 1. 
47 Castile, Taking Charge, 49. 
	
116	 
claims and bring pressure against governments to change the policies. The AIIT serves as 
a helpful case study in how activists attempted to continue the international turn of the 
1970s and bring international attention to issues that affected Native Americans at both 
the national and local levels..48 
In April 1982 activists congregated at D-Q to discuss a preliminary response to 
the Reagan Administration’s new programs. The meeting led to the creation of the AIIT 
and planning would continue through September. One of the first issues before the 
planning committee was finding a location for the proceeding. Located in Davis, 
California, just west of Sacramento, D-Q University seemed like the obvious choice as it 
grew out of an activist movement led by professors in the Native American Studies 
program at University of California-Davis, as well as Indigenous and Latinx students 
who saw themselves as under-represented in Davis’s administrative structure and felt that 
education should be controlled by the individual groups. Situated on a decommissioned 
military base, the founders secured the plot of land after an occupation protest resulted in 
the University of California withdrawing an application for the land. While UC-Davis 
had argued the site would be used for the Native American Studies program, it would 
also serve as a research facility, which D-Q founders argued would be controlled by 
“larger private corporations, motivated by the infamous publish or perish threat, and 
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performed without regard to human benefits or ecological consequences.” In contrast, 
research on the campus was meant to “enhance rather than degrade Mother Earth.”49  
Jack Forbes, Kenneth Martin, and David Risling, all D-Q founders, authored a 
report that looked at the ways in which the establishment of the institution was the best 
example of an Indigenous-Chicano partnership and the benefits it had for both 
communities. In their view, not only was the formation of the university one of the “most 
significant” steps in building Indigenous education, but its creation marked “the first 
‘Pan-Indian’ movement (cutting across tribal lines and national boundaries) which 
expressed real success” that also potentially being the first “worker-peasant-intellectual” 
which embraced “the conditions and lives of the common people.”50 The writers went on 
to note that the university would expand on the creation of the Native American Studies 
program at nearby University of California-Davis, which, while an important milestone, 
was created because of “the temporary fear and guilt…induced by several ‘Third World’ 
student strikes and by student militancy” and quickly lost power with administrators.51  
The conflicts with UC-Davis were mirrored by the Davis community at-large, 
which had a large “white liberal” population that had provided support in the past but, 
																																																								
49 “D-Q University,” Kay Cole Papers, Box 1, Folder 1, 1. 
50 Jack D. Forbes, Kenneth R. Martin, David Risling, “The Establishment of D-Q 
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according to the authors, responded to the founding of D-Q mostly with either 
indifference or hostility, further highlighting the need for movements led and organized 
by indigenous peoples themselves.52 Furthermore, much of the support found within the 
community came from the lower classes, with the authors reporting only a handful of 
white professors and students moving to actively support the new institution.53 While the 
founders mostly focused on relations with non-Natives, the university’s creation did 
underline divides within Indigenous activism. While historians have elaborated on the 
importance of the occupation of Alcatraz by the Indians of All Tribes between 1969 and 
1971, D-Q’s founders explicitly founded the University with an activist mentality, they 
sought to differentiate it from the Alcatraz approach.54 Many of those who took part in 
the earlier incident arrived ready to support the initial D-Q protests in 1971, but many 
were “unaware of the history” of conflict within the UC-Davis community and sought a 
process rooted in “liberation” and amorphous “Indian rights” that would create an “inland 
Alcatraz” rather than more established procedures and a formal university the students of 
UC-Davis were attempting to implement.55 Rather than creating a new Alcatraz, the 
founders hoped to promote “warrior scholars” who would form alliances across racial and 
political lines, in the process posing a “tremendous threat because immediately the bonds 
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53 “The Establishment of D-Q University,” 5. It should be noted that the authors go on to 
note that support for the new institution was minimal regardless of race. Support from both the 
African American and Asian communities are listed as minimal in the report. 
54 See Troy R. Johnson, The American Indian Occupation of Alcatraz Island: Red Power 
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of colonialism in the colonialized mind begin to be broken.”56 In other words, while the 
founders wanted a more formalized structure, they also founded a university rooted in an 
activist mentality. This in many respects became the primary selling point, as educational 
institutions such as the Navajo Community College preceded D-Q and provided a more 
institutionalized educational environment. The activist mindset is best emphasized by the 
fact that the institution selected Dennis Banks as chancellor in 1979. Banks, who both 
took courses and taught at the school, served as the university’s only chancellor in its 
history and emphasized a program rooted in traditional Indian ceremonies.57 
Even though D-Q University was far less formal than a traditional university, the 
Ad-Hoc Committee on Indian Education that formed during the planning of the AIIT 
argued that D-Q was the surest way to counter funding issues related to Reagan’s 
presidency, and the university would provide a pathway out of poverty and ensure Native 
American youth were not transformed into “ignorant technicians.”58 Forbes built on this 
idea in testimony at the AIIT when he stated D-Q was a way of checking the 
transformation of indigenous peoples “into proletariats, either rural or urban cheap labor 
working classes,” making them forget their indigenous heritage and converting them into 
“part of a color-graded racial caste system.”59 D-Q would provide a venue for both 
building collations and re-affirming separate identities. 
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As one of the only tribal colleges not affiliated with a tribal nation and the 
location of an emergency meeting to create an initial response to Reagan administration 
policies in April 1982, D-Q University seemed like a decent place to hold the AIIT. But 
the question of location was not immediately resolved in the planning discussions. Phillip 
Deer argued for Washington D.C., noting “all problems come from there.” Other 
participants were concerned about the potentially fleeting attention anything in D.C. 
would receive, undoubtedly remembering the attention the Trail of Broken Treaties 
received in 1972. Herb Powless argued that “Washington has too many issues which will 
detract from our issue. Only one day coverage.”60 In contrast, D-Q University offered 
connections to the indigenous community and the ability of Dennis Banks to take part; 
Banks was still using California Governor Jerry Brown’s support to avoid charges related 
to South Dakota’s state charges related to Wounded Knee. The university won out and 
would host the tribunal in September 1982, which it subsequently used to promote itself 
as a place to counter tours by various military and government officials who regularly 







60 The Trail of Broken Treaties was a protest that sought to present a list of demands to 
the Nixon Administration and ended with the occupation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs building 
for a week prior to the 1972 presidential election. The best analysis of what the protest was 
seeking still remains Vine Deloria, Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties: An Indian Declaration of 
Independence, 1st University of Texas Press ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985); a 
historical overview of the protest can be found in Smith and Warrior, Like a Hurricane. 
61 “D-Q University,” Kay Cole Papers, Box 1, Folder 1, 2. 
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The Scope of the American Indian International Tribunal 
Besides location, the organizers discussed to what extent the tribunal should be 
centered on Ronald Reagan’s new policies versus crimes of the United States as a whole. 
Originally prompted to convene as a result of New Federalism policies, the organizers 
thought that confining the discussion to Reagan alone would be less effective because 
Reagan was only part of the problem. Russell Means argued for a more expansive 
meeting that would move beyond just exposing Ronald Reagan’s policies. In the typed 
notes from the planning meetings, Means argued that the real issues were “sovereignty, 
economics…Reagan’s aspect [as] puppet of corporation[s].”62 Powless, however, 
cautioned restraint and noted AIM had its issues with thinking too big. According to 
Powless, the weakness of AIM was that the organization “always goes into it, before we 
know it we are attacking the universe,” and that “we came here to repeal Reaganomics 
and we’re not international. Need to come out of our communities….” The international 
idea ultimately won the day, and Means threw a satirical apology towards the others for 
“acting white——making something complicated which is not complicated. Propose we 
have International Tribunal, and lets get on with it.”63 The divergence between Means 
and Powless over the scope of the tribunal indicates that even after a decade of activism 
by the IITC and support for moving towards an international focus by the leaders of AIM, 
a level of concern still remained within Indian Country that significant local issues would 
be obscured and forgotten by an ill-defined international aspect.  
																																																								




The divide over the scope of the tribunal would be evident in the fact that the 
proceeding would have an international focus, including multiple days of internationally-
focused testimony, but would conclude with a day of testimonies by U.S. interests that 
would remain rooted in the original issues of New Federalism and Reagan’s move to 
scale back the federal government. Building upon comments by Philip Deer, Russell 
Means embraced an idea of blissful ignorance, arguing that if Indigenous peoples 
returned to more traditional ways, Reagan would be nothing more than a name. 
Amazingly, Means maintained that “Educated Indians are screaming over Reaganomics. 
The elders don’t mention cutbacks. They don’t know who Reagan is.”64 Means’s 
comments exemplify his particular mindset that emphasized unrealistic proclamations 
and put him at odds with a number of Native leaders over the years. They highlight the 
uneven nature of a movement that had the potential to follow outlandish ideas in the 
name of progress. 
While Means proclaimed ignorance, those in attendance at the planning meetings 
agreed Reagan would be bad for Native peoples, but there was talk that the new policies 
might actually be a long-term victory for indigenous peoples. Dennis Banks, opening the 
April 1982 meetings, emphasized that the activists sought to challenge Reagan and the 
federal government as a whole, but he claimed they should “oppose termination of these 
programs but also realize the need to get off the addiction and become self-sufficient.”65 
Bill Means, Russell’s brother and a member of AIM and the IITC, extended thanks to 
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Reagan in his later tribunal testimony for “making our people realize that the hand that 
feeds you can be drawn back at any time. We thank you for helping our people realize 
that they must become active, that they must become involved, in order to take their place 
in society…”66 According to Bill Means, Reagan’s policies spurred “the red man of the 
Western Hemisphere” to emerge onto the world stage during the 1980s in the same way 
blacks and Arabs emerged in the 1960s and 1970s respectively.67 Or, to put it more 
succinctly, Dennis Banks simply said, “First get rid of him [Reagan], then we’ll thank 
him.”68 
Yet, the policies that the Reagan Administration sought to curtail, particularly in 
regards to funding for health services, were threatening to have serious implications for 
Native Americans around the country. The members of the tribunal, while 
acknowledging this, had difficulty bringing themselves to support many of the policies 
they wanted to save from the administration. In particular Banks focused on Indian 
hospitals, claiming they could not be de-coupled from support from large corporations 
and statements supporting the clinics were tantamount to saying “save Bayer, save 
Exxon.” In Banks’ view, the meetings needed to issue firm statements opposing 
European medicine because “those clinics are killing us.”69 When other members of the 
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working group tried to argue that getting rid of Indian hospitals would cause serious 
issues for people who could not afford any other options, Banks responded that while the 
removal of “European” medicine would “cause suffering…we must do it.”70 The changes 
would present issues, potentially for close to two decades according to many in 
attendance, but it would wake up Indians who had previously been opposed to AIM or 
other “militants” because “When we sit down at the table with our children and there is 
no food, then we will see who becomes militant.”71 Philip Deer echoed some of the same 
sentiments, stating, “People are too comfortable. They talk about termination but it’s 
gonna take termination to wake people up.”72 Nevertheless, those in attendance had to 
understand the callousness of the discussion, and the end result would be a statement 
arguing for continued support of Indian hospitals with control resting with tribes rather 
than the federal government. 
The role of corporations in the health industry stresses one of the central 
organizing aspects of the tribunal, not only trying Reagan for his issues but also the role 
of the U.S. and its corporations in exploiting indigenous peoples around the world. The 
organizing committee settled on a guiding principle of examining “the economic effects 
of U.S. foreign and domestic policies and their impact on Indigenous lands and 
peoples.”73 In a funding proposal for the tribunal, the organizers note that the tribunal 
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would be run by indigenous peoples but would not be exclusively indigenous, because “It 
has long been believed and accepted that other racial groups are equally concerned with 
the domestic and [foreign] policies of the U.S., and have taken various stands on those 
issues which directly affect their communities.”74 Furthermore, Banks had already 
reached out to organizations in Europe and South and Central America. The ultimate goal 
would be to expose the issues with the United States’ foreign and domestic policies and 
by issuing the ruling to the general public that would theoretically generate “worldwide 
concern…to achieve" changes to the policies.75 After the first day of the tribunal, which 
would cover issues of multi-national companies and “money changers,” the subsequent 
days would be divided into testimonies by individuals and groups from Africa/Middle 
East, Asia/Pacific Islands, Central/South America, and North America respectively. 
Over the six months between the original meetings in April and the tribunal in 
September, members sent out material seeking groups and organizations to testify against 
the United States as well as promoting the event to various mailing lists and 
organizations. While testimonies would come from indigenous groups around the world, 
Dennis Banks received various letters from non-Indigenous individuals around the U.S. 
and the world adding support to the tribunal. At the same time the letters highlight that 
the scope of the promotion, the letters also showcase many of the same superficial 
responses that made support for the IITC uneven. Many were from non-Natives offering 
support, but also having minimal understanding of indigenous issues, many times 
																																																								
74 “Proposal for Funding” from the First American Indian International Tribunal to The 
Funding Exchange, June 30, 1982, Kay Cole Papers, Box 2, Folder 1, 1. 
75 “Proposal for Funding, June 30, 1982, to The Funding Exchange,” Kay Cole Papers, 
Box 2, Folder 1. 
	
126	 
providing rambling discussions of their claimed indigeneity and how the U.S. 
government had wronged them. Nevertheless, the tribunal did provide some interesting 
alliances of minority groups. In one case, a nineteen-year-old resident of South Tyrol, a 
majority German-speaking region of Italy, wrote to Dennis Banks in August 1982 to note 
that the experiences of Native Americans in the United States had opened her up to issues 
of colonization at home. She noted that she was an “apple,” utilizing a pejorative term for 
an Indian who acted white, because she had more Italian friends and had adopted much of 
the Italian language but she was rediscovering her identity.76 
 
Multi-National Corporations and Exploitations 
The first event at the tribunal after the opening sunrise ceremony was a 
presentation by Holly Sklar, a non-indigenous writer speaking on the issues of multi-
national corporations and their ability to exploit and degrade communities around the 
world. Sklar, who had written a book on the Trilateral Commission—an economic 
organization formed by David Rockefeller to build economic cooperation between the 
U.S., Western Europe, and Japan, laid out the case for corporations having much greater 
power than many Third World countries, leading much of the developing world to buy 
into the “‘middle class’ by mortgaging their peoples’ futures.”77 In the U.S., the issues of 
corporations were overwhelmingly felt by Native Americans, with Sklar noting the issues 
of uranium and coal mining on reservations and the ability of corporations to control 
prices of goods available. While Sklar tackles issues focused on indigenous communities 
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both in the U.S. and overseas, the main point of her talk was not directly centered on 
indigenous issues. Nor was one of Russell Means’ appearances before the tribunal in 
which he read testimony from a member of the Committee for Monetary Reform, a group 
which viewed the debt-based economic system as unsustainable. While Means seemed at 
times to have only a basic grasp of what he was reading, the significance for the tribunal 
was the idea that international banks utilized debt as a way of controlling smaller 
countries, but because Native Americans had little connection to the international 
economic scene, “they have used political destruction, genocide, assimilation” to control 
indigenous people.78 Means noted in follow-up questioning that the issue of currency 
presented issues for Native Americans, but he also argued much of it was a diversion to 
keep people occupied. Buying into or opposing the system was simply a game, leaving 
people “arguing about Marxism vis-à-vis Trotskyism vis-à-vis imperialism. You can spin 
your wheels there, being the diversion that they want you to be, or you can get down to 
some very basic respect for your relatives.”79 
Much of the testimony by Sklar objecting to transnational corporations and the 
undue influence of banks, along with the guiding principal of opposing Reagan’s policies, 
certainly seemed to place AIM and the tribunal in line with leftist ideologies. Yet many 
of the participants were hesitant to endorse the idea that the tribunal served as a partisan 
affair in terms of U.S. politics. The tribunal had to function on its own, as an indigenous 
event that drew in a variety of issues and fostered debates centering on Native 
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Americans. Bill Means, in summarizing the proceedings, noted that the crimes against 
indigenous peoples were glaringly obvious, but the solution was not. He noted that, “No 
longer are Indigenous people accepting political ideologies which are European and 
merely a change in government but applying principles of traditional…governments 
which governed our peoples for thousands of years.” Means jarringly concluded by both 
invoking Justice Robert Jackson’s statement at the Nuremberg trials that the United 
States was “not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we 
would not be willing to have invoked against us,” but also noting, in all caps, “IF YOU 
DON’T FUCK OFF WE’LL KILL YOU”80 The message being that Indigenous issues 
deserved a place in the international political discourse, but Indigenous peoples were also 
separate from much of the politics that revolved around the movement. The tribunal, 
however, could not escape ties to the ongoing Cold War and the renewed hostilities 
brought about by Reagan’s harsh stand against the Soviet Union. Bill Means, in 
discussing Reagan’s claims about revolutions being exported from Cuba to Central 
America, argued the issue was simply “colonialism being exported.” Means also noted 
issues with working with international communities, arguing that when Indians were on 
the international stage they were labelled the “first communists.”81 The dismissal of 
socialism/communism still remained a contentious issue for non-Native supporters.  
Four months prior to Reagan’s election, Russell Means gave his self-proclaimed 
“most famous speech” at the Black Hills International Survival Gathering. The gathering 
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had been a partnership between the Black Hills Alliance, which comprised both AIM and 
peace movement activists, along with local white ranchers opposed to Black Hills 
development, with the goal of creating a dialog on stopping environmental exploitation. 
The most notable thing to come out of the gathering, however, was Means’s speech 
entitled “For America to Live, Europe Must Die,” which laid out his argument that 
Marxism was incompatible with Indigenous life. Instead of benefitting American Indians, 
it simply “changed power relations within Europe around a bit, but only to meet the needs 
of the white world at the expense of everyone and everything else.”82 Using the example 
of uranium, which was plentiful on the Pine Ridge Reservation, Means argued that 
capitalists would exploit the natural resources only as long as it was profitable, 
potentially buying indigenous peoples time should it not be worth the cost of mining. In 
contrast, Marxists, according to Means, sought the “perfection of the industrial process 
which is destroying us all.” This would continue to foster the exploitation of Native 
resources while only redistributing the profits of the enterprise to a wider group of 
people. In other words, according to Means, Marxism has no place for distinct indigenous 
peoples; instead, if Natives wish to join the Marxist system, they need to assimilate and 
become proletarians. Means concluded the fiery speech by noting that his words and 
positions had long been twisted to make indigenous activism represent “Marxist-
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Leninist” ideas and convinced the “white ‘left’” that they “believe[d] they share[d] our 
values, while rejecting the same values at every practical turn.”83 
While others around Means found themselves skeptical of Marxism as a blanket 
answer for indigenous issues, many non-Natives took serious issue with Means’s 
speech.84 As Bill Means testified, whereas many saw indigenous peoples as the first 
communists, after Russell’s speech appeared in Mother Jones, Indians moved to being 
labelled capitalists, “so we get it from all sides.”85 Revolutionary Worker wrote up the 
speech and Means’s appearance at the gathering saying the speech “disgusted literally 
hundreds, [and] left thousands with a sour taste in their mouths,” while noting that the 
attendees were mostly anti-nuke activists with a small group of American Indians and 
some local ranchers. In a lengthy retort, the paper claimed Means was a retrograde 
seeking to return to more primitive times and capitulating to the status quo social order of 
capitalism.86 Anthropologist and activist Steve Talbot, while not responding directly to 
Means, echoed much of the Revolutionary Worker argument in his book The Roots of 
																																																								
83 Copy of Means’s speech to International Survival Gathering, Kay Cole Papers, Box 9, 
Folder 33, page 14. 
84 Ward Churchill, who worked with Means at the Denver AIM chapter wrote in “False 
Promises: An Indigenist Examination of Marxist Theory and Practice” that “no Marxist-Leninist 
setting have the national rights of any small people been respected, most especially not those of 
land-based, indigenous (‘tribal’) peoples.” Furthermore, “The punch line is that Marxism as a 
worldview is not only diametrically opposed to that held by indigenous peoples, it also quite 
literally precludes their right to a continued existence as functioning socio-cultural entities” 
because Marx’s ideal cultural model was based solely on European cultures. Ward Churchill, 
Since Predator Came: Notes from the Struggle for American Indian Liberation (Oakland, CA: 
AK Press, 2005), 318, 324. 
85 Bill Means, Testimony, Kay Cole Papers, Box 2, Folder 22, 5. 
86 “Searching for the ‘Second Harvest: Russell Means’ Attack on Revolutionary 
Marxism,” Revolutionary Worker, August 22, 1980, Eda Gordon Papers, Center for Southwest 
Research, University of New Mexico, Box 1, Folder 23, 9, 14, 20-21. 
	
131	 
Oppression: The American Indian Question. After laying out the litany of ways in which 
Native Americans have been exploited by the federal government over the years, Talbot 
concludes by arguing that indigenous peoples needed to clearly define their friends versus 
their enemies, otherwise there would not be an effective response to Reagan’s policies of 
a military build-up. In Talbot’s view, “the best and truest allies of Native American 
peoples and nationalities in the fight-back, in terms of their structural position in the U.S. 
political economy, will be the other oppressed minorities and the working class 
generally.”87 
The issue of corporation and capitalist exploitation were important to indigenous 
peoples across the world and would grow increasingly more pressing in the decade that 
followed with the rise of globalization and trade agreements that had a disproportionate 
affect on rural communities. But as Martin Andersen writes in Peoples of the Earth, 
“Efforts to cast native demands in the left-right dichotomy not only does a disservice to 
understanding the issues at hand; they frequently further marginalize those who have 
little voice in their own labelling.” Furthermore, as activists in South America argued, the 
attempts to lump indigenous issues into socialist causes many times resulted in the 
“paternalism of traditional elites…replaced by a class-based paternalism in “subtle 
revolutionary-proletariat camouflage.”88 The discussions at both the tribunal and in the 
preceding years highlighted attempts of Native Americans to define themselves in 
relation to western political ideologies, yet the discussions were only a small part of 
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Native activism at the turn of the 1980s. Even though AIM had sought to transition away 
from occupations and confrontations with the government, the 1980s witnessed both the 
Yellow Thunder Camp in South Dakota and the Big Mountain protest on the 
Navajo/Hopi Reservation. Both protests attracted considerable attention in Indian 
Country, and both became prominent events in promoting indigenous issues in the U.S. 
around the world. In addition, attempts to deliver housing opportunities for the urban 
Indian community in Minneapolis rooted itself in rhetoric similar to that used by Yellow 
Thunder and Big Mountain. All three helped to build connections and translate the 
abstract ideas of the preceding discussions into on-the-ground activities, building on the 
idea that the international and local events of indigenous activism were connected. 
 
Land and Relocations 
In South Dakota Russell Means and activists organized the Yellow Thunder 
Camp to emphasize both the importance of the Black Hills for the Oglala Sioux as well as 
the significance of traditional ways. Named after Raymond Yellow Thunder, an Oglala 
man killed by whites in a reservation border town in the early 1970s, the camp was “the 
Dakota answer to Reaganomics, genocide planned by the U.S.A., colonialism, drug 
abuse, juvenile delinquency, and violence.”89 The camp, situated on federal land, would 
be a back to the land movement for the Lakotas and served as a way of reasserting 
traditional practices. After its creation in early 1981, the camp, popular with both Lakotas 
and non-Natives who came from as far away as Japan and central Europe, served as a 
thorn in the side of the Forest Service and the federal government. However, the camp 
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also attracted people who were less concerned with the movement, but rather simply 
sought free shelter, food, or escaping the hassles of Rapid City. In July 1982, a few 
months prior to the AIIT’s opening, a white resident of Rapid City died at the camp from 
gunshot wounds, prompting the federal government to quicken attempts to shut it down.90 
The camp would continue, but Means, originally dedicated to the movement, grew 
frustrated with the camp and would ultimately leave both it and the American Indian 
Movement in 1985, saying he was sick of “babysitting” the camp.91 Yellow Thunder, 
however, provided opportunities that Wounded Knee in 1973 did not; notably, for a 
period it had much greater local support than Wounded Knee did and at least for a period 
offered chances to discuss issues affecting indigenous peoples without the sensationalism 
of the previous protest. 
Meanwhile, the protests at Big Mountain arose from the partition of the Joint Use 
Area of the shared Hopi/Diné lands in northeastern Arizona. The area had a group of 
roughly 15,000 traditional Diné and less than a thousand Hopis who were subject to 
removal after Public Law 95-531 divided the area between the two tribes to settle the 
conflict over control. Many of the residents were older, non-English speaking members 
who saw little issue with the situation as it stood prior to passage of the 1977 law. In 
contrast, those testifying about the issue at the AIIT pointed to the mineral deposits under 
																																																								
90 New York Times, September 27, 1982. 
91 News from Indian Country, February 28, 1988. 
	
134	 
the land, particularly coal and uranium, which could be more easily exploited by 
corporations in the event the land dispute was settled.92 
While Big Mountain was one of the remotest segments of the southwest 
reservation, Clyde Bellecourt testified at the tribunal about the Little Earth housing 
development in Minneapolis, which sought to provide affordable housing for Indigenous 
residents. Little Earth was a 2.3-acre housing development created by the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development in the 1960s. Located close to Franklin Avenue, the 
center of Minneapolis’s indigenous community, a majority of the development’s 
occupants were Native Americans. By the mid-1970s, the development had fallen into 
disrepair with many of the units uninhabitable. The American Indian Movement pushed 
to take over management of the development, and after a community vote the 
organization, with Clyde Bellecourt as the official head, was selected to manage the 
property. According to AIM and Bellecourt, in subsequent years the community was 
drastically transformed; yet, HUD continued to present additional obstacles for its 
development. Rent increases were regularly withheld by the government, and the tribunal 
report documented instances of HUD demanding millions of dollars in repairs that could 
not be paid for without the increased rent payments it was withholding.93  Nevertheless, 
the project continued, and in his testimony at the tribunal, Bellecourt summed up the 
importance of the project and aligned it with the rural protests by saying, “Relocation is 
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stopping right here, at Little Earth. It’s stopping at D.Q. University…at Yellow Thunder, 
it’s stopping wherever our people are.”94  
 
Conclusion 
The American Indian International Tribunal was an attempt to build on the 
successes of the 1970s and further expand indigenous connections to events outside the 
United States while at the same time creating indigenous ideas about how to approach the 
international world. While the IITC, AIM, and other activist organizations had expanded 
internationally, visiting countries and building alliances with various political and 
governmental entities, the venture was at many times a lonely affair. Bill Means noted in 
testimony that in his years working with both AIM and the IITC, “we heard a lot of 
support, we heard a lot of rhetoric,” but many of those statements did not translate into 
full support of the movement. But at the same time the experiences of the previous 
decade had awaken him to the potential victories that could be had on the international 
level. Not only was it natural, given that Indian nations signed treaties with the U.S. and 
were supposed to be operating as government-to-government entities, but indigenous 
peoples around the world provided alliances and support that was not possible from the 
various non-native groups that had come to support AIM and the IITC. While 
reservations had their issues, the best thing Native Americans could do in the 1980s was 
to “internationalize our people on the local level,” essentially going around the U.S. to 
secure funding for those issues at home.95 For Means and other activists at the American 
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Indian International Tribunal, the international stage was not only a national place for 
indigenous issues, but the most powerful. 
Yet, when the American Indian International Tribunal concluded in September 
1982, ruling that “native peoples of the third world…are being subjected to slavery by the 
policy of the United States in supporting the international monetary system and the 
multinational corporations that roam freely around the world sucking up the world’s 
natural resources for their own profit,” there seemed to be little consensus on how to 
actually progress.96 Reagan was obviously not impeached by the movement, and 
divisions were beginning to open among those in attendance. Nevertheless, Dennis Banks 
concluded the tribunal proceedings, noting that it would be headed to the Yellow Thunder 
Camp to take testimonies and document the issues in South Dakota (without Banks, who 
was still under indictment in the state for issues related to the occupation of Wounded 
Knee), but he hoped that the tribunal could remain active into the future. Speaking on 
where the movement could go in the coming years, Banks said, “We may keep this 
tribunal in session, going from place to place. Even if we have to years from now call a 
tribunal in South Africa, or the Philippines or Nicaragua or wherever.”97 The AIIT would 
move to the Yellow Thunder Camp and then onto Minneapolis to visit the Little Earth 
housing development, but it did not reconvene in the manner Banks laid out. While 
originally meant as a one-time event, the tribunal ruled that it needed to stay in session in 
order to protect indigenous peoples from governments, both large and small. 
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The tribunal’s order reaffirmed indigenous sovereignty from both the United 
States and international structures as a whole. While the tribunal sought to create a 
separate space for Indigenous issues at the start of the 1980s, the growing Nicaraguan 
controversy of the decade showed that separating those issues was much harder in 
practice.98 After 1982 the tribunal largely faded from view, one of the many pieces of 
Native activism overlooked during the period. But Banks’ mention of Nicaragua was 
significant because even in 1982, the Central America country was already beginning to 
divide indigenous activists over Sandinista conduct towards the Miskitu Indians of the 
eastern coast. While the tribunal did not move to Nicaragua, numerous U.S. activists did 
and their experiences and opinions on the matter, provide an important way of seeing 
how the ideas discussed at the AIIT translated towards reality.
																																																								









“[DIS]-UNITING THE RED PEOPLE OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE: 
INDIGENOUS ACTIVISTS IN NICARAGUA 
In November of 1985 Russell Means held a press conference in San José, Costa 
Rica and proclaimed his desire to recruit roughly 100 “warriors from North America” to 
take part in supporting Nicaragua’s Miskitu Indians, who were fighting for increased 
sovereignty from the country’s ruling Sandinista government.1 Means, who had recently 
“resigned” from the American Indian Movement but remained one of the most prominent 
American Indian activists, argued the call for support would begin the process of “uniting 
the red people of the Western Hemisphere” to back indigenous rights regardless of 
national borders.2 Means’ larger than life personality ensured his call for recruits gained 
media attention across the United States, but his participation in Nicaragua was only a 
small, uncoordinated part of a much larger engagement in the country by U.S.-based 
Indian activists who sought to foster indigenous rights throughout the hemisphere rather 
than solely in the United States. While the movement across international boundaries
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began following Wounded Knee, the events in Nicaragua grew out of the discussions at 
the United Nations in the late 1970s and the attempts to define an Indigenous political 
identity in the early 1980s. Nicaragua, then, was a real-world attempt to move beyond 
discussions and support on-the-ground change for Indigenous groups. Nicaragua, 
however, was also a central pillar of Ronald Reagan’s aggressive Cold War policy and 
the civil war in the country between the ruling Sandinista government and the U.S.-
backed Contras meant observers in the United States equated criticism of the Sandinistas’ 
Indigenous policies with support for Reagan’s political ideology and goals. As a result, 
Nicaragua fostered a serious schism within Native activism in the United States, a divide 
that highlighted the limitations of Native protest during the Cold War, fundamentally 
altered the landscape of Indigenous activism and broke up the collations between white 
liberals and Native Americans that came to the forefront during the Red Power era of the 
early 1970s. 
Events in Nicaragua during the 1980s have been the subject of extensive historical 
research from both Latin American historians and U.S. foreign policy historians.1 Yet the 
relationship between indigenous peoples of the east coast and the largely Hispanic Pacific 
coast during the 1980s has been given little more than cursory notes within much of the 
historiography. Many of the materials on the subject situate the Miskitu protests within 
the Contra backlash to the rebellion or place the indigenous groups alongside the 
																																																								
1 Much of the background material on US policies in Latin America during the Cold War 
was pulled from Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the 
Rise of the New Imperialism (New York: Metropolitan, 2006); Stephen G. Rabe, The Killing 
Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 




campesino (peasant) protests against the Sandinista government (FSLN). Hal Brands in 
Latin America’s Cold War-one of the more comprehensive works on Latin America and 
the Cold War-devotes part of a paragraph to the Miskitu movement, combining them with 
groups like the Anti-Sandinista Popular Militias (MILPAS) that controlled much of the 
opposition in the mountainous interior of the country and opposed Sandinista policies of 
forced collective farming.2 
Most accounts that provide major emphasis on the Miskitu situation take 
opposing sides, arguing the conflict arose from either failed Sandinista policies or the 
covert operations of Reagan’s CIA. Philippe Bourgois, writing contemporaneously in 
1985, argued that while the Miskitus and other eastern coast indigenous peoples had 
historic tensions with the Pacific coast, the underlying issue of the violence was United 
States support for counter-revolutionary forces. According to Bourgois, “the 
responsibility for the conversion of these historic tensions into a fratricidal war lies with 
the United States, which armed, trained, and provided international legitimation for the 
counterrevolutionary…forces, thereby preventing a peaceful solution based on dialogue 
and compromise from emerging.”3 Furthermore, he argued that the Miskitus did not 
constitute a “sovereign nation-state” but were instead a “mystified” group that grew out 
of historical exploitation by the British to undermine Spanish colonization.4 In contrast, 
																																																								
2 Brands, 201-202. 
3 Philippe Bourgois, in Nicaragua: The First Five Years, ed. Thomas W. Walker (New 
York: Praeger, 1985), 201–16, 201. 
4 Ibid., 207. 
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Bourgois takes a complimentary view of the Sandinistas, noting that the revolutionary 
government had taken a number of steps to correct relations with the indigenous peoples. 
In comparison to Bourgois’s account. which cites external factors as the cause for 
most of the conflict on the eastern coast, anthropologist Charles Hale argues in 
Resistance and Contradiction that the conflict arose as much from contradictions within 
the revolution as it did from outside forces. Hale’s account, which remains the most 
comprehensive account of Miskitu interactions with the Nicaraguan state, centers on the 
divide between the Sandinistas’ “passionate defiance of U.S. imperialism” and Miskitu 
acceptance of “Anglo-American neocolonialism,” which made them ambivalent towards 
Sandinista encroachment.5 Hale’s work is important not only because of its 
comprehensiveness, but also because Hale travelled within both the Sandinista and 
Miskitu spheres without much resistance. As a result of his work with the Center for 
Research and Documentation on the Atlantic Coast (CIDCA) and his anthropological 
fieldwork in Sandy Cay, Nicaragua, Hale’s book provides an examination of the conflict 
from the perspective of someone sympathetic to the revolutionary aims but ambivalent 
about the execution of the goals on the eastern coast. 
In contrast to the accounts that detail events in Nicaragua, far fewer works have 
explored the connections between Miskitus and international indigenous organizations. 
György Ferenc Tóth provides a cursory overview of the events rooted in the competing 
autobiographies of Russell Means and Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz and noted that the conflict 
was a real world example of American Indian activists being fractured over the debate on 
																																																								
5 Charles R. Hale, Resistance and Contradiction: Miskitu Indians and the Nicaraguan 
State, 1894-1987 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 15, 27. 
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Marxism.6 More comprehensively, James Jenkins’s chapter, “The Indian Wing: 
Nicaragua Indians, Native American Activists, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1979-1990,” 
correctly highlights the indigenous issues at stake in the country and chronicles the issues 
U.S. activists faced when they became involved. Jenkins, however, argues the U.S.-based 
activists ultimately weakened the position of the Miskitus by ignoring historic claims to a 
Miskitu Kingdom founded in the nineteenth century and instead moved towards “militant 
pan-Indianism that resembled the Red Power era of the United States.”7 Jenkins’s 
account, while moving along many of the same avenues as this one, provides a relatively 
limited assessment of the conflict. The Miskitu activism in Nicaragua in the 1980s was 
not a new event and reflected long-term goals of Indigenous activists in the region. 
Furthermore, while it is correct that Russell Means at least rhetorically embraced direct 
action akin to Wounded Knee, the majority of U.S. activists attempted to utilize strategies 
similar to the pre-Red Power era of the 1960s chronicled by Daniel Cobb in Native 
Activism in Cold War America that focused not on militant action, but diplomacy and 
working through established channels. 
This system-based activism happened in large part because most U.S. activists 
were sympathetic to the Nicaraguan revolution and saw the clear benefits to a Sandinista 
government. Nicaragua marked a pivotal movement for these activists; it was an attempt 
																																																								
6 György Ference Tóth, From Wounded Knee to Checkpoint Charlie: The Alliance for 
Sovereignty Between American Indians and Central Europeans in the Late Cold War (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2016), 196-201. 
7 James Jenkins, “The Indian Wing: Nicaraguan Indians, Native American Activists, and 
U.S. Foreign Policy, 1979-1990,” in *Beyond the Eagle’s Shadow: New Histories of Latin 
America’s Cold War," Virginia Garrard-Burnett, Mark Atwood Lawrence, and Julio E. Moreno, 
ed. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2013), 194. 
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to have a leftist revolution that embraced indigenous issues, and this fact is what makes 
the conflict over Nicaragua such a confusing and difficult topic to address. In many 
respects the debate was less about Nicaragua than personalities in the United States. 
Overwhelmingly activists agreed on the basic principles that the Sandinistas were the 
better of the two sides, and Indigenous rights needed to be upheld. Yet, for much of the 
1980s, members of the American Indian Movement, the International Indian Treaty 
Council, and others across the activist landscape fought about Nicaragua and lobbed 
accusations with ferocity that overshadowed the substance of the debate. As a result, 
Nicaragua was a mess of revolutionary contradictions that left many alleged supporters of 
indigenous rights in no better standing than the Reagan administration, which 
superficially embraced Miskitu rights to undermine the Sandinista Revolution. 
 
Roots of Rebellion: Miskitus and the Nicaraguan State 
Even in the 1980s the eastern coast of Nicaragua was a remote, inhospitable area 
that remained largely a mystery to Nicaraguans living on the Pacific coast. While the 
Pacific regions had extensive development, the eastern half of Nicaragua was mostly 
undeveloped and required the use of boats to reach many remote villages. The region had 
a population of “Spaniards,” Nicaraguans of Spanish heritage, but it was primarily 
dominated by the Indigenous Miskitu with smaller tribes including the Sumu and Rama 
that remains true today. Furthermore, the area had a large population of creoles, mixed-
race Nicaraguan that trace their heritage back to African slaves brought to the region by 
the British. The two main centers of population in the region are Bluefields in the south, 
which serves as the center for the region’s creole population, and Puerto Cabeza in the 
north, which is the center of the Miskitu population. As a result, many of the events in 
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this chapter occur in the northeast corner of Nicaragua and along the Rio Coco, which 
makes up the northern border with Honduras. 
In many respects Nicaragua has long been composed of two separate entities, both 
only vaguely connected by national boundaries and central control. While the Spanish 
colonized the western half of the country throughout the colonial period, the territory 
claimed by the Miskitus was largely left untouched by Spanish entities. The region, 
however, fell under the influence of the British empire which sought to utilize the area to 
check the Spaniards on the other side of the mountain ranges that essentially divide the 
country in half. Instead of establishing major settlements, the British supported the 
creation of what became the Mosquito Kingdom or Mosquitia, and the creation of a 
Miskitu king. In the place of an imperial British presence, the region drew influence from 
Moravian missionaries who made deep in-roads into Miskitu communities and made the 
Moravian Church the major religious institution in the region. The end result was both 
Miskitu affinity for the British over the Spanish and the development of layers of 
colonialism as the Miskitus exploited the British backing to subjugate other Indian tribes 
such as the Sumu. When the British pulled out of the isthmus in the latter part of the 
1700s, the Miskitus successfully managed to curtail Spanish attempts to incorporate the 
region for much of the next half century and “exercised unprecedented political 
autonomy.”8 By the end of the 1800s the region witnessed a rapid period of economic 
colonization at the hands of American enterprises and politicians seeking to exploit the 
region’s vast natural resources, including the construction of a trans-isthmian canal. 
																																																								




Figure 2: Map of the Zelaya Department, which comprised Mosquitia (Wikimedia 
Commons)9 
 
While Great Britain’s involvement on the east coast declined in the latter part of 
the 1700s, its formal claim to Mosquitia as a protectorate did not end until 1860, when 
the British ceded the territory to the independent Nicaraguan state. The region, however, 
was largely ignored by the Nicaraguan government until 1894, when troops occupied 
Bluefields and attempted to exert formal control of the territory. Carried out by President 
José Santos Zelaya, the orders were based on the idea that the 1860 treaty between the 
British and Nicaraguans was invalid because the Miskitus it sought to protect had 
“withdrawn deep into the jungle…while the Reserve Government has become a 
contemptible fiction under the control of black usurpers [negros usurpadores].”10 The 
British sent some troops to the region for police protection of British interests but refused 
to officially get involved on the side of the Miskitus. While Nicaragua now claimed 
control over the eastern half of the country, the region retained a strong Anglo affinity, 
																																																								
9 “Zelaya in Nicaragua,” Wikimedia Commons, 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Zelaya_in_Nicaragua.svg [Accessed April 9, 2018] 
10 Ibid., 41. 
	
146	 
and most indigenous peoples remained ambivalent at the very least when it came to 
control from Managua. 
Following reincorporation into the Nicaraguan state, Mosquitia continued to 
experience development by North American interests but now had to confront issues of 
land titles, taxes, and migration of mestizos from the Pacific Coast.11 Miskitu leaders first 
attempted to seek support from the British government, which they still held in high 
regard. When diplomacy and international appeals failed to secure a return to Miskitu 
control, individuals began to utilize more militant actions. In 1906 Miskitu leaders sent 
Sam Pitts, a tribal member from the northern region, to Jamaica in the hopes of 
negotiating a deal with the British. When Pitts failed, he returned and began a militant 
campaign to overthrow Nicaraguan rule. While Pitts was executed within a year, and the 
movement failed to secure support outside of the Miskitu community, both the diplomatic 
program and Pitts’s militant response are significant. Writing in Nicaraguan 
Perspectives, activist Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz argues the kingdom was little more than a 
paper fiction in the British government’s “self-serving struggle” against the Spanish, and 
the “king” (Dunbar-Ortiz utilizes the quotes) was “chosen and installed by the British for 
two centuries.”12 While Dunbar-Ortiz is correct in noting that the arrival of the British 
had a negative effect on indigenous peoples who found themselves subjugated by 
																																																								
11 Generally, this chapter uses the term Spaniard which notes a person has both 
indigenous and Hispanic heritage in line with its use for much of the period covered to signify 
individuals from the Hispanic Pacific Coast. 
12 Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, “The Indigenous Question and the Miskito People in 
Nicaragua,” draft of article published in Nicaraguan Perspectives. Tonantzin Land Institute 
Records, Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico Special Collections, 
Albuquerque, Box 21, Folder 2. 
	
147	 
Miskitus, she downplays the agency of Miskitus in the region.13 As Charles Hale argues, 
the basic contradiction of the Miskitu mobilization in the early 1900s was both a firm 
rejection of the Nicaraguan government and an affinity for British colonialism that 
advanced their cause “at the cost of a reinforced sense of dependence on a powerful 
external actor.”14 
Nicaraguan politics for almost half of the twentieth century were dominated by 
the Somoza family which included Anatasio Somoza (“Tacho”) who took power in 1937 
and centralized the government to increase both his power and wealth. During his nearly 
forty-four-year authoritarian rule known as somocismo, Tacho exploited populist rhetoric 
to build alliances with the country’s labor unions as a counter-weight to conservative 
opposition to his tenure in office. Utilizing both the savvy alliances and rampant 
corruption, Tacho removed essentially all serious opposition to his tenure. Following his 
assassination in 1956, control of the government essentially fell to his two sons Luis and 
then Anastasio (“Tachito”). Rising anti-communist sentiments led Luis to crack down on 
labor unions in the country ending the populist alliance with unions. Both brothers were 
less skilled at managing the legacies of somocismo, and the 1970s witnessed a further 
weakening of the regime as opposition increasingly arose to Tachito’s growing dictatorial 
																																																								
13 In many respects the region parallels the development of the American Southwest and 
the after affects of Spanish colonialism that were documented by Ned Blackhawk, Violence over 
the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American West (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. 
Press, 2008). 
14 Hale, Resistance and Contradiction, 51. 
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powers and the spread of economic issues that inflated prices and cut supplies throughout 
the country.15 
The weakening of somocismo in the second half of the 1970s provided an opening 
for the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) to make a remarkable come-back. 
During the 1960s the small group had been roundly marginalized by the National Guard, 
and most who remained saw themselves as nothing more than a small “group of 
conspirators” rather than a legitimate revolutionary movement.16 The group ultimately 
split during the decade into three wings: the Prolonged Popular War, which drew 
influence from the guerrilla campaigns in Vietnam and based itself in the mountain 
peasant communities; the proletarian wing, which sought to mobilize urban union 
members and workers into a revolutionary movement; and the tercerista (Third Way), 
which aligned itself with more conservative elements and ultimately became the biggest 
segment of the FSLN. Given how contradictory the Third Way was to the other two 
factions, leader Daniel Ortega had to regularly deny that he sought to create a movement 
that amounted to  “Somozism without Somoza.”17 
The conflict between the Sandinistas and Tachito’s government largely took place 
on the Pacific Coast of Nicaragua and away from Misquitia. Nevertheless, the events 
would deeply influence the region and lead to a resurgence of Miskitu activism. As 
Charles Hale argues, the rise of Miskitu activism in the 1970s and 1980s was not new, 
rather it was a reversion to previous history that witnessed a Miskitu territory that 
																																																								
15 Brands, 167-168. 




retained power to roughly the same degree as the Nicaraguan state. As with other rights 
movements, the formation of the first modern Miskitu rights group, ALLPROMISU 
(Alliance for Progress of Miskitu and Sumu), came about from class conflicts between 
the indigenous peoples and the wealthier Spaniards who had taken up residence in the 
region.18 In one example Hale documented from oral interviews, the impetus for the 
movement came from a pregnant Miskitu woman who was told to “Go and have [her] 
baby out on the street.” Opposition also arose to secure land rights from the Somoza 
government and in response to economic exploitation by American capitalists, which 
Miskitus generally argued was another way Somoza and the Spaniards were exploiting 
the country’s indigenous peoples.19 Armstrong Wiggins, a Miskitu representative who 
joined the Indian Law Resource Center, stated in 1981 that the movement arose as much 
from political issues with the Somoza government as from a desire to restore cultural 
identity. According to Wiggins, “Our culture must survive, so we can continue to exist. 
The contemporary organizing sought to revitalize our religion, our culture, the way of our 
grandparents….”20 
After its founding in 1974, ALLPROMISU worked within the Somoza 
government to promote both indigenous political autonomy and cultural revival 
throughout the Misquitia and continued after the Sandinista uprising in 1979. The 
																																																								
18 Many of the indigenous organizations appear in various publications under multiple 
spellings or acronyms—for instance ALLPROMISU appears at times as ALLPROMISO. I have 
attempted to use the most common version except when quoting a source. 
19 Ibid., 73-75. 
20 “Colonialism and Revolution: Nicaraguan Sandinism and the Liberation of the Miskito, 




Sandinistas, and leader Daniel Ortega in particular, were not entirely supportive of the 
idea of an ethnic-based group and proposed ALLPROMISU and indigenous peoples 
utilize the Association of Rural Workers arguing that everyone in the movement was part 
of a collective whole. When ALLPROMISU leaders Steadman Fagoth, Brooklyn Rivera, 
and Hazel Lou, along with the four-hundred and fifty delegates to the 1979 
ALLPROMISU conference, rejected the idea, Ortega and the Sandinistas agreed to the 
formation of MISURASATA (Miskitos, Suma, Rama, and Sandinistas All Together) to 
be the representative for indigenous issues.21 Originally founded simply as MISURA, the 
addition of Sandinistas to the name was a critical requirement for the revolutionary 
government to signal that the indigenous issues were part of the revolution and 
supportive of the government. Miskitu Indians later told an NIYC representative that, 
“We looked to the triumph of the Revolution, with its basis in a philosophy of liberation 
from oppression, as a vehicle by which we could regain our self determination.”22 The 
early co-operation between the Sandinistas and indigenous leaders would fray over the 
next fourteen months as Sandinista policies began to marginalize the popular 
representatives’ position in the government, and many Miskitos began to move towards 
militant actions. 
Following its creation, MISURASATA quickly became the leading political 
entity across the Misquitia and began to challenge the Sandinistas for control of 
governmental operations across the region. Not only were Miskitus vying with the 
																																																								
21 Ibid., 133. 
22 Jim Anaya, “A Miskito Memoir,” in Impact (Albuquerque Journal Magazine), 
September 11, 1984, 3. NIYC Papers, Box 23, Folder 1. 
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revolution for control, but the legacies of ALLPROMISU’s work within the Somoza 
government over the course of the 1970s caused fear that the organization still had 
sympathies for the old dictator and was not so quietly working to undermine the 
revolution under the guise of ethnic revival. While the organization had a formal seat at 
the Council of State in Managua, the Sandinista leadership formed the Nicaraguan 
Institute of the Atlantic Coast (INNICA) and channeled much of their work in the region 
through the organization that was headed by a Pacific Coast resident who was 
“unfamiliar with [the] Indian reality.”23 While marginalized in their view, in 1980 
MISURASATA secured a major victory when it compelled the Sandinista government to 
offer a proposed literacy campaign in native languages rather than solely in Spanish. 
Following the victory, MISURASATA organized youth groups comprised of high school 
and university students to work in the program and promote indigenous languages. These 
“brigadistas” travelled around the remote eastern coast not only bringing the literacy 
campaign to small villages but highlighting issues of Miskitu rights. As a result, the 
villages were not only integrated into the Miskitu struggle but the youth leaders also 
“gained an emotionally charged sense of identity and solidarity with their people.”24 
At the same time, MISURASATA began to organize a campaign for increased 
land rights for Indigenous peoples, a move that quickly resulted in a complete break with 
the Sandinista leadership. In February 1981, the FSLN ordered the arrest of fifty 
MISURASATA leaders and held major figures such as Steadman Fagoth for “separatist” 
																																																								
23 “Colonialism and Revolution,” 11. 
24 Ibid., 134. 
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views and alleged covert actions on behalf of the old Somoza government. Most of those 
rounded up in the first half of 1981 were released shortly after being taken into custody, 
the lone exception being Fagoth who was held until May and subsequently fled to 
Honduras upon his release.25 While originally sympathetic towards the Sandinistas, 
Fagoth would ultimately lead offshoots of MISURASATA in Honduras and align himself 
with CIA-backed Contra movements originating in the country. 
Issues and claims of Miskitu connections to the Contras increased in December of 
1981 when Sandinista forces attempted to move 8,500 tribal members from their 
traditional homelands along the Río Coco River on the border with Honduras, arguing the 
area was unsafe due to Contra activity. The operation, called Red Christmas, resulted in 
the death of dozens of Miskitu Indians, the displacement of thousands more, and served 
as one of the major issues U.S.-based activist organizations would seek to address upon 
becoming involved in the issue. Inversely, the term Red Christmas has come to signify a 
CIA-backed Contra operation that required the relocation of Miskitus for their own 
personal safety.26 It is in this environment that U.S. activists began to work and the 
contradictory definitions of Red Christmas provide some understanding of how divided 






25 Ibid., 135. 
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Early Indigenous Support for the Sandinistas 
Because of their prominence on the international stage and the Sandinista 
endorsement of the occupation of Wounded Knee, the International Indian Treaty 
Council and members of the American Indian Movement were invited to Nicaragua to 
observe issues related to the Sandinista/Miskitu conflict and provide advice to the 
government. Between 1981 and 1983, the IITC/AIM made a handful of visits to 
Nicaragua to document the events on the eastern coast of the country. During visits the 
group claimed to interview over 2,000 Miskitu Indians, leading the group to conclude 
that not only were events in the region the result of U.S. involvement but, also that “The 
liberation of the natural world is in the balance.”27 
While leaders such as Clyde Bellecourt toured Nicaragua and endorsed the 
revolutionary goals, Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz was one of the most vocal supporters and 
made numerous trips to the country to work with the Sandinista government. While a 
trained academic, Dunbar-Ortiz spent much of her time prior to the 1980s working with 
various activist causes, including the IITC and AIM. Writing in Blood on the Border: A 
Memoir of the Contra War, the third in her multi-part historical memoir series, Dunbar-
Ortiz writes that her goal was “to rally support for the Miskitus within the revolutionary 
process, and to try to help the Sandinista leadership understand Indigenous aspirations.”28 
Furthermore, she felt that the Sandinista government had a real opportunity to “become a 
model for Indigenous self-determination amid a world of negative examples” through the 
																																																								
27 “I.I.T.C. Nicaragua Report” in untitled material, NIYC Papers, Box 22, Folder 10. 
28 Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, Blood on the Border: A Memoir of the Contra War, Oklahoma 
paperback edition (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016), 81. 
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promotion of U.N. human rights forums and the inclusion of Indigenous Atlantic Coast 
peoples in the delegations.29 The biggest problem facing the indigenous peoples of 
Nicaragua according to Dunbar-Ortiz, was not the government in Managua but rather the 
threat of US imperialism that would seek to divide the Indigenous peoples against one 
another in the same manner U.S. forces had exploited divisions during the Indian wars of 
the nineteenth century. Furthermore, she argued, while the Indigenous policies of the 
early 1980s were plagued with mistakes, the threat of the Contras and U.S. support for 
rebellious groups in Nicaragua contributed to the Sandinistas hesitantly to work with 
Miskitus and other groups.30 
While Dunbar-Ortiz talked about supporting the Miskitus within the revolution, 
she was ambivalent towards many of the leaders. The activities of Steadman Fagoth, as 
well as MISURASATA leader Brooklyn Rivera, who distanced himself from Fagoth’s 
Contra-aligned group in Honduras, were the culmination of interventionist policies that 
sought to exploit the “just ethnic demands of the people” to at the very least disrupt the 
revolution but could also have culminated in the eastern third of the Nicaraguan territory 
being declared independent, which would ultimately lead to “debilitating and isolating 
																																																								
29 Ibid., 87. In Indians of the Americas: Human Rights and Self-Determination (London: 
Zed Books, 1984), she writes that, “The aspirations of the indigenous population of America, 
traditionally exploited, oppressed and subjected to the rigours of a brutal internal colonialist 
system, are now aspirations contained within the Sandinista Revolutions; aspirations which must 
not be betrayed.” Excerpted in IITC Report on the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, 
First Session, August 9-13, 1982. Raul Salinas Papers, M0774, Dept. of Special Collections, 
Stanford University Libraries, Stanford, CA, Box 23, Folder 5. 
30 Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, “The Indigenous Question and the Miskito People in 
Nicaragua,” Paper written for inclusion in Nicaraguan Perspectives, Tonantzin Land Institute 
Papers, Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico. 
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Nicaragua from the Atlantic and the Caribbean.”31 While other historians, including 
Jenkins, embrace the legitimacy of the historical treaties that governed the Miskitu and 
British relations and argue they were a more legitimate avenue to achieve Indigenous 
rights in Nicaragua during the 1980s, Dunbar-Ortiz dismissed the treaties as historical 
incidents of “imperialism” and contended that the whole argument was “artificial and 
false.” According to this narrative, “In none of this did the Miskito people, or even the 
‘king’ nor the Nicaraguan people play a role, or carry on a struggle for real self-
determination.”32 
Dunbar-Ortiz’s public appearances and vocal endorsement of the Sandinista 
government made her the main point of criticism for groups aligned with 
MISURASATA. Bernard Nietschmann, a Berkeley geography professor who provided 
reports for the Miskitus, responded to Dunbar-Ortiz’s criticism that he utilized a 
“romantic, indígenista view which could later be easily manipulated by the CIA” by 
saying he had a file entitled “Roxanne, Don’t Turn On the Red Light” that included 
quotes from “Chairwoman Rox(-anne Dunbar-Ortiz)” and “Managua Rose.”33 Hank 
Adams circulated a “dossier” of documents that criticized a number of pro-Sandinista 
indigenous activists and explicitly claimed Dunbar-Ortiz should be investigated for 
																																																								
31 Ibid., 5. 
32 Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, “Notes on the clarification of the issue of treaties as a basis for 
Indian land and other rights…,” Ibid., 3. 
33 Ibid., 198. The file is a clear reference to “Roxanne,” a single by The Police from 1978 
that centered on a prostitute. 
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fraudulently claiming to be Indian as well as “for treason for giving aid and comfort to 
the enemy–the enemy being Nicaragua, but also Cuba.”34 
The criticisms continued, but Dunbar-Ortiz claimed the cruelest response to her 
positions came from National Indian Youth Council Chairman Gerald Wilkinson, who 
rather than publicly attacking her in the press, simply stopped talking to her.35 In 
communications to supporters, however, Wilkinson expressed frustration with Dunbar-
Ortiz’s positions. When the Youth Council received letters imploring it to consider 
consulting Dunbar-Ortiz, Wilkinson pointed to what he saw as a contradictory statement 
in which she compared Miskitu fighters to “Indian Brothers who looked like they had just 
come down from Yellow Thunder camp…or Big Mountain…talking about the 
hemispheric struggle for self-determination.”36 NIYC staff attorney James Anaya also 
had communications with Dunbar-Ortiz in late 1985 when she criticized him for refusing 
to stand on the same stage as her during an appearance in Albuquerque. Anaya claimed 
her positions supporting the Sandinistas were out of line with the NIYC’s position 
endorsing Miskitu sovereignty, but welcomed further discussions. In subsequent letters 
the two sparred over whose position on the subject had changed over time. According to 
Dunbar-Ortiz, her opinions on the subject had remained consistent; instead, the NIYC 
and other pro-Miskitu organizations had “opportunistically exploited this issue for your 
																																																								
34 ibid., 240. Dunbar-Ortiz has long maintained her mother was “part-Indian” but has 
never claimed enrollment in any federally recognized Indian tribe in the United States. Additional 
information can be found in Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, Red Dirt: Growing up Okie (Norman, OK: 
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own motives,” and they “contributed to the continuation of the conflict and the 
misinformation initiated by the Reagan administration, rather than working to resolve the 
authentic issues involved.”37 
While Dunbar-Ortiz took the brunt of the criticism from the NIYC and its allies, 
her position fit within the position of the International Indian Treaty Council, which had 
remained consistent since the start of the revolution. The official IITC position on the 
situation in Nicaragua was complimentary to the Sandinistas and stated that while there 
were legitimate concerns about the relations between the Miskitus and the Sandinista 
government—notably in relation to state of emergency laws which limited due process 
and effective administration of governmental programs—the link between the two had 
“many positive aspects” and that the “government of Nicaragua is becoming more and 
more sensitive to the unique needs of the Indian populations and is attempting to make 
serious gains in the improvement of the quality of life for them.”38 Even though the 
revolution had many positives for leftists, Clyde Bellecourt acknowledged in his 
autobiography that the early support the Sandinistas provided to the occupation of 
Wounded Knee and the fact that both were fighting against “covert operations” by the 
U.S. government played a role in AIM/IITC’s solid endorsement of the Revolution.39 
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Russell Means and the Divide Within AIM 
Even though AIM and the IITC had come out firmly in support of the Sandinista 
Revolution and Russell Means had a weak relationship with the organization in the mid-
1980s, his history with the group continued to make him its most well-known member 
,regardless of what he or others perceived his role to be. After Means made his trip to 
Nicaragua in late 1985, he returned to the United States and stated he was ready to assist 
the Miskitus in any capacity they needed, saying “With a shovel in one hand, a rifle in 
my other hand, and peace in my heart, I stand with the Miskito Indians against all foreign 
invaders.”40 Means was initially ambivalent about the trip but came around to the idea 
because “When one Indian anywhere in the world is treated with racial hatred, all Indians 
are victims.”41 While Means’ position within AIM is always debatable, the leadership 
situation within the organization was even cloudier when it came to Nicaragua. Even 
though Means argued that AIM was de-centralized and had no official national leadership 
since Wounded Knee, he first sought approval to go to Nicaragua from his brother and 
Clyde Bellecourt, both of whom opposed the plan. According to Means, the 
unwillingness of the Bellecourts and his brother to support the Miskitus centered on the 
idea that “…AIM was always supposed to be on the far left of whatever white man’s 
movement was most popular. Supporting Brooklyn Rivera and Indians who were fighting 
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for their lives, their people, and their culture against the ‘darlings’ of the Left—the 
Sandinistas—wasn’t part of that plan.”42 
Means’ position, while dismissed by other AIM activists, found support from 
Denver’s AIM chapter that was headed by Glenn Morris and Ward Churchill along with 
Means. While the Denver branch of AIM took a more negative view of the Sandinistas, 
they did at times take a more lenient line towards the ruling government than many of 
Means’ public statements. In one official declaration on the matter, the chapter said it 
acknowledged the government of Nicaragua as “the legitimate representative of the non-
indigenous peoples of Nicaragua,” and it opposed attempts to remove the Sandinistas 
from power by the United States or any other counter-revolutionary groups outside of the 
country. Additionally, AIM-Colorado encouraged MISURASATA to remain non-violent 
in its protests against the Nicaraguan government; if the organization did not feel it 
possible, “[AIM-Colorado] respect their right to request assistance from other indigenous 
peoples in the form of spiritual, material, physical, financial, or political support.”43 
Even though Means’ closest allies within AIM nominally supported the 
Sandinistas, Means sought to promote his interpretation of the situation by touring the 
country with the backing of the Unification Church, a right-wing religious organization. 
Outside of supportive audiences in Denver, along with Seattle and Los Angeles, most of 
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Means’ talks were met with a healthy dose of opposition. In one instance at the 
University of Vermont, Means went so far as to punch a protestor who yelled that the 
film being screened was just CIA lies.44 Means’s affiliation with the Unification Church 
appears to have been little more than an alliance of convenience in which Means, 
shunned by leftists, got paid speaking engagements and the Church got to distribute 
literature at events. In fact, as late as November 1985, the Washington Times, which was 
founded by Sun Myung Moon, was labelling AIM as a “militant, anti-white organization” 
that had members trained in “PLO terrorist camps in Libya and Lebanon.” To highlight 
the anti-white sentiment of the organization, the Times included Russell Means’ presence 
at a Nation of Islam rally at Madison Square Garden, where Means pushed for 
black/Indian solidarity to take back lands and said Indians “ain’t nobody’s Tonto” 
anymore.45 Means, however, did express frustration with liberals in the United States, 
even telling the Cherokee One-Feather in 1986 that “the first time I was treated as an 
equal partner and appreciated for my Indianness was just a year ago” when he began to 
interact with libertarians and conservatives. Means distinguished his relationship with the 
two parties by saying liberals only asked “What can we do for you?” while conservatives 
asked “What can we do, together?”46 
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In response to Means’s and Colorado-AIM’s actions on Nicaragua, Clyde 
Bellecourt and members in Minneapolis, who claimed to be the official leaders of AIM as 
a whole organization, labelled the Denver chapter as “defecting” from the movement. 
Beginning in April of 1985, Bellecourt stated Means was only speaking for himself and 
no one with him had the authority to speak for AIM or the IITC in any capacity.47 AIM 
supported the peace processes in Nicaragua and Means’s statements against the 
Sandinistas arose from “his views about the white Left in this country. I think it goes 
back to his very early contact with some of the Sandinista leadership—personality 
conflicts.”48 
Ward Churchill and Glenn Morris responded to the dismissal of Colorado-AIM in 
the Colorado Daily that the Denver chapter was the “New AIM” and was being purged 
by the “Stalinist left” within (old) AIM for “ideological differences related to someone 
else’s revolution.” In contrast to the Minneapolis chapter, Morris and Churchill argued 
that Colorado-AIM stood for insuring indigenous rights rather than supporting an 
autonomy program in Nicaragua “that reads like a rehash of the…Indian Reorganization 
Act of 1934, all dressed up in Marxist language.”49 Regardless, the position of 
Bellecourt’s AIM on Nicaragua was very different from what it articulated following 
Wounded Knee as it expanded internationally. In a November 1985 press release, 
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Bellecourt said AIM supporters should “continue our struggles here for our peoples, 
lands and resources. [emphasis in original]” One would assume Bellecourt defined “here” 
as the United States, and his following sentence laying out issues from the Black Hills to 
Big Mountain and the Nisqually fish-ins to the Great Lakes supports the idea. However, 
Bellecourt includes a passing reference to “the Northwest Territories,” and judging by the 
framing, the usage seems to indicate he is referring to the Canadian province. So 
confusingly an organization that sought a hemispheric movement in the 1970s was 
suddenly re-defining its aims to focus on politics north of the Rio Grande when 
confronted with the conflict in Nicaragua.50 
Means’ involvement was relatively minimal, and the call for warriors was 
essentially just a publicity stunt for an activist always willing to put his face in the media. 
Three months later in Denver, MISURASATA leader Brooklyn Rivera claimed Miskitus 
did not want Means’ warriors, stating that the organization had their own fighters and 
needed aid more than anything. Rivera also argued that the Miskitus had the ability to 
police their own territory, claimed there were no Contras currently operating in the area, 
and MISURASATA would keep the Contras out of the regions they controlled if the 
Nicaraguan government granted them autonomy.51 Even though the real world results 
were almost non-existent, the divide within AIM and the issues it fostered were very real. 
AIM’s goals of expanding internationally had fallen into a morass of arguments that did 
nothing to move the issue forward. In contrast, the National Indian Youth Council had a 
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more engaged campaign that sought to bring real world results to the conflict, but 
nevertheless still found itself stuck within the political binaries of the Cold War that left 
little room for an indigenous point of view. 
 
The National Indian Youth Council’s Role in Nicaragua 
Nicaragua and the conflicts between the Sandinista government and the Miskitu 
Indians of the eastern coast was the Youth Council’s most involved campaign during the 
decade. The NIYC first became active in Nicaragua shortly after the overthrow of the 
Somoza government, but it took a much larger role as a neutral arbitrator in negotiations 
between the Sandinistas and the Miskitos beginning around 1984. According to a 
proposal created in 1985 to secure additional funding for another round of negotiations 
between MISURASATA and the Sandinistas, the NIYC noted it was working essentially 
as MISURASATA’s international representative, not only coordinating meetings and 
promoting the goals of the movement but also preparing position papers and legal 
documents for the negotiations.52 
In preparation for the negotiations in Bogota, which sought to resolve the conflict 
and provide autonomy for the Miskitu communities, the NIYC drafted a funding proposal 
seeking $25,000 to continue assisting the Miskitus in Nicaragua. The proposal paralleled 
the writings of the IITC and AIM, noting that the events in Central America posed 
considerable significance outside of Nicaragua as “Indians across the hemisphere are 
looking to the talks to see if they can effectively survive as a people under a leftist 
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regime. If the talks are unsuccessful the implications for the pan-hemispheric Indian 
movement are enormous.”53 If that were the ultimate result and the talks failed to secure 
an agreement between the two sides, “Indian organizations and movements across the 
Hemisphere will spawn a new generation of leadership that will be convinced that 
Indians cannot survive in the nation-state regardless of whatever regime is in power.”54 
As such, contrary to claims by many of the NIYC’s critics, the group saw the Miskitu 
protest as an integral component of a successful Sandinista revolution and aligned 
Indigenous movements with the promises of leftist revolutions in the Americas. In 
contrast, Russell Means, speaking with the Denver-based Camp Crier ahead of the 
second round of Bogota negotiations, argued that the significance of the activities on the 
eastern coast lay not in securing Indigenous issues within nation-states, but putting 
Indigenous politics beyond the reach of individual governments. According to Means, “If 
we as Indian peoples can ally ourselves and form cohesive bonds…no single country will 
have the might to deny our rights as peoples.”55 
The involvement, however successful Executive Director Gerald Wilkinson 
proclaimed it to be in mailings, was highly contentious with the organization’s 
supporters, both Native and non-Native. Writing to a large donor in December 1984, 
Wilkinson noted that James Anaya, a staff attorney for the organization who was fluent in 
Spanish, had been serving as a personal attorney for Brooklyn Rivera, and his support 
was “invaluable” at a meeting between the Sandinistas and Rivera’s MISURASATA 
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organization earlier in the month. Nevertheless, Wilkinson went on to note that the 
organization had run into problems securing support from church groups that had 
previously been fundamental backers of the organization’s initiatives. While the groups 
“greatly prais[ed] the meeting after the fact,” they “totally backed off from being 
involved in anyway” because they feared “losing their image with leftist groups.” Most 
annoyingly for Wilkinson was the “ecclesiastical mystery” of why church groups would 
not support policies in Nicaragua that were comparable to their goals in the United States. 
Wilkinson further said that even though the groups distanced themselves from the 
meeting and the document in order to keep face with fellow liberals in the United States, 
many of the groups were now trying to “take credit for its success.” Wilkinson’s letter 
highlights both the heavy involvement of the Youth Council in the country and the 
growing unease the organization had with liberal supporters, something that would 
continue to plague the organization’s involvement in the conflict over the next few 
years.56 
The most controversial moment for the NIYC’s involvement in the Nicaraguan 
affair came in 1985 when Wilkinson wrote an appeal letter to donors with the central 
focus being the Miskitu Indians. Wilkinson clearly hoped to gain support by noting that a 
liberal clergy member spat on him and decried the organization by saying, “You Indians 
are just anybody’s dog who wants to walk you!” However, the real centerpiece of the 
letter for many on the NIYC mailing list was the claim that the situation in Nicaragua was 
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as bad as what was going on in Guatemala. That one line, tucked in the middle of the 
letter, drew a huge response from potential donors with many decrying the naiveté́ of the 
organization and refusing to donate. A typical example is Lynn Sonfield, who responded 
to the letter by noting the comparison was “an obscene distortion in light of the massive 
massacres and torture of Indians which have been official Guatemalan policy for years.” 
Another letter writer asked to be dropped from the membership rolls and said he would 
be sending his donations to the Native Rights Fund, “which seems to know what it’s 
doing. I doubt that you do….Ridiculous, not to say shameful.”57 Responses like 
Sonfield’s poured into the Youth Council offices for the rest of 1985. While many of 
them were little more than hand written notes on the donation card with the absurd 
notation that the NIYC was a CIA front group, many more letters arrived signed, most 
coming from either California or the Northeast.58 
In addition to viewing NIYC policies as too friendly towards the Contras, writers 
such as Charles Myers of Michigan argued the organization had not achieved native 
rights in the United States and had no business getting involved in foreign affairs when 
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tribes in the United States had pressing issues. While the NIYC of the 1980s argued 
native rights did not end at national borders, the basic criticism would have been well 
received by previous NIYC leadership, which established the organization with the firm 
goal of improving local issues first and foremost. Clyde Warrior, the founder of the 
Youth Council, often referred to indigenous movements outside the United States and 
regularly invoked anti-colonial ideas in his speeches, as did many Indigenous activists 
situating themselves within the rhetoric of the Cold War.59 Yet, as one biographer noted, 
“He would never openly [call] for a unity of purpose across international lines the way 
that the [National Congress of American Indians] and later AIM did. His focus was on 
more immediate matters closer to home.60 As a result, the shifting goals left the 
organization open for criticism that it had failed to meet its fundamental mission. Dean 
Chavers, who took part in the occupation of Alcatraz in 1969, made the criticism the 
centerpiece of a December 1986 editorial entitled “Where Are Our Leaders?" that 
appeared in News from Indian Country. Chavers highlighted serious needs in Indian 
country, including jobs, housing, sovereignty, education, and healthcare, but noted many 
leaders had “become more concerned with what is going on with the Indians of 
Nicaragua or El Salvador…than they are about their own people.” Getting involved 
overseas was not only a “waste of time” when reservations had seventy percent 
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unemployment, but to him it smacked of paternalism to have “more advanced Natives of 
the U.S….helping our ‘poor’ brothers in the Amazon jungle.”61 
Wilkinson’s and the NIYC’s frustration with attacks on their Nicaragua position 
came to a head in February 1986, when a majority of the outgoing NIYC messages were 
related to Nicaragua.62 His arguments were largely centered upon needing to take a more 
nuanced view of the Nicaraguan conflict that removed it from the political divide in 
American politics. First, Indians had to acknowledge that people like Washington, 
Jefferson, and Jackson may have done an enormous amount for the country but they were 
still terrible in regards to Indians; the same could be said in regards to Sandinista policies, 
which may ultimately benefit Nicaragua but were hurting the Miskitus. Secondly, the 
Miskitus were asking for the same thing Indians in the U.S. were seeking, the autonomy 
to govern their own affairs, and he noted many tribal leaders at a recent NCAI meeting 
said they would reject a plan similar to the Sandinistas’ if it were proposed in the United 
States because it was “nothing the most patriotic flag waving tribal council in the US 
could support.”63 While it is impossible to figure out how effective these letters were in 
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rebutting the criticisms, it is worth noting that of the letters saved in the NIYC files only 
two are follow-ups providing donations and thanking Wilkinson for his clarification. 
The organization also produced a document entitled “Common Misconceptions 
about the Indian Situation in Nicaragua” that included many of Wilkinson’s points but 
expanded them while addressing the five major criticisms leveled against the 
organization. The unsigned document begins by downplaying the Sandinista 
acknowledgement that errors were committed in regards to the Miskitus, noting the 
government “found an effective smokescreen with an extremely loyal and ideological 
following willing to buy into it.” However, the forced relocations, rapes, burning of 
villages, torturing, and arbitrary arrests “can hardly be passed off as mere mistakes.”64 
Wilkinson also expressed consternation with the idea that the NIYC was supporting the 
Contras or Reagan’s conservative politics, writing to one member that the Youth Council 
withheld support for Misursata at first because they “could not believe that a progressive 
government that we supported…could possibly have a policy that was so damaging to 
our people.”65 
Furthermore, the organization argued that none of the human rights reports that 
provided a basis for arguing issues in the region could not be trusted because of limited 
access to the region and an overall attitude of fear on part of many Indians to testify 
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against the Sandinistas.66 The document also countered claims that the Sandinistas had 
begun a ceasefire, implemented an autonomy program, and allowed Miskitus to return to 
the Río Coco region. The NIYC argued that the autonomy program was a program 
imposed from above that had little support from average Miskitus and had “little regard 
for traditional forms of Indian self-government which the Indian people of the Atlantic 
coast are seeking to regain.”67 On ability to return to the Río Coco region, the 
organization argued the policy weakened any ability of the Sandinistas to claim the 
forced relocations were meant to protect the Miskitus in the first place because fighting 
was still going on in the region when people began returning from relocation camps. 
Finally, and most importantly for the NIYC if it wanted to regain the support of its 
former liberal allies, the group argued that MISURASATA was not affiliated with the 
Contras, noting that President Daniel Ortega’s willingness to negotiate with the 
government was evidence that the Sandinistas in Managua understood the movement was 
about land, rather than ideology. 
The next major attempt to gain support for MISURASATA came in the latter half 
of 1985 and into 1986 and 1987 with the formation of the Pana Pana support 
organization. While Pana Pana, meaning “to help each other” in Miskitu, came out of 
conversations at the Working Group on Indigenous Populations in Geneva, Switzerland, 
during the summer of 1985, the organization was primarily the work of the Youth 
Council and extended their programs from the previous half decade. The group hoped to 
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raise $10,000 for a unity meeting of MISURASATA, MISURA, and the Indigenous 
Creole Council, but its main goal in the long-term appeared to be focused on publicity as 
evidenced by a memo that noted it would promote “a full range of public support 
activities, including preparing materials, organizing speaking engagements, letter writing 
campaigns, and other support activities requested by MISURASATA.”68 The initial 
mailing list for the organization, numbering just over 400 people and organizations, was 
largely geared towards an international audience, with a majority of the mailings sent to 
Europe along with Canada, Australia, and various countries in South America.69 
While Pana Pana produced one newsletter and various alert mailings during 1986 
and 1987, the response was minimal at best. In August 1987 an organizer provided 
statistics on requests for information that arose from various mailings and ad campaigns 
over the previous year. The initial mailing in fall of 1985 that went out to over 1000 
people brought in only twenty-three responses. Returns for other communications were 
roughly the same, with the fall 1986 newsletter receiving the most responses. While 
twenty-one people requested additional information (packets, videotapes, audio) only 
four provided contributions or allowed their name to be used in some capacity.70 The end 
result was no response from organizations it had hoped to use to build a network, only 
$400 in donations, and over $4000 in debts between expenses (that needed to be 
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reimbursed) and a loan from Cultural Survival.71 The Youth Council ultimately covered 
all of the expenditures, and Pana Pana itself was in no position to give direct aid to 
MISURASATA until the outreach efforts brought in more funds.72 The group never 
managed to achieve that goal. Two years after it began, Pana Pana produced a funding 
proposal that indicated it had “helped a little bit with funding of MISURASATA’s phone 
and travel expenses” but had “missed numerous opportunities to support 
MISURASATA” and operated on a budget of less than a $7,000. The group was largely 
focused on expanding its network, writing that it saw “Indian organizations, churches, 
moderate Democrat and Republican elected officials” as fertile ground for organizing in 
support of MISURASATA.73 As usual, the vast majority of expenses would go towards 
funding the publication of the newsletter, but the important facet of this new network was 
that Pana Pana, and by extension the Youth Council, had begun to see moderates rather 
than liberals and leftists as the biggest potential source of income for the movement. 
The role of church groups in the Nicaraguan campaign was a central complaint by 
both the NIYC and Native sovereignty expert Hank Adams, who travelled to Nicaragua 
with Russell Means and provided information to the NIYC. Writing in February 1986 
after returning from Nicaragua, Adams expanded on Wilkinson’s issues with liberal 
church groups by saying he knew many religious groups “place their faith and belief in 
another quarter, namely in the government of Nicaragua.” Adams noted he had been 
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allied with many of those people in the past, but now he felt that they had abandoned 
their moral positions for the convenient alliances of leftist politics. Adams asked his 
former allies, especially Christians, “Friends, sisters, brothers: Have none of you the 
decency left, in God’s Name, to ask your Sandinista friends, ‘Stop the bombing.’? Will 
none of you stand to demand of them, ‘End the War against the Miskito.’?”74 He went on 
to demand that the liberal churches, “Revert to [their] conscience and moral code; 
Restore your moral voice.”75 While Means moved towards libertarian politics and toured 
the country with the Moonies, Adams was the only activist to really endorse positions on 
par with those the Reagan administration articulated. In the typed diary of his trip to 
Nicaragua, Adams claimed the Sandinista “communists” were using a reign of terror to 
control the eastern coast and could resort to “a Cambodian model of blood-letting and 
decimation of the Miskito people,” and his first order of business upon returning would 
be to ensure the Miskitos save Central America from the communists.76 He made his 
position even clearer when he concluded the release by exclaiming, “Creating a 
communist hell of inhumanity and heartless horrors, the Sandinistas have extend their 
bombing schedule to Sundays….Misurasata…must be furnished all necessary armaments 
& weapons of defense – to halt the monstrous, maniacal, madness of Sandinista 
Marxists!!”77 
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75 Hank Adams, testimony on Nicaragua involvement, February 1986, NIYC Records, 
Box 22, Folder 1 
76 “Jungle diary of Hank Adams,” February 1986, NIYC Papers, Box 23, Folder 5, 2. 
77 Ibid., 4. 
	
174	 
Adams provides an interesting comparison to the other groups involved in 
Nicaragua because, unlike the others, he took a hardline position opposed to the 
Sandinistas, and many times positioned himself on the conservative end of the spectrum. 
In announcing a campaign to showcase photographs of issues documented during the trip 
to Nicaragua, Adams hoped the tour would involve churches across the country and a 
“continuing public prayer vigil” that he “promised the villagers who saved our lives 
would be undertaken in their behalf.” The use of prayer was obviously tied to the deep 
communal connections of the Moravian Church across the eastern provinces but also a 
way of pulling in groups that were heavily involved in the Nicaraguan discussion. As 
Christian Smith highlights, liberation theology was a critical facet of promoting the 
Sandinista revolution and merging Christian ideology with revolutionary politics. In 
addition to having a handful of Catholic priests serving in the Nicaraguan government, 
liberal U.S. Christians viewed the events in Nicaraguan as a guiding light and “an 
experiment and a sign of hope” in the process of reforming American society.78 Many of 
those church groups organized tours to Nicaragua to experience the new realities on the 
ground, and their experiences shaped opinions back in the United States, including 
responses to the Youth Council’s mailing. Jo Ellen Davis wrote to Wilkinson that some 
of her friends had gone to Nicaragua to learn the “real truth” and returned to tell her that 
mistakes had been made but the issues were being corrected.79 
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While the Youth Council devoted most of its international energies in the 1980s 
to Nicaragua, the involvement was not out of line for the group which increasingly saw 
international activism as the way forward. Jim Anaya, who was fluent in Spanish, made a 
number of fact-finding journeys to Latin America during the 1980s. Over the course of 
the decade he made trips to Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Guatemala. The Youth 
Council’s files include a number of detailed summaries of the visits, although many of 
them are less than complete because Anaya found himself getting bored with a number of 
the subjects interviewed. The Guatemala trip, carried out over two and a half weeks in 
1986, was one of the most expansive Anaya undertook. Underwritten by Cultural 
Survival, Inc., the trip included meetings with various Native representatives (including 
one Anaya and the other non-Native representatives on the trip suspiciously viewed as 
non-Native until they visited his community), along with governmental and non-native 
officials. While most of the information included in the archives is Anaya’s narratives 
and summaries of his fact-finding trips, they provide little indication of NIYC’s motives 
or recommendations for further actions. Nevertheless, the trips did prove fruitful for 
Indigenous people. In January 1987 the Inter-American Foundation provided just over 
sixty-nine thousand dollars to the Shuar Federation in Ecuador to continue land-titling 
efforts in the region. According to Chuck Kleymeyer, the IAF representative for Ecuador, 
a major factor in the IAF’s decision to extend additional funds to the organization was 
Anaya’s detailed reports from the region, a letter of support for the project, and his 
credentials as a lawyer for the Youth Council. 
For the Youth Council, and Ramiro Reynaga, a Bolivian activist and NIYC board 
member, the future of the organization at the end of the 1980s centered firmly on further 
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extending the organization’s involvement in the international arena. In addition to calling 
for additional support of “brother” Rivera through backing for whatever policies the 
Miskitus decided on, Reynaga saw the importance of an organizational doctrine of 
principles not only for Nicaragua but also for the Americas as a whole. This doctrine 
would not only ensure that native voices were heard in the western nation-state debates 
that tended to exclude indigenous voices, but it would also continue the process of 
building on concepts of “holistic” and “oneness” and what Reynaga saw as the inevitable 
decline of the nation-state overall. As Reynaga concluded, “Sooner or later we will not be 
able to afford the lack of our own ideological tool for freedom fight.”80 Finally, Reynaga 
also sought to move beyond Latin America. With the arrival of the five-hundredth 
anniversary of the conquest of the Americas, Reynaga saw fertile ground to cultivate 
alliances with European youths who felt “embarrassed by the ‘glorious deeds’ of their 
colonizer ancestors.” Reynaga also highlighted the possibility for solidarity with 
marginalized groups, particularly Andalusian and Catalan nationalists upset with Spain’s 
winning the 1992 Olympics and the World Exposition. 
 
Conclusion 
In 1990 the Sandinistas held open elections in Nicaragua that culminated in 
Daniel Ortega and the Sandinistas’ losing power to a collection of political parties, 
including former Contras. Within the eastern coast of Nicaragua, YATAMA, a 
combination of MISURASATA and Miskitu organizations headquartered in Honduras 
and Costa Rica won nearly half of the seats up for election, essentially splitting the seats 
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with the Sandinistas.81 While progressives despaired over the rise of a conservative 
government funded in large part by the U.S. Congress, Jim Anaya’s reporting for the 
Youth Council heralded the results, not only for YATAMA and its successes in 
comparison to the limited timeframe it had to organize but also the policies implemented 
by the new government of Violeta Chamorro. Chamorro authorized the creation of the 
Nicaraguan Institute for Development of the Autonomous Regions (INDERA) and 
appointed Rivera the head of the new cabinet level position. Anaya grouped the successes 
with the “winds of change” sweeping the globe during the fall of the Soviet Union and 
argued that while the new positions could be co-opted and exploited by the new 
government, Miskitus were now tasked with the new structures, “which are not of their 
own design, work for a future that is of their making.”82 
At the time of YATAMA’s rise to power, the NIYC was dealing with the passing 
of Wilkinson, who died a year earlier after a heart attack at the age of fifty.83 The 
Nicaraguan conflict, while the major issue for the organization, was a matter of confusion 
for those who took over running the group during the next decade. In a series of letters in 
1996, Vine Deloria, Jr. and Ned LaCroix, the new executive director, attempted to get to 
the root of Wilkinson’s desire to insert the organization into the Nicaraguan conflict. 
Deloria noted that during the 1980s he supported the Sandinistas because “I wanted one 
country that didn’t give a damn about taking orders from the American State Department 
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and the CIA.” The position led Deloria to get into arguments with Wilkinson and others 
because, according to Deloria, both “were straddling the fence in some weird manner that 
suggested they knew considerably more about the situation than they were letting on.”84 
In a follow-up letter, Deloria elaborated that “if you were paying attention to Indian 
affairs in the U.S., you didn’t have time to deal with events overseas. So where did Gerry 
get the background to understand this situation and know so much detail about it?”85 The 
matter, was largely left at that, with the biggest segment of the organization’s activity for 
the last decade as a confusing question of loyalties both politically and to Indians in the 
United States. 
Richard Nixon once told Donald Rumsfeld that Central America “doesn’t matter. 
Long as we’ve been in it, people don’t give one damn about Central America.” But for 
Native American activists, along with the United States as a whole, Central America in 
the 1980s could not have been more important.86 Activists from across the spectrum 
overwhelmingly agreed on basic principles: the importance of solidarity across 
international boundaries, the significance of upholding sovereignty for indigenous groups 
in Nicaragua, and the need for the success of the Sandinista revolution. Yet, throughout 
the decade, groups and individuals failed to agree on how this could best be 
accomplished. While the Youth Council, Russell Means, and Hank Adams aligned 
themselves with more conservative elements and argued for unwavering support of 
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MISURASATA and a hardline towards the Sandinistas, they found themselves ridiculed 
by many others in the United States. Given the basic fact that both sides agreed on the 
underlying principles, it seems that the differences could have been handled without a 
protracted and contentious debate. However, the clash of personalities that had long 
dominated the Indian Movement in the United States ensured that what could have been a 
simple problem would turn into an issue and that would divide the organizations for years 
to come. While Nicaragua took a conservative turn after the Sandinistas lost power in the 
1990 elections, in large part thanks to YATAMA and Miskitu support, the Youth Council 
receded from public view, and AIM would find itself split into numerous new 
autonomous chapters, each of which would claim to be the rightful heir to the legacies of 












1992 marked the quincentennial of Christopher Columbus’s arrival in the 
Americas and the anniversary was meet with widespread demonstrations by Indigenous 
peoples across the western hemisphere. The Los Angeles Times, writing on the events in 
Latin America, stated, “never has so much publicity been given to so many meetings, 
manifestos, protests, and demands by native peoples in the former New World colonies 
of Spain and Portugal.”1 While the paper and some activists felt the protests had caused a 
lot of noise and little action, 1992 witnessed the Organization of American States drafting 
a declaration of Indigenous rights, the creation of a development fund for Indigenous 
peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Earth Summit that saw world 
leaders endorse support for Indigenous cultures and identities. The United Nations 
furthermore proclaimed 1993 to be the International Year for the World’s Indigenous 
Peoples. Speaking at the opening ceremonies inaugurating the year of indigenous 
peoples, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali heralded the “welcome 
change…taking place at national and international levels” that witnessed Indigenous 
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peoples becoming “active in seeking improvements in their situations.”2 The opening 
ceremonies witnessed ceremonial prayers followed by testimonies by over twenty 
speakers, opening a year that sought to expand the international understanding of Native 
issues.3 
While 1992 and 1993 marked a “boom time” for public understanding of native 
issues according to the Los Angeles Times, the following year witnessed the United 
States’ most well-known native activist group tearing itself in two as competing factions 
sought to control the direction of the American Indian Movement. Thirty years after the 
occupation of Wounded Knee and a decade after cracks began to show over the conflict 
in Nicaragua, the 1990s saw AIM supporters split into the National American Indian 
Movement headquartered in Minneapolis and the AIM-International Confederation of 
Autonomous Chapters based in Denver. Members of both factions at first attempted to 
keep the conflict internal, but the schism spilled into the open and played out both in the 
pages of News from Indian Country, the leading native news source in the United States, 
and a public tribunal in March 1994 organized by the Colorado faction to try Clyde and 
Vernon Bellecourt for alleged crimes against the movement. While much of the conflict 
was fueled by the large personalities of its participants, the proceedings during the early 
1990s both bring to an end the division created by the Nicaraguan conflict and highlight 
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how AIM and activism found itself caught up in many of the debates in Indian Country 
about the nature of what it meant to be Indian during the period. 
The tribunal in 1994 arose, in part, because of AIM’s decentralized organizational 
structure. Following Wounded Knee, the group had various national directors, including 
Dennis Banks and John Trudell, who had run the Indians of All Tribes radio station 
during the occupation of Alcatraz. However, after Trudell’s wife and three children died 
in a house fire that many claimed was politically motivated, the national director position 
was eliminated for the safety of whomever was in the position and to make it harder to 
destroy the organization through arrests and surveillance. Yet, while AIM members 
regularly proclaimed that the organization did not have a national structure after 1979, the 
group still operated as a single entity. A history of the group in the early 1980s outlined 
various issues of focus in the new decade ranging from the international to the regional 
and local level. The latter included further strengthening of local chapters, all of which, 
the document noted, “must be approved by the National General Council.”4 At the same 
time, the IITC broke away from the movement, operating on its own, albeit with the 
cross-over of various activists. Yet, for many it remained the international arm of AIM. 
While AIM had its internal issues throughout the 1980s, it still remained a 
divisive organization for many American Indians, especially older, more traditional 
groups. Furthermore, while AIM sought to create a pan-Indian alliance that incorporated 
all tribal nations, there remained considerable skepticism about the abilities of the 
organization’s perceived leaders. When Dennis Banks ended his self-imposed exile in the 
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mid-1980s and surrendered to authorities in South Dakota for the charges that arose from 
the occupation of Wounded Knee, one “full-blooded Minneconjou woman” was quoted 
as saying, “…send that rice-eater Banks back to Minnesota.” In addition, the woman 
added about the legal proceeding related to Native prisoner Leonard Peltier, “Who gives 
a damn about Peltier?”5 Others expressed issues with AIM’s alleged disrespect and antics 
that they saw as inappropriate for a native rights movement, “When AIM first started we 
were all for it.…But then those AIMsters starting mistreating our young students. Russell 
Means dropped the flag a woman had given him that had covered the coffin of her son 
killed in Vietnam. If they got new leadership we might listen to them.”6 An unsigned 
chronicle of the events in 1984 concluded by saying that even though AIM had been 
around for close to twenty years, by the mid-1980s, “AIM was still struggling in its 
original and awkward way towards understanding the true Indian Way, the correct path of 
The Red Road. It was no longer infantile but it was perhaps still adolescent.”7 
Various attempts were made during the 1980s to construct a more defined 
movement. Significantly, in 1987 various members of AIM convened a meeting in 
Colorado under the organization of the Colorado AIM branch to address the future 
structure of the movement and re-constitute a national AIM. The group concluded AIM 
would have a national structure centered around an Elder’s Council, with a National 
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Governing Council serving as the executive branch under the guidance of the Elder’s 
Council. From there, AIM would be broken up into various regional chapters and then 
further into individual local chapters. The group also unanimously decided that the new 
AIM governing body needed to reconstitute and recognize the local AIM chapters “on a 
formal basis.”8 While some of the changes appear to be part of AIM’s attempt to claim 
responsibility for things that had previously been present, the meeting highlighted the 
growing divide within AIM. The report of the proceedings noted that the changes would 
allow the new group to address the perceived issues that had lead AIM to stray from its 
original goals. The group explicitly pointed to six major issues: 
A default on leadership marked by the development of personality cults and ego 
tripping. 
The widespread use of alcohol and drugs (as well as sales of drugs) among many 
AIM members at all levels. 
Failure to communicate with grassroots people. 
Support of nation-state governments at the direct expense of Indian nations. 
Adoption of non-Indian ideologies. 
Leftwing type factionalism by expulsions of members and the public airing of 
differences.9 
While many found it ironic that Russell Means would endorse a proposal that labelled 
ego-tripping a problem, the second half of the list is particularly important to note. Bill 
Means attended the meeting and listed himself as representing Minneapolis and the IITC, 
but the issues have the clear mark of AIM’s Colorado chapter. Even though the debate 
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over the Miskitus is not explicitly mentioned, the document, which is marked for internal 
use only, opened with a quote from Nicaragua Indians that read, “Only Indians help 
Indians.” The division, however, was readily apparent in the group demanding that the 
IITC “must be returned to their proper role within AIM, under direction of the Elders 
Circle and National Governing Council.” Calling it “the highest priority,” the new AIM 
sought to return the IITC to being “the international diplomatic arm of the American 
Indian Movement.” Even though the document applauds the “excellent” work of the 
IITC, it lays out that until the IITC is re-incorporated within AIM, “no further actions, 
international delegations and the like by IITC will be recognized as reflecting the 
positions and interests of AIM.”10 Given the position of Colorado AIM versus the Treaty 
Council’s early embrace of the the Sandinistas, it seems as if Colorado AIM were 
attempting to shift the movement towards their view of the decade’s events. 
Tensions between the competing factions in Colorado and Minneapolis would 
continue to rise throughout the next half decade, with both sides claiming the other 
sought to undermine the movement and co-opt it for its own purposes. The end result was 
a tribunal publicly by the Autonomous AIM chapters but largely spearheaded by 
Colorado AIM and members close to Russell Means and Ward Churchill. The new group 
wrote up a twenty-eight-page indictment that laid out eight “crimes against the 
organization” committed by Vernon and Clyde Bellecourt. The charges ranged from 
misappropriation of funds and drug use to subversion of the movement and complicity in 
genocide and high treason. The main points of criticism against both Bellecourt brothers 
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centered on their views on Nicaragua and their criticism of Ward Churchill. The eight 
charges included seventy-one evidentiary points for Vernon and twenty-six for Clyde. 
For both brothers, issues related to Churchill and Nicaragua were the most cited; 
Vernon’s indictment including twelve points related to Churchill and thirteen related to 
Nicaragua. While Clyde’s had only one mention of Churchill, six of the twenty-six points 
related to Nicaragua. As a whole, the two issues accounted for thirty-five percent of the 
criticism against Vernon and twenty-seven against Clyde. While neither constituted a 
majority, it is impossible to read the indictment documents written for the tribunal and 
not interpret them as a referendum on AIM’s position on Nicaragua and the role of 
Churchill within the movement.11 
Ward Churchill had been involved in various aspects of native activism, 
particularly with the Denver AIM chapter, since the 1970s and served as a professor at 
the University of Colorado-Boulder. At various times he has claimed Cherokee, Creek, 
and Métis ancestry and noted his enrolled status with the United Keetoowah Band of 
Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma. Neither the Cherokee nor Creek Nations have Churchill 
listed on their tribal rolls, and the Keetoowah Band stated in 2005 that Churchill’s 
enrollment in the tribe was an “honorary associate membership” and did not denote 
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enrollment in the tribe.12 Churchill received considerable support during the period when 
his ancestry was questioned, and many supporters dismissed the charges as ridiculous.13 
Furthermore, one letter to the editor printed in NFIC argued that the term “wannabe” did 
not have to be a negative one. J.D Whitney wrote that while a wannabe could be involved 
in “cultural imperialism that appropriates Native traditions and spirituality,” it could also 
mean, in their view, “living a life committed to social justice, multi-cultural survival and 
integrity, and the active defense of Native Peoples rights to self-determination.” Whitney 
does not provide a note on their background but concludes the letter by noting that if 
being a “wannabe” meant learning from Native Americans how “to live honorably, 
carefully, and intelligently in the place we call North America-then, yes, I’ll be a 
wannabe.”14 
Ward Churchill’s alleged Indian ancestry became a center-piece of the criticism 
against the Colorado AIM chapter and reflected a larger movement among Native 
Americans to challenge perceived “wannabee” Indians that began in earnest in the 1980s 
with guidance from Cherokee Principal Chief Wilma Mankiller. As Mark Edwin Miller 
documents in Claiming Tribal Identity, the second half of the twentieth century saw a 
rapid rise in self-proclaimed tribes claiming indigenous ancestry, with a large minority of 
those alleging some connection to one or more of the five major tribal nations removed to 
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present-day Oklahoma during the Removal Era.15 Part of the larger ethnic revival during 
the twentieth century, the rise of these new groups seemingly added credence to claims 
by conservative American Indians that AIM and other urban indigenous groups to appear 
in the 1960s were not actually Native Americans. During the 1960s Cherokee Principal 
Chief W.W. Keeler and Cherokee Nation attorney Earl Boyd Pierce saw the new 
movements as a threat to traditional tribal governments and lumped both unrecognized 
tribes and activist organizations together as illegitimate Native entities in a campaign to 
undermine their position in Indian Country.16 
The Churchill issue would surface thorough-out the lead up to the tribunal. Robert 
Robideau took the lead on much of the planning for the 1994 tribunal, including reaching 
out to Native journalists and members of the American Indian community in Minneapolis 
to build a case against the Bellecourts. In addition, Robideau tried to gain support for the 
proceedings from individuals and tribes that were ambivalent about the entire process and 
the threat of further division within the movement. The calls and discussions were, at 
times, contentious and difficult. In one particular incident at the beginning of March 
1994, Robideau had a prolonged conversation with Billy Tayac, the hereditary chief of 
the Piscataway Indian Nation, a state-recognized tribe in Maryland, and a leader of 
indigenous activism in the Washington, D.C. area. The conversation centered upon 
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Tayac’s desire to remain neutral in the entire AIM Tribunal affair, arguing that the whole 
process was simply going to create additional division. Tayac stated, “I am not against 
anybody but what we are trying to do is get some kind of unity man!”17 The Autonomous 
AIM group dismissed the idea that the proceedings as harmful because the group needed 
to remove those who posed a threat to the movement. Writing in a frequently asked 
questions, the chapters argued “within our midst there have always been traitors. There 
have always been those who would sell the birthright of our children and 
grandchildren…so-called leaders who ‘touched the pen’ with the Europeans.” 
Furthermore the group claimed they needed to use a western-style tribunal because “the 
defendants had embraced European values so thoroughly in their actions…that the 
consequences of a Western-style Tribunal would be clearer to them than would an 
indigenous forum.”18 
As the conversation grew increasingly heated, with Robideau demanding Tayac 
take a side, and then claiming he had taken a side by not disowning the Minneapolis 
group, Mark Tayac joined the conversation and returned to a point Billy Tayac had only 
passingly mentioned at the start of the call: Ward Churchill. Mark noted that one of the 
biggest issues the Piscataway Tribe saw was the rise of “a lot of non-Indians posing as 
Indian people to get benefits. There is an Indian commission here and 7 out of 9 people 
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are people posing as Indian people.”19 When Robideau asked how this related to their 
refusal to support the tribunal, Tayac made the point clear that there were concerns that 
Ward Churchill and Glenn Morris were not Indians and the issue needed to be put out in 
the open and resolved.20 While Robideau called the issue an “illusion” and a distraction 
from the main point of Minneapolis AIM’s claiming to represent the movement as a 
whole, the issue of “wannabee Indians” were a serious concern for many Native 
Americans during the 1980s and 1990s. The fact that the criticism came from a group of 
non-federally recognized Native Americans makes the issue even more important. 
David Bradley, who served as a vice-president of the Native American Artists 
Association, argues in “The Columbus Syndrome and Ward Churchill, Chief of the 
Wannabes: A Tribe of the Master Race” that the rise of alleged American Indians 
threatened to drown out legitimate tribal members from both political and cultural 
discussions, especially those surrounding the 1992 anniversary of Columbus’s arrival in 
the Americas. The process of exclusion, which he termed the Columbus Syndrome, was 
“a very serious battle in the new high-tech business of cultural genocide,” and like a 
virus, it was unleashed on Native Americans from the inside and threatened to confuse 
everyone about who the legitimate voices for Indigenous issues were. In addition to 
Churchill, Bradley noted that both Jimmie Durham and Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz had 
claimed Indigenous heritage but were “whites” masquerading as Native Americans. 
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Bradley dismissed all the claims and noted that just because many people may be able to 
find some Indigenous heritage in their family tree, it did not make the United States a 
nation of Indians. Furthermore, the rise of romanticized Indians in Hollywood pictures 
such as Thunderheart and Dances With Wolves meant “any pseudo-Indian white 
person…can now open their own neighborhood chapter of AIM and call themselves ‘co-
director’.”21 Additionally, Bradley dismissed the counter-argument by Churchill that his 
non-enrolled status could not be held against him because Leonard Peltier, AIM’s most 
well-known political prisoner, was also not an enrolled member. Peltier’s tribal 
background was easily identifiable; the background of Churchill, Dunbar-Ortiz, and 
Durham were not.22 
Bradley’s letter, which originally appeared in the Leonard Peltier Defense 
Committee (LPDC) Newsletter, prompted Ward Churchill to write a fiery letter to Peltier 
stating he was resigning from the organization for the “sheer political stupidity” of 
allowing the letter to be printed. He noted that it did more to discredit the LPDC than 
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Documentary that covered the Leonard Peltier situation, it had loose connections to the events on 
Pine Ridge over the preceding two decades. 
22 Dunbar-Ortiz it should be noted is open about her heritage, writing in her memoirs that 
the heritage is difficult to trace. According to her she was encouraged to embrace her heritage by 
Wallace “Mad Bear” Anderson, a Tuscarora activist, in the early 1970s after the occupation of 
Alcatraz, although she did not begin to fully proclaim an indigenous identity until after Wounded 
Knee. Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, Blood on the Border: A Memoir of the Contra War, Oklahoma 
paperback edition (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016), 15. Durham has maintained he 
is Cherokee and “many Cherokees are not registered. My family didn’t even think about 
registering,” and mirroring Churchill in calling the enrollment process a “tool of apartheid.” “The 
Artist Jimmie Durham: A Long Time Gone, but Welcomed Back,” New York Times, March 10, 
2017. Accessed from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/arts/design/the-artist-jimmie-durham-
a-long-time-gone-but-welcomed-back.html (Accessed on July 22, 2017). 
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Churchill himself, who allegedly had a copious amount of support from both Colorado-
AIM and various other AIM members and Wounded Knee veterans. In Churchill’s 
telling, the entire campaign to discredit him was nothing more than a conspiracy by 
Vernon Bellecourt arising from the Miskitu/Sandinista conflict in the 1980s in which “the 
Sandinistas and several white leftist organizations up here in the States were paying ol’ 
Vern to side against the Indians down south.”23 
A year before the 1994 tribunal, AIM-Minneapolis formally endorsed its 
opposition to Churchill’s presence as a Native activist. The group coordinated the 
twentieth-fifth anniversary meeting of the American Indian Movement in Mankato, 
Minnesota, that saw participation of up to 17,000 Native and non-Native supporters, 
according to organizers. Minneapolis’s AIM leaders noted in response to the tribunal that 
one of the main points of discussion at the anniversary gathering was the need to address 
the “wrath” of imposter Indians. While these “shake and bake shamans, phony medicine 
men and women, artists, writers, and self-proclaimed ‘AIM leaders’” may have adopted 
their identities out of “romanticism, self grandeur, exploitation, [or] greed,” the group 
also claimed it could be part of more coordinated and covert campaigns by the FBI and 
other government agencies to disrupt the movement.24 The Minneapolis letter went on to 
say that Ward Churchill and Glenn Morris were the two members who most fit the 
description of these fake Indians; Churchill responded that the attacks were part of a 
																																																								
23 Ward Churchill letter to Leonard Peltier, February 1, 1993, reprinted in News from 
Indian Country, Late July 1994. 
24 “National AIM office says two don’t represent movement,” News from Indian Country, 
Late December 1993. 
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“racial purity crusade” and amounted to “racial cleansing.”25 While opposition to federal 
recognition is a complicated affair, Churchill’s position was extreme and at times 
bordered on violent Mark Edwin Miller noted Churchill had been known to threaten 
those who questioned his tribal affiliations.26 
In addition to attempts to push Churchill and others out, the charges against the 
Bellecourt brothers included a litany of complaints which can be grouped almost entirely 
under the fact that they allegedly had a much closer relationship with the U.S. federal 
government than the confederated AIM members believed was warranted. The 
indictment claimed the brothers took federal money and received funds from corporations 
such as Honeywell, that went towards the Little Earth housing project, a violation of AIM 
policies dating back to 1972. More critically, however, the Bellecourts were accused of 
supporting the Native American Free Exercise of Religion Act (the American Indians 
Religious Freedoms Act) and the Indian Arts and Crafts Act. Many American Indians and 
activists within AIM heralded the passage of the Religious Freedoms Act in 1978 as a 
marquee movement and a sign of AIM’s contributions to indigenous rights. Yet, both that 
act and the Arts and Crafts Act restricted themselves to federally acknowledged tribes, 
which, as noted, was a point of contention for people like Ward Churchill. In particular 
the Arts and Crafts Act has received criticism from members of non-recognized tribes as 
well as artists who were not formally enrolled in any tribe because the law made it a 
crime to market art as Native American if the artist was not enrolled in a federally 
																																																								
25 Ibid. 
26 Miller, Claiming Tribal Identity, 294. 
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recognized tribe.27 For activists like Churchill, the act was less of an attempt to protest 
American Indians that further erase them from the cultural landscape by having non-
natives in the government decide who was and was not able to be American Indian. 
The issues over Ward Churchill and Indigenous identity were deeply connected to 
his support for the Miskitus in Nicaragua and his (and Colorado AIM as whole) 
opposition to the Sandinistas. As a result, the International Indian Treaty Council played 
a significant role in the 1994 proceedings. The indictment claimed the Bellecourts had 
regularly attempted to subvert and destroy the movement. In one instance the indictment 
claimed the IITC had the support of the Ba’ath Socialist Party in Iraq in the early 1980s, 
but after Vernon came out in support of the Iranian government, the Ba’ath withdrew 
support, undermining both the IITC’s finances and reputation.28 
While the IITC, while classified as part of AIM by some, and a major subsection 
of the issues related to the schism, choose to remain neutral in the entire tribunal affair. 
The IITC did, however, write a letter to tribunal organizers right before the proceedings 
in March 1994 to note what they perceived as “significant misstatements” within the 
indictment that related to the Bellecourts’ alleged subversion of the Treaty Council. The 
IITC argued that Autonomous AIM’s assertions of being co-opted or undermined were 
false, providing a page of events the IITC had taken part in recently to highlight their 
																																																								
27 “Split in AIM leads to Charges,” News from Indian Country, Mid January 1994. 
28 “International Confederation of Autonomous Chapters of the American Indian 
Movement v. Vernon Bellecourt and Clyde Bellecourt: Indictment and Statement of Charges,” 
Robert Robideau Papers, Box 19, Folder 29. It should be noted during the Iranian hostage crisis 
AIM had organized mail delivery for the hostages, which Means attributed to the successes of the 
IITC, the Geneva conference, and the alliance the organization had with the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization. Russell Means and Marvin J Wolf, Where White Men Fear to Tread: 
The Autobiography of Russell Means (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 399. 
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significance to the international indigenous community. In contrast the group noted that 
the tribunal was primarily an “internal affair,” and the event would have “very little 
consequence internationally for Indigenous peoples and very little bearing on the respect 
and ongoing work of IITC overall,” although they did note some European groups had 
begun to take part in the debate. Furthermore, the IITC argued issues like Nicaragua were 
matters of opinion rather than facts, and “to state them as indisputable fact only serves to 
prolong painful and basically unresolvable differences of opinion. For what good purpose 
we are not sure, so we will refrain.”29 
The tribunal itself took place in Oakland, California with roughly fifty people in 
attendance. Vernon refused to attend, arguing the entire event had no legitimate purpose 
and did not want to give support to the idea. Clyde called the tribunal a “joke” and 
claimed that AIM chapters in Ohio, Virginia, Florida, and Montana (which were all 
incorporated and officially recognized by National AIM in Minneapolis) told the 
Bellecourts they had not signed onto the tribunal charges or been involved with it in any 
way, but nevertheless attended in the hopes of working out a compromise.30 However, 
Clyde’s appearance ended shortly after he attempted to offer a pipe ceremony, after 
which he claims Russell Means became irate. After informing Means, “We don’t want 
you. We don’t want you in the Movement,” Bellecourt and his supporters left the 
																																																								
29 “Re: Tribunal Indictment,” International Indian Treaty Council to The Organizers, 
Judges, and Participants in the “AIM Autonomous Chapters Tribunal,” March 21, 1994. 




proceedings.31 Following Bellecourt’s appearance at the tribunal, Minneapolis AIM 
released a statement that the whole proceeding was nothing more than a “bizarre case” 
put forward by “con artists, ex-cons and non-Indians who know little or nothing about the 
needs of American Indians. This tribunal is ridiculous.”32 
In addition to Clyde’s claims that the opening prayer became contentious, the 
tribunal ended with a confrontation between Andrea Jaimes, a professor at Colorado, and 
Carole Standing Elk, a supporter of Minneapolis AIM who showed up to the tribunal 
press conference to distribute literature in support of the Bellecourts. The confrontation 
ended with Jaimes and a police officer covered in coffee and competing claims by 
Churchill and Standing Elk that the other had spat on them during the incident.33 
Furthermore, archival documents include hand-written flyers attacking both Clyde 
Bellecourt and Floyd Red Crow Westerman, a prominent Indigenous recording artist and 
AIM member supportive of Minneapolis AIM. The flyers (Figure Three) embrace ideas 
circulated by the Autonomous AIM chapters that the Bellecourts and their supporters 
were using the movement for their own benefit. Westerman’s poster including his 
photograph and the caption: “Look new Teeth!” Minneapolis AIM and Clyde Bellecourt 
responded that it was Russell Means who had sold out the movement, using his fame 
within it to gain publicity for various presidential campaigns and movie roles, including 
																																																								
31 Clyde H. Bellecourt and Jon Lurie, The Thunder Before the Storm: The Autobiography 
of Clyde Bellecourt (Saint Paul, MN: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 2016), 285. 
32 “American Indian Movement Frauds Present Bizarre Case at Mock ‘Tribunal’,” 
Robideau Papers, Box 19, Folder 28. 




many that Bellecourt claimed only enhanced native stereotypes Means said he was 
opposed to.34 
 
Figure 3: Flyers circulated during 1994 AIM Tribunal (Robideau Papers) 
The tribunal proceedings would continue to linger through the rest of the decade, 
with both sides continuing to accuse the other of various things over time. AIM did not 
end in 1994, but it was certainly much diminished afterwards. Furthermore, in contrast to 
the vibrancy of the 1992 celebrations, 1994 overshadowed many of the issues Native 
American activists sought to solve. In a prophetic statement Dennis Banks told News 
from Indian Country that he wanted no part in the tribunal proceedings because “That’s 
not what I perceive as solving problems for Indian people.” He went on to argue that, 
“When people look at it 20, 30 years from now and say ‘What were the big issues?’ 
																																																								
34 ibid., 285. Bellecourt pointed in particular to 1994’s Natural Born Killers, Oliver 
Stone’s movie about two mass murders in which Means has a small role as an old Navajo who is 
shot by the main characters while performing a native ceremony. 
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Fishing rights, sovereignty, some people having a paper war.”35 Now, nearly twenty-five 
years later Banks’ statement is pretty accurate. AIM in the 1990s was certainly focused 
on various issues at the local level, but at least as far as most people knew, the AIM of 
1994 was squabbling amongst each other about who was Native American and who had a 
right to lead and guide the movement. As commentators noted at the time, little good 
would come out of the whole affair, and it would fundamentally undermine the 
effectiveness of the movement beyond that period. While Clyde Bellecourt is correct in 
noting that AIM is still around and that he has been doing the hard work within his 
community, in many respects the paper wars of the mid-1990s were the closing chapter 
for the movement that had begun as a community patrol twenty-five years earlier in 
Minneapolis.
																																																								











“[People] like to think the American Indian Movement rolled over after 1973, that 
Wounded Knee was our final act, after which AIM ceased to exist. I’d like to take them 
on a tour of Minneapolis and St. Paul and show them all the beautiful things we’ve 
developed here since Wounded Knee.” 1 - Clyde Bellecourt 
While the 1990s marked a defined end for an era of the American Indian Movement, 
Clyde Bellecourt’s invitation to tour the Twin Cities and see what AIM is still up to in the 
twentieth-first century provides a counter to the idea that AIM completely disappeared in 
the decades that followed Wounded Knee. The American Indian Movement started out as 
the small band of activists that sought to counter rampart police brutality and improve the 
daily lives of the city’s urban Indigenous population and even though AIM always 
remained rooted in the local community around Franklin Avenue, in the twenty-first 
century it has decidedly returned home as Bellecourt and the other activists who founded 
it have become elders within their communities. Yet the international engagement that 
AIM helped promote in the years that followed Wounded Knee continues. 
In 2007, thirty years after the Indigenous Peoples conference in Geneva, the United 
Nations overwhelmingly passed the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP). The non-binding resolution endorsed the human rights of Indigenous peoples, 
																																																								
1 Clyde H. Bellecourt and Jon Lurie, The Thunder Before the Storm: The Autobiography 
of Clyde Bellecourt (Saint Paul, MN: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 2016), 315. 
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supported indigenous autonomy and sovereignty, and endorsed the significance of 
upholding treaties between Indigenous peoples and nation-states.2 A marque moment in 
Indigenous history, the resolution represented “the dynamic development of international 
legal norms and reflect the commitment of states to move in certain directions, abiding by 
certain principles.”3 While UNDRIP passed with 144 votes, the United States, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand—all countries with difficult Indigenous histories—voted 
against the resolution; however, in subsequent years, the four have endorsed the 
resolution to various degrees.4 Nevertheless, UNDRIP still has its issues. The resolution 
fails to define indigeneity and skirts recognition of complete Indigenous self-government, 
thus it “redefined indigenous nations into citizens and ethnic groups” and sought to 
“enable the participation of indigenous peoples within new and emerging possibilities of 
democratic multiculturalism.”5 As legal scholar Duane Champagne argues, multicultural 
nation-states, while a significant improvement, cannot fully account for the needs of 
Indigenous peoples, who “want to participate in the world and the nation-state, but they 
																																																								
2 United Nations, General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. A/ 61/295 (12 September 2007), available from 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf (Accessed on July 15, 2018) 
3	“Frequently Asked Questions: Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” 
available from https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/FAQsindigenousdeclaration.pdf 
(Accessed on July 15, 2018)	
4	In addition, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, 
Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa and Ukraine abstained from voting on the resolution at the 
time. 	
5 Duane Champagne, “UNDRIP (United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples): Human, Civil, and Indigenous Rights in Wicazo Sa Review 28 (Spring 2013), 11, 18. 
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want to do so informed by their own histories, cultures, and interests.”6 As such, like 
Wounded Knee for AIM, UNDRIP marked no an ending point, but a beginning to apply 
these new norms to daily life for Indigenous peoples. 
This new era of history played out over the course of this dissertation and in many 
respects influenced its direction. In particular, the Idle No More and Dakota Access 
Pipeline protests have highlighted both a new generation of activism, the limitations of 
the current relationships between Indigenous peoples and nation-states, and the 
international connections that continue to propel the movements. In 2012, Canadian 
Indigenous activists formed the Idle No More movement in response to proposed policies 
by the Conservative-led government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper. The movement 
gained additional attention when Attawapiskat Chief Theresa Spence went on a hunger-
strike in an attempt to get a meeting with Harper over the proposed policies. The 
movement spread not only spread across Canada’s First Nations communities, but it also 
filtered around the world with solidarity protests among Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
activists extending south to the United States, including in Minneapolis. While the 
protests were led by a younger generation of activists, Clyde Bellecourt made an 
appearance and promptly got arrested; the video footage of the incident quickly spread 
around the Internet.7  
While Clyde was not involved in coordinating the protest, his appearance allegedly 
prompted the Minneapolis police department to break up the gathering, ordering 
																																																								
6 Ibid., 18. 
7 “Indian Activist Clyde Bellecourt arrested after protest,” Minneapolis StarTribune, 
December 27, 2012. Accessed from www.startribune.com/indian-activist-clyde-bellecourt-
arrested-after-protest/184762151/ (Accessed on May 25, 2018). 
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Bellecourt to take it under control because he was “the big chief.”8 Bellecourt, now an 
elder suffering from various medical problems, still remained a respected and 
acknowledged leader of Indigenous activism in Minneapolis’s native community. 
Although he remained connected to much of it, however, activism had now moved 
beyond the American Indian Movement and the old activist organizations of the 
preceding century. 
Four years later in 2016, the United States witnessed further protests in North 
Dakota over the Dakota Access Pipeline, which sought to transport oil from the tar sands 
of Canada to refineries in the United States; it would cross land on the Standing Rock 
Reservation after residents of Bismarck objected to the pipeline crossing north of the 
capital city. Organizer LaDonna Brave Bull Allard, writing in Yes! Magazine, noted that 
the proposed route for the pipeline would cross sacred grounds on the reservation and 
threaten twenty-six archaeologically significant sites.9 The resulting protests, grouped 
under the #NODAPL hashtag, drew representatives from over three-hundred federally 
recognized tribes to the Sacred Stone Camp and various other offshoots that also included 
upwards of 3,000 allies and supporters.10 While the pipeline was ultimately completed 
																																																								
8 Clyde H. Bellecourt and Jon Lurie, The Thunder Before the Storm: The Autobiography 
of Clyde Bellecourt (Saint Paul, MN: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 2016), 291. 
9 “Why the Founder of Standing Rock Sioux Camp Can’t Forget the Whitestone 
Massacre,” Yes! Magazine, September 3, 2016. Accessed from 
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and turned online following the election of Donald Trump, the protest was the largest 
Indigenous protest since the AIM protests of the 1970s. Groups like Rezpect Our Water 
and the International Indigenous Youth Council, both created and run by a new 
generation of Native activists, provided another sign of the vibrancy and power of 
Indigenous activism into the twentieth-first century.11 
Both Idle No More and the Dakota Access protests played out over the course of 
working on this dissertation. At the same time over the last half decade, those activists 
who took lead the Red Power Era and served as the figureheads for activism of that 
period have begun to pass away. Among the well-known people to pass on are Dennis 
Banks, Russell Means, John Trudell, as well as activists such as Carter Camp, an 
Oklahoma AIM member and Wounded Knee occupier, and Lehman Brightman, a Bay 
Area activist who founded United Native Americans and took part in various 
occupations. Many more who were not well-known have undoubtedly also walked on. 
There remains a wealth of material and histories that still need to be covered in the 
period following Wounded Knee. The connections between U.S.-based activists and 
Canada remains understudied, and the involvement and interplay of groups ranging from 
the Indigenous-led World Council of Indigenous Peoples as well as non-Native 
organizations such as Cultural Survival needs further study and incorporation into the 
narrative. Likewise, the connections and impacts of these international activities to local 
communities remains undocumented as does a more comprehensive bottom-up 
accounting of the American Indian Movement and native activism in the latter-half of the 
																																																								




twentieth-century. It was true when this dissertation began and it remains true at its 
conclusion that we still do not possess a full accounting of the history of this period as it 
relates to those who took part below the level of the major national figureheads.12 
 While there remains history to be written, the events chronicled here showcase 
how indigenous activists attempted to work themselves into the political frameworks of 
the second half of the twentieth-century and construct an indigenous space for political 
discourse that sought to re-write traditional narratives that promoted integration of native 
issues into the politics of various nation-states. In response, activists worked around the 
margins to counter traditional ideas of what constituted a nation and re-enforce the idea 
that Native Americans not only had parallels to indigenous and liberation movements 
around the world but also that Native Americans were not objects of history books, but a 
viable political presence on both the national and international level. While uneven and 
jagged, those discussions continue today.
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